State of Iowa v. Matthew MacTaggart ( 2014 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 4-051 / 13-0829
    Filed March 12, 2014
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    MATTHEW MACTAGGART,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, John J.
    Bauercamper, Judge.
    A defendant appeals from a judgment of guilty and sentence imposed
    after he pled guilty to a charge of second-degree theft. AFFIRMED.
    Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold,
    Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
    General, W. Wayne Saur, County Attorney, and J.D. Villont, Assistant County
    Attorney, for appellee.
    Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran, J., and Goodhue, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2013).
    2
    GOODHUE, S.J.
    Matthew MacTaggart appeals from a judgment of guilty and sentence
    imposed after his plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree theft, a class “D”
    felony.
    I. Background Facts and Circumstances
    MacTaggart was charged with first-degree theft but signed a written plea
    of guilty to the amended charge of second-degree theft pursuant to a plea
    agreement. The minutes of testimony allege that MacTaggart did unlawfully take
    possession or control of a racecar engine and other engine parts with the intent
    to deprive the owner thereof, and further alleged the property to have a value
    exceeding $10,000. As a result of a search pursuant to a warrant, the racecar
    engine and other items, including car parts and tools, were discovered at the
    Arthur Loyd residence. The minutes of evidence attached to the trial information
    included the statement of the racecar engine owner that it alone had a value in
    excess of $20,000.       The minutes also contain a statement from Loyd that
    MacTaggart had given him the racecar engine as payment on a debt that
    MacTaggart owed him. In the written plea, MacTaggart acknowledged that the
    property taken exceeded $1000 in value and that the minutes of testimony were
    substantially correct.
    When the plea was entered, the court initially noted that it had been
    handed a written plea signed by MacTaggart. The court conducted a lengthy
    plea colloquy, in which the court advised MacTaggart of the elements of second-
    degree theft. The court asked MacTaggart if he understood, and MacTaggart
    responded that he did.
    3
    The court then had MacTaggart look at the minutes of testimony.
    MacTaggart acknowledged that they were for the most part true, but then
    indicated that he only helped Loyd load the tools when they were taken, and
    further that he was not involved in taking all of the items listed.            He
    acknowledged that he knew Loyd did not have the authority to take the items and
    later admitted that he knew Loyd did not intend to return them to the owner. After
    the plea was entered, immediate sentencing was pronounced pursuant to
    MacTaggart’s request.
    MacTaggart appeals contending that the factual basis of the value of the
    property involved in the theft was never established to be between $1000 and
    $10,000 as required to constitute second-degree theft. He further contends that
    he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel did not note
    the deficiency and failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment.
    II. Preservation of Error
    No motion for arrest of judgment was filed as required by Iowa Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 2.24(3)(a), but when a defendant alleges ineffective
    assistance of counsel for permitting a plea where there is no factual basis, an
    exception exists to the requirement that a motion in arrest of judgment be filed.
    State v. Allen, 
    708 N.W.2d 361
    , 365 (Iowa 2006).
    III. Scope of Review
    Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are reviewed de novo, and when
    the record is adequate, they may be reviewed on direct appeal. State v. Finney,
    
    834 N.W.2d 46
    , 49 (Iowa 2013). In this case we, find the record sufficient.
    4
    IV. Discussion
    Rule 2.8(2)(b) of the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the
    court “shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is
    made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis.” Pursuant to the rule
    cited, it is initially incumbent on the trial court before accepting a plea to
    determine that a factual basis exists, and if counsel allows a defendant to enter a
    plea of guilty when there is no factual basis of record, it is considered ineffective
    assistance of counsel. State v. Schminkey, 
    597 N.W.2d 785
    , 788 (Iowa 1999).
    An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim requires a claimant to show both
    failure to perform an essential duty and prejudice. State v. Maxwell, 
    743 N.W.2d 185
    , 195 (Iowa 2008). When a defendant is permitted to plead guilty to a charge
    where no factual basis exists and fails to file a motion in arrest of judgment,
    counsel has failed to perform an essential duty. State v. Brooks, 
    555 N.W.2d 446
    , 448 (Iowa 1996).
    In determining whether counsel has provided ineffective assistance of
    counsel by permitting his client to enter a plea of guilty when no factual basis
    exists, it is appropriate to look at the entire record, including the minutes of
    testimony, rather than being restricted to the in-court colloquy.       Finney, 834
    N.W.2d at 62. Focusing on the racecar engine only, the minutes of testimony
    reflect it had been stolen, that it was worth more than $20,000, and it had been
    delivered by MacTaggart to Loyd in payment of a debt. In establishing that there
    was a factual basis for acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court must determine
    that the facts support the crime—not necessarily that the defendant is guilty.
    State v. Keene, 
    630 N.W.2d 579
    , 581 (Iowa 2001).
    5
    MacTaggart contends that because he advised the court in the colloquy
    that he had not been involved in the theft of all of the property recovered from the
    Loyd property, he in effect did not admit that the $1000 minimum requirement to
    constitute theft in the second degree had been met. He therefore concludes that
    the factual basis for the crime has not been satisfied.
    A plea of guilty waives all objections that are not intrinsic to the plea itself.
    State v. Moorehouse, 
    316 N.W.2d 884
    , 885 (Iowa 1982) overruled on other
    grounds by State v. Kress, 
    636 N.W.2d 12
     (Iowa 2001). As previously stated the
    purpose of establishing a factual basis to a guilty plea is for the court to be
    satisfied that facts support the crime for which the plea of guilty has been
    entered. It is not for the purpose of wringing a confession from the defendant.
    State v. Hanson, 
    221 N.W.2d 274
    , 276 (Iowa 1974).
    MacTaggart’s reluctance to admit that he was involved in the theft of all
    the property seized from the Loyd residence has no effect on the existence of the
    factual basis for the criminal charge to which the plea was entered.
    V. Conclusion
    Because we find the record disclosed a factual basis for the plea entered,
    MacTaggart’s conviction and sentence is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.