Kevin Baxter, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2014 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 3-1232 / 11-0694
    Filed February 5, 2014
    KEVIN BAXTER,
    Applicant-Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Thomas N.
    Bower, Judge.
    Applicant appeals the district court’s decision denying his application for
    postconviction relief from his convictions for manufacturing methamphetamine
    and receipt of precursor drugs for an unlawful purpose. AFFIRMED.
    Carla S. Pearson of Pearson Law, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
    Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and James Katcher,
    Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
    Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Doyle, J., and Mahan, S.J.* Bower, J.,
    takes no part.
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2013).
    2
    MAHAN, S.J.
    Kevin Baxter appeals, claiming he received ineffective assistance from
    postconviction counsel.    Baxter contends postconviction counsel should have
    called more witnesses to testify at the hearing, done more to refresh the memory
    of his trial counsel, and investigated the case more fully. He does not assert
    what additional information could have been presented if these actions were
    taken. We conclude Baxter has not shown he received ineffective assistance
    from postconviction counsel. We affirm the decision of the district court.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings
    Kevin    Baxter     was   charged      with   conspiracy   to   manufacture
    methamphetamine,        manufacturing     methamphetamine,        possession     of
    pseudoephedrine, and receipt of precursor drugs for an unlawful purpose. A jury
    found him guilty on all charges. At sentencing, the district court merged the
    conspiracy charge with the manufacturing charge and merged the possession
    charge with the receipt of precursors charge.       Baxter was sentenced on his
    convictions for manufacturing methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa Code
    section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (1999), and receipt of precursor drugs, in violation of
    section 124B.9, to terms of imprisonment not to exceed thirty years and ten
    years, respectively, to be served concurrently.1
    Baxter’s convictions were affirmed on appeal. State v. Baxter, No. 00-
    0407, 
    2002 WL 570663
     (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2002). Procedendo was issued
    on May 30, 2002.
    1
    On the charge of manufacturing methamphetamine, Baxter was sentenced pursuant to
    section 124.411 to three times the term of imprisonment otherwise authorized because
    this conviction was a second or subsequent offense.
    3
    Baxter filed an application for postconviction relief on July 25, 2002. He
    claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) file a motion to dismiss
    based upon violation of defendant’s speedy trial rights; (2) request the dismissal
    of a juror who fell asleep during the trial; (3) adequately consult with defendant;
    and (4) adequately investigate the case.       He claimed he received ineffective
    assistance of appellate counsel on the following grounds: (1) failure to raise the
    speedy trial issue; (2) failure to raise an issue regarding whether defendant was
    prejudiced because the jury heard evidence on both the conspiracy and
    manufacturing charges, which were later merged; (3) failure to raise the issue of
    prosecutorial misconduct; (4) failure to raise an issue concerning the sleeping
    juror; and (5) failure to allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to
    inadequate investigation of the case.
    For reasons not readily apparent from the record, the case languished in
    the court system until a postconviction hearing was held on January 31, 2011.2
    Baxter testified at the hearing, as did his trial counsel. Baxter’s trial counsel
    testified he did not remember much in the way of specifics about Baxter’s case.
    The district court denied Baxter’s application for postconviction relief, finding he
    had not shown he received ineffective assistance from trial or appellate counsel.
    Baxter now appeals.
    2
    Baxter’s first postconviction counsel had a conflict and new counsel was appointed on
    March 19, 2004. The case was dismissed pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
    1.944 on January 1, 2005, but was later reinstated. The case was set for hearing
    several times, but counsel for one party or the other would ask for a continuance, and
    these requests were granted by the court until the matter had dragged on for more than
    eight years.
    4
    II. Standard of Review
    We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Ennenga
    v. State, 
    812 N.W.2d 696
    , 701 (Iowa 2012). To establish a claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel, an applicant must show (1) the attorney failed to perform
    an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied the applicant a
    fair trial. State v. Carroll, 
    767 N.W.2d 638
    , 641 (Iowa 2009). “In determining
    whether an attorney failed in performance of an essential duty, we avoid second-
    guessing reasonable trial strategy.” Everett v. State, 
    789 N.W.2d 151
    , 158 (Iowa
    2010). In order to show prejudice, an applicant must show that, but for counsel’s
    unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
    State v. Madsen, 
    813 N.W.2d 714
    , 727 (Iowa 2012).            An applicant has the
    burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective.
    See State v. McKettrick, 
    480 N.W.2d 52
    , 55 (Iowa 1992).
    III. Merits
    On appeal, Baxter contends he received ineffective assistance from
    postconviction counsel. He asserts postconviction counsel should have sought
    testimony from his appellate counsel and an attorney who assisted his trial
    counsel. He also asserts that postconviction counsel should have done more to
    refresh the memory of his trial counsel.             Baxter additionally asserts
    postconviction counsel did not do enough to investigate the case. He claims he
    was prejudiced by the performance of his postconviction counsel and should
    receive a new postconviction hearing.
    Baxter is required to state the specific ways in which postconviction
    counsel’s performance was inadequate. Rivers v. State, 
    615 N.W.2d 688
    , 690
    5
    (Iowa 2000).    He must also state how competent representation would have
    changed the outcome of the postconviction proceeding. 
    Id.
     “When complaining
    about the adequacy of an attorney’s representation, it is not enough to simply
    claim that counsel should have done a better job.” Dunbar v. State, 
    515 N.W.2d 12
    , 15 (Iowa 1994).
    While Baxter contends postconviction counsel should have called more
    witnesses to testify at the hearing, done more to refresh the memory of his trial
    counsel, and investigated the case more fully, he does not assert what additional
    information could have been presented if these actions were taken. Baxter does
    not suggest what information would have been revealed by calling other
    witnesses or conducting additional investigation, or how this information would
    have supported his application for postconviction relief. See 
    id.
     Furthermore, he
    does not state how this additional information would have changed the result of
    the postconviction proceedings. See 
    id.
    We conclude Baxter has not shown he received ineffective assistance
    from postconviction counsel—he has not shown counsel failed to perform an
    essential duty or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. We note
    Baxter’s appellate brief does not address the merits of his underlying claims of
    ineffective assistance from trial and appellate counsel. Therefore, we do not
    address these issues in our opinion.
    We affirm the decision of the district court denying Baxter’s application for
    postconviction relief.
    AFFIRMED.