State of Iowa v. Alston Ray Campbell ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-0558
Filed April 16, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALSTON RAY CAMPBELL
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lawrence P.
McLellan, Judge.
Alston Ray Campbell appeals his conviction for operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated, first offense. AFFIRMED.
Andrea K. Buffington of Ranes Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and James Hathaway, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
2
BOWER, J.
Alston Ray Campbell appeals his conviction for operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated, first offense. He contends the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress. We find the information given by a known informant was
sufficiently credible to justify the stop of his vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On September 15, 2012, April Muir was at a gas station in Altoona when
her vehicle was nearly struck by a red minivan driven by Alston Campbell. Muir
dialed 911 and spoke with the police, informing them of her belief Campbell was
intoxicated.1 She provided an accurate description of Campbell, his vehicle, the
license plate number, and remained on the phone until an officer arrived to
investigate. Muir left after speaking with the officer.
Upon arrival, Campbell’s vehicle was located and Officer Chambers
activated his squad car’s emergency lights. Campbell drove across the parking
lot, stopped in front of the store, and exited his vehicle. Upon approaching
Campbell the officer noticed a strong smell of an alcoholic beverage coming from
Campbell and other signs of intoxication. Campbell later provided a breath test
showing a blood alcohol concentration of .195, well above the legal limit.
Campbell moved to suppress the results of the stop, claiming a violation of his
rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
1, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. The district court denied the motion and
Campbell was later found guilty by a jury.
1
Muir was employed as a bartender at the time and is familiar with signs of intoxication.
3
II. Standard of Review
We review issues of constitutional rights, such as search and seizure, de
novo. State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Iowa 2013).
III. Discussion
Campbell claims the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him
based upon the citizen informant’s tip. He primarily relies upon our supreme
court’s recent decision in Kooima.2
The Kooima court discussed the relevant constitutional issues. Id. at 206.
Under the Fourth Amendment, governmental officials may not arbitrarily intrude
into the privacy and security of its citizens. Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523,
528 (1967). An automobile stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). A person may be briefly detained
for investigative purposes if there is a reasonable suspicion, supported by
articulable facts that criminal activity has occurred. United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
In Kooima, our supreme court considered a situation similar to Campbell’s.
The informant in Kooima observed several men drinking at a restaurant and
contacted police as the men began to leave in a motor vehicle. Kooima, 833
N.W.2d. at 203–04. The informant gave a description of the men and the vehicle
being used, advising the police the men were intoxicated. Id. at 204. The
2
Our supreme court has reserved the right to interpret the Iowa Constitution differently
than the United States Constitution despite nearly identical language, though a strictly
federal analysis is appropriate where the case can be decided under the federal
constitution alone. See Kooima, 833 N.W.2d at 206. Campbell does not argue for a
different standard under the Iowa Constitution.
4
responding officer followed the vehicle for a time and did not observe any traffic
violations. Id. at 205. Based only on the tip, the officer initiated a stop and
discovered the driver was intoxicated. Id. Our supreme court engaged in a
thorough analysis of state and federal law regarding automobile stops after
informant tips and concluded:
a bare assertion by an anonymous tipster, without
relaying to the police a personal observation of erratic
driving, other facts to establish the driver is
intoxicated, or details not available to the general
public as to the defendant's future actions does not
have the requisite indicia of reliability to justify an
investigatory stop.
Id. at 210–11.
Campbell contends Muir did not observe erratic behavior or give predictive
information, therefore the tip was unreliable. The situation before us today differs
from Kooima in one important respect. The tipster in this case was not
anonymous, but rather known and remained available until the police arrived so
she could be held accountable for the information provided.3 Tips from known
informants are inherently more reliable for this very reason. See Florida v. J.L.,
529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972) (tip
provided by known informant considered stronger than tip from anonymous
individual). Additionally, Muir personally observed erratic driving, which was
relayed to police. Muir was also correct about the location and description of
Campbell’s vehicle, and although she left the scene after speaking with law
enforcement, she remained available to be held accountable if the information
3
Muir remained available and her testimony was presented in court.
5
later proved to be inaccurate. Because the tip was not anonymous, we find the
additional indicators of reliability required by Kooima are unnecessary here.
AFFIRMED.