Homeowners Association of the Coves of Sundown Lake v. Appanoose County Board of Supervisors ( 2014 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 3-1013 / 13-0296
    Filed March 26, 2014
    HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
    COVES OF SUNDOWN LAKE,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    APPANOOSE COUNTY BOARD OF
    SUPERVISORS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, Lucy J.
    Gamon, Judge.
    The Appanoose County Board of Supervisors appeals the district court
    ruling granting the Homeowners Association of the Coves of Sundown Lake’s
    writ of certiorari. AFFIRMED.
    George W. Appleby, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Randall B. Caldwell, and Dennis F. Chalupa until deceased, of Caldwell,
    Brierly, Chalupa & Nuzum, P.L.L.C., Newton, for appellee.
    Heard by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
    2
    BOWER, J.
    The Appanoose County Board of Supervisors (Board) appeals the district
    court order granting the Homeowners Association of the Coves of Sundown
    Lake’s (Association) writ of certiorari. The Board claims the district court erred in
    finding the Association had standing to request the writ.           The Board also
    contends the district court erred in finding: (1) the Board acted illegally in denying
    the Association’s petition to establish a rural improvement zone on procedural
    grounds after setting the petition for a public hearing; and (2) the Board acted
    illegally in denying the petition on the merits.     We find the Association has
    standing to request the writ, the Board acted improperly in finding the Association
    had failed to meet the filing requirements after granting a public hearing, and the
    Board acted improperly in considering irrelevant matters in denying the
    Association’s request for a rural improvement zone. We affirm.
    I.      Background Facts and Proceedings
    The Association is comprised of several owners of land surrounding
    Sundown Lake in Appanoose County. The Association filed a petition for writ of
    certiorari after the Board refused a request to establish a rural improvement zone
    (zone) surrounding the lake.
    The landowners requested the establishment of a zone for the purpose of
    diverting future property tax revenue growth towards making improvements in the
    Sundown Lake area. The petition to establish the zone was filed with the Board
    by 172 signatories, claiming they comprised at least twenty-five percent of the
    residents of the proposed zone as well as twenty-five percent of the total
    3
    assessed value of the proposed zone. See Iowa Code § 357H.2 (2011). The
    Association requested a public hearing before the Board to establish the zone.
    The Board held a public hearing on November 2, 2012. During the hearing,
    information on the need for improvements to the lake—most notably to alleviate
    the effects of silting—was presented.          The Board also discussed the
    requirements for establishment of a zone and the loss of revenue to the county if
    a zone was created. The statutory requirements necessitating that the Board
    hold a hearing were not discussed.
    The Board issued its decision on November 13, 2012, finding the
    petitioners had failed to meet the threshold requirements for Board consideration
    and further denying the petition because of the loss of tax revenue to the county
    as a whole.
    The Association, acting on behalf of the individual residents who signed
    the petition, filed a petition for writ of certiorari on December 6, 2012. After a
    hearing, the district court determined the Association had standing to pursue the
    writ.   The district court also found the Board was precluded from examining
    whether the petition had satisfied the statutory requirements for holding a hearing
    because the Board had set and held the hearing. The district court also ruled the
    Board acted illegally by concluding the zone was not in need of improvements
    based upon considerations outside the scope of the statute, specifically, the
    impact on county tax receipts. The writ was granted, and the court ordered the
    Board to reconsider the petition.
    4
    II.       Standard of Review
    “Certiorari is a procedure to test whether a lower board, tribunal, or court
    exceeded its proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.” Barnhill v. Iowa
    Dist. Ct., 
    765 N.W.2d 267
    , 272 (Iowa 2009). We review for correction of errors at
    law. City of Okoboji v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 
    744 N.W.2d 327
    , 330 (Iowa 2008). “Relief
    through certiorari is strictly limited to questions of jurisdiction or illegality of the
    challenged acts.” Barnhill, 
    765 N.W.2d at 272
    .
    III.      Discussion
    A. Standing
    The Board claims the Association lacks standing to request the writ of
    certiorari because the Association was not a party to the original petition.
    Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy aimed at correcting the illegal act of
    an inferior court. State v. West, 
    320 N.W.2d 570
    , 573 (Iowa 1982). It is the
    general rule that only a party to the action before the inferior court may obtain the
    writ. 
    Id.
     It is understood an association may, in certain circumstances, assert the
    rights of its members. Citizens for Washington Square v. City of Davenport, 
    277 N.W.2d 882
    , 886 (Iowa 1979). To do so, an association must show that any of
    its members are suffering an immediate or threatened injury that would have
    been a justiciable case had one of the individual members brought it in their own
    capacity.     Hunt v. Wash. St. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 
    432 U.S. 333
    , 342–43
    (1977).      An association must also show the individual participation of each
    injured party is unnecessary. 
    Id.
     Finally, the interests an association seeks to
    protect must be germane to the organization’s purpose. 
    Id. at 343
    .
    5
    Here, the Association is a collection of the homeowners within the
    proposed zone. Although the Association was not a party to the original petition,
    it does include the persons who were signatories to the petition as its members.
