State of Iowa v. Eduardo Becerra Santanna ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1396
Filed March 9, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO BECERRA SANTANNA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. Blink,
Judge.
Eduardo Becerra Santanna appeals his sentence following his guilty plea
to the charge of operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent, an
aggravated misdemeanor, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
AFFIRMED.
Jeremy B. A. Feitelson of Feitelson Law, L.L.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
2
MULLINS, Judge.
In May 2015, Eduardo Becerra Santanna1 pled guilty to the charge of
operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent in violation of Iowa Code
section 714.7 (2015). Santanna does not dispute that he committed the
underlying offense. Instead, he appeals his sentence,2 arguing his trial counsel
was ineffective by incorrectly stating to the court at sentencing that Santanna
was on probation. While Santanna does not specify the resulting prejudice in his
appeal, presumably he contends that this misstatement resulted in a more
severe sentence from the district court.
In order to prove an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, an appellant
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel (1) failed to perform
an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Ennenga v. State, 812 N.W.2d 696,
701 (Iowa 2012). We can resolve ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under
either prong. State v. Ambrose, 861 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Iowa 2015). While
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are generally preserved for
postconviction relief actions, we will address them on direct appeal where, as
here, the record is sufficient to permit ruling. See State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41,
48 (Iowa 2013).
1
The arraignment order recites that defendant’s correct name is Eduardo Becerra-
Santana. The presentence investigation report lists a number of aliases, none of which
spells defendant’s last name “Santanna.” We use the spelling the sentencing order and
notice of appeal use.
2
Santanna requests that the court reverse his conviction and remand for an order of
dismissal or for new trial. However, Santanna’s brief alleges ineffective assistance only
with regard to his sentence, not the underlying guilty plea. Accordingly, error has not
been preserved as to any challenge of the conviction, and we will consider Santanna’s
brief as a request to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
3
At sentencing, both Santanna’s counsel and the State represented to the
district court that Santanna was on probation at the time of the vehicular offense.
The parties do not dispute, and the record reflects, that this was, in fact, not the
case.3 After hearing the arguments of counsel and a statement from Santanna—
in which Santanna corrected the misstatement regarding his probation status—
the district court sentenced Santanna to two years in prison. In doing so, the
district court reasoned:
Well, it’s clear, Mr. Santanna, that you are unable to succeed
on probation. Your record just makes that abundantly clear.
Probation has been tried, and it has not worked. You can become
violent.
While you were out on probation, you were using drugs.
There really is no other alternative at this point except to sentence
you to prison based upon your record and your consistent failure to
comply with the terms of probation.
Starting in 2007, Santanna’s record contains multiple probation sentences
and subsequent probation violations. The district court clearly considered the
entirety of Santanna’s criminal history and lack of compliance with the terms of
probation when it determined the appropriate sentence. Santanna has not met
his burden to show a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been
different absent his counsel’s misstatement. See Ambrose, 861 N.W.2d at 557
(“To establish prejudice in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the result of the
[proceeding] would have been different. The likelihood of a different result must
3
The offense in this case occurred in February 2015. On November 20, 2014, Santanna
was charged with an unrelated offense, for which a probation sentence took effect in
March 2015.
4
be substantial, not just conceivable.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s sentence pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 21.26(1)(d).
AFFIRMED.