    The signatory-members chose to pursue the writ collectively through the
    Association rather than on an individual basis. Assuming the petition was proper
    and required the Board to establish the proposed zone, as the Association
    asserts, the individual members have and will continue to suffer harm because of
    the Board’s action. Although each of the members of the Association has been
    harmed, none have been harmed in any individual way that would require
    individual participation. It is the collective interest of the group, as homeowners
    within the proposed zone, which is the object of these proceedings.           As a
    collection of homeowners, the rights the Association seeks to protect are
    germane to the purpose of the group. We conclude the Association has standing
    to seek the writ of certiorari.
    B. The Hearing
    Iowa Code chapter 357H (2011) provides a procedure by which rural
    improvement zones may be created in counties “with a private lake development”
    and with populations below a certain threshold. Section 357H.1 requires the
    county board of supervisors to create such a zone upon receipt of a petition
    described in section 357H.2 and after a determination the area requires
    improvements.1      On the petition of twenty-five percent of residents, section
    1
    Iowa Code section 357H.1 states, in relevant part:
    The board of supervisors of a county with less than twenty
    thousand residents . . . and with a private lake development shall
    6
    357H.2 requires the board set a hearing, “if the assessed valuation of the
    property owned by the petitioners represents at least twenty-five percent of the
    total assessed value of the proposed zone.” Iowa Code § 357H.2(1). Upon
    receipt of the petition, the board has thirty days to hold a public hearing. Id. §
    357H.3.    During the hearing, the board “may consider the boundaries of a
    proposed rural improvement zone” and “for that purpose may amend the petition
    and change the boundaries of the proposed zone.” Id. § 357H.4.2 The board
    has ten days after the hearing to establish the zone by resolution or deny the
    petition. Id.
    The petition in this matter described the boundaries of the proposed zone
    and stated it was presented on behalf of at least twenty-five percent of the
    residents and represented owners of at least twenty-five percent of the total
    assessed value of the proposed zone.           It also asserted the proposed zone
    included approximately 250 families. After receiving the petition, the Board set
    and held a public hearing.
    designate an area surrounding the lake, if it is an unincorporated area of
    the county, a rural improvement zone upon receipt of a petition pursuant
    to section 357H.2, and upon the board’s determination that the area is in
    need of improvements.
    2
    Iowa Code section 357H.4 “Hearing on petition—action by board,” states:
    At the public hearing . . . the board may consider the boundaries of a
    proposed rural improvement zone, whether the boundaries shall be as
    described in the petition or otherwise, and for that purpose may amend
    the petition and change the boundaries of the proposed zone as stated in
    the petition. The board may adjust the boundaries of a proposed zone as
    need to exclude land that has no reasonable likelihood of benefit from
    inclusion in a rural improvement zone. However, the boundaries of a
    proposed zone shall not be changed to incorporate property which is not
    included in the original petition.
    Within ten days after the hearing, the board shall establish the
    rural improvement zone by resolution or disallow the petition.
    7
    The discussion at the hearing centered on two points. Through certain
    representatives, the signatories to the petition presented evidence concerning
    the need for improvements within the proposed zone, specifically concerning
    erosion and silting, and other citizens spoke on the impact the zone would have
    on the county’s tax receipts. Reservations were expressed by the Board as to
    how the zone would impact county services and the bonding capacity of the local
    school district.   At no time during the hearing was information presented
    concerning the requirements of section 357H.2 (petition for public hearing), nor
    did the Board question the legitimacy of the petition.
    The Board’s decision denied the petition for two reasons. First, the Board
    decided the petition was inadequate.            Second, the Board decided no
    improvement was necessary in the given area because, on a cost-benefit
    analysis, approving the zone would harm the financial standing of the county with
    little improvement to the zone. The Board went on to sharply criticize chapter
    357H as written and to interpret the chapter in a way the Board found preferential
    to its revenue concerns.
    In granting the writ of certiorari, the district court found the Board could not
    reexamine the sufficiency of the petition once the hearing was held. On appeal,
    the Board argues the statute does not preclude the Board from making a
    determination on the sufficiency of the petition during the hearing itself.
    This issue is one of statutory construction. Unlike a case where we are
    called upon to interpret specific words of the statute, in this instance we are
    required to consider the meaning of a number of statutory provisions spread
    8
    across a chapter. The goal in statutory construction is to give meaning to the
    intent of the legislature in crafting the statute. Iowa Ass’n of Sch. Bds. v. Iowa
    Dep’t of Educ., 
    739 N.W.2d 303
    , 309 (Iowa 2007). No part of the statute is to be
    considered in isolation. In re Detention of Huss, 
    688 N.W.2d 58
    , 66 (Iowa 2004).
    As a part of this process, we must consider the context of any challenged
    provision to achieve consistency. Iowa Ass’n of Sch. Bds., 
    739 N.W.2d at 309
    .
    We also attempt to consider the law as a whole so as to harmonize the section in
    question with other sections on the same subject. Freedom Fin. Bank v. Estate
    of Boesen, 
    805 N.W.2d 802
    , 811 (Iowa 2011). When considering connected
    statutes, we must consider them together as they relate to one another. Olson v.
    Iowa Dist. Ct., 
    55 N.W.2d 339
    , 340 (Iowa 1952). Our reading of related and
    connected statutes should be harmonious. McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 
    288 N.W.2d 181
    , 188 (Iowa 1980).
    Sections 357H.1 through 357H.4 are interconnected.               Each section
    specifically relates to the preceding section, creating a complete procedure for
    the consideration and establishment of rural improvement zones.                Section
    357H.2 establishes the requirements for the petition, and section 357H.3 requires
    the hearing be held within thirty days.        Section 357H.4 describes the proper
    scope of the hearing required by section 357H.3. Read in conjunction, a board is
    provided with a ten-day period during which it can consider whether the petition
    has satisfied section 357H.2.3 Thereafter, the sufficiency of the petition is not a
    3
    Section 357H.3 requires the hearing be held within thirty days; however, notice must be
    published at least twenty days before the hearing is held. See 
    Iowa Code § 331.305
    .
    9
    part of the carefully proscribed issues a board may consider during the hearing.
    See Iowa Code § 357H.4. For example, during the hearing, a board is granted
    the power to amend the petition in certain specific ways; however, nothing in the
    chapter allows a board to call a hearing for the purpose of determining the
    sufficiency of the petition itself.
    In this case having called a hearing under section 257H.2, the only type of
    hearing the Board was empowered to call under chapter 357H; the Board
    proceeded directly to a hearing on the merits of the petition. See id. §§ 357H.1–
    .4. But, it was beyond the Board’s power to reconsider the sufficiency of the
    petition at that time. See id.
    This interpretation avoids the element of unpredictability found in this
    case. The Board’s interpretation of the chapter would allow a board to set a
    hearing for the purpose of determining whether an improvement is needed, hold
    the hearing on the merits, and then confound the petitioners by deciding, after
    the hearing on the merits and without discussion, that the hearing itself should
    not have occurred. We find nothing in the chapter to evidence a legislative intent
    to create such inefficiencies.        Rather, under our statutory scheme, a board
    determines the sufficiency of the petition by its actions of publishing notice of,
    and then holding, a public hearing.         Accordingly, the Board herein had no
    authority to review the sufficiency of the petition after the hearing had been held.
    The effect of the publication requirement is a ten-day period between receipt of the
    petition and publication of notice.
    10
    C. Denial of the Petition
    The Board began the discussion of its reasons for disallowing the
    proposed zone by stating, “[t]he proposed [zone] would have a critical long term
    impact on the taxes which would otherwise be available for school and local
    governments.” A lengthy discussion followed concerning how the proposed zone
    would impact county tax coffers.        The Board then explained in detail its
    interpretation of chapter 357H, which it read as including a cost-benefit analysis.
    The district court found error in the Board’s decision to reject the petition by
    considering matters outside the scope of chapter 357H.          The district court
    determined the Board’s reliance on the overall financial health of the county was
    improper.
    Section 357H.1 requires a board to create a rural improvement zone, upon
    receipt of a 357H.2 petition, “and upon the board’s determination that the area is
    in need of improvements.” Id. § 357H.1(1). The term “improvements” is defined
    to include dredging and erosion control measures, the types of improvements
    sought by the Association. Id. § 357H.1(2)(b). Not defined is the term “need.”
    As previously explained, section 357H.4 gives a board the power to establish the
    boundaries of the proposed zone but does not include any factor other than the
    need for improvements.
    The Board claims these sections to give it discretion to engage in a cost-
    benefit analysis, considering the need for the improvements in light of the impact
    on the county as a whole.        We disagree.    The chapter directs a board to
    establish the zone if the area is in need of improvements. Id. § 357H.1. The
    11
    consideration is specifically and unambiguously limited to the needs of the area
    under consideration and does not include issues pertaining to the county as a
    whole.4 The term “shall” imposes a duty upon a board to establish the zone if the
    area in the proposed zone is in need of the defined improvements. See id. §
    4.1(30)(a).    The Board acted improperly by considering the impact the zone
    would have on county finances. The language the legislature used in crafting the
    statute directed a county board to consider only the need for the requested
    improvements within the specific area at issue.
    The district court’s ruling granting the petition for writ of certiorari and
    ordering the Board to consider the Association’s petition using a proper
    interpretation of chapter 357H is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    We are uncertain if the legislature, in drafting these statutory provisions, intended to
    limit the board’s ability to consider the needs of the county as a whole when determining
    the “need” for improvements. We are also unsure whether the legislature intended to
    draft a statute, as presently written, that infringes upon the doctrine of county home rule,
    effectively limiting the county’s power to protect the rights of its citizens in these matters.
    See 
    Iowa Code § 331.301
    (1). Though statutory construction is an exercise in giving
    effect to the legislative intent, we are required to discern the legislature’s intent by
    considering “what the legislature actually said, rather than what it should or could have
    said.” Stille v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 
    646 N.W.2d 114
    , 116 (Iowa 2001).