LaForest Bennett v. State of Iowa ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0926
Filed October 6, 2021
LAFOREST BENNETT,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Heather Lauber, Judge.
Applicant appeals following his postconviction-relief trial, asserting he was
entitled to a competency hearing, which would have established he was
incompetent to plead guilty. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
2
GREER, Judge.
After several steps to address his competency, Laforest Bennett argues that
at the critical time, his counsel failed to challenge the district court’s finding of
competency and the acceptance of his guilty pleas. He raises this issue in a
postconviction-relief (PCR) format. His pro se application only asserted that his
trial counsel withheld a psychiatrist’s report that determined he was not competent
to stand trial. Based on the court file, this allegation proved to be inaccurate. But,
in the PCR proceeding, Bennett also raised several other issues all based on his
competency and his guilty plea. After the PCR trial, the district court denied the
allegations and dismissed the PCR application. Bennett appeals from that ruling.
He argues the district court failed to make findings regarding if he was restored to
competency.1 And Bennett urges that his trial counsel should have raised the
issue in any event because he was not competent to plead guilty. The State
asserts Bennett’s claims are unsupported in the record.
I. Factual background and Procedural History.
In April 2016, the State charged Bennett with two counts of first-degree
robbery and one count of first-degree theft, eluding, and operating while
intoxicated. The charges arose from the events of one evening in February 2016.
First, Bennett demanded keys to a vehicle he did not own, wielding a knife at the
vehicle owner. The vehicle owner escaped and ran away without giving up the
keys. Next, Bennett successfully hijacked a vehicle after again demanding the
keys from another vehicle owner while displaying his knife. When officers located
1Here, the same district court judge presided over the pretrial conference, the plea
proceeding, and the sentencing hearing.
3
the vehicle, Bennett led them on a high-speed chase that ended when he crashed
the vehicle into a garage. After he was taken to the hospital, blood tests confirmed
Bennett was under the influence of alcohol and controlled substances.
The case progressed toward trial. At a status conference in May 2016, the
district court learned that Bennett was asking to represent himself. On the record,
the court inquired why Bennett wanted to represent himself. After a short
discussion with Bennett, the district court said:
All right. Let me—let me—counsel, can I order—can we
continue this and order a psychological evaluation? That’s what I
want to do. Before we go any farther, I want to do that. I’m not
comfortable with all this. I’m especially not comfortable with fact that
the defendant has admitted to the fact that he’s got—been diagnosed
with some sort of mental health issues and we have no idea what
those are, and so I would feel more comfortable proceeding in that
way. . . .
. . . But my inclination is right now that I don’t think that this
defendant is competent to try his own case.
Like the district court, we have the benefit of three attempted or completed
competency examinations.2 After attempting the first competency evaluation, Dr.
Michael Huston3 wrote to the district court on June 6, 2016, alerting the court he
could not complete the competency examination because Bennett refused to
cooperate. Yet, Dr. Huston noted Bennett became increasingly paranoid as the
2 At no time in the proceedings did Bennett’s trial counsel request a competency
exam. Instead, in June 2016 at a pretrial conference, Bennett’s counsel noted:
Your Honor, our office has not—well, from my interaction with
Mr. Bennett, I do not believe he suffers from mental disorder that
would not—that would qualify him—or classify him as being
incompetent to stand trial. For that reason, our office has not
requested an evaluation to determine competency.
As the Court is aware, and the Court has made the record
abundantly clear, that order was done at the—by the Court. The
evaluation was ordered by the Court and not at our request.
3 Dr. Huston is a licensed psychologist at a counseling agency in central Iowa.
4
interview progressed, and the psychiatrist recommended a transfer to a state
facility to conduct a competency examination at that setting.
Then in September, Dr. Abraham Assad4 completed a competency
examination and concluded that Bennett was not competent to stand trial.
Specifically, Dr. Assad found that Bennett met criteria for schizophrenia with
current active symptoms that, along with psychotic symptoms and delusional
thinking, would influence his understanding of the legal process and his ability to
assist legal counsel. Dr. Assad concluded, “I believe he is a candidate for
restoration.” The district court ordered inpatient treatment for Bennett, finding a
preponderance of the evidence showed Bennett “[wa]s suffering from a mental
disorder which prevent[ed] him from appreciating the charges, understanding the
proceedings or assisting effectively in his own defense.” The order noted,
“Proceedings tolled until defendant is competent to stand trial. Report back to
court in 30 days and every sixty days thereafter re: mental disorder and whether
restored to competency.”
Now under a restoration order, Bennett pursued treatment at IMCC in
January 2017. As a follow-up on Bennett’s status for trial, a third mental-health
provider weighed in on Bennett’s condition. On February 10, 2017, by way of a
letter, Dr. Gary Keller5 described Bennett’s condition to the judge. Dr. Keller
diagnosed Bennett with schizophrenia, personality disorder, alcohol use disorder,
and amphetamine use disorder. Because Bennett had previously been treated at
4 Dr. Assad is a staff psychiatrist at the Iowa Medical and Classification Center
(IMCC).
5 Dr. Keller is a treating psychiatrist at the IMCC.
5
the hospital, the staff “was able to move rather quickly” with Bennett’s treatment.
Because of the previous association, Bennett “was able to assimilate the
restoration material rather quickly” and his “mental health symptoms were better
controlled as well.” Dr. Keller noted the restoration evaluation was completed and
the district court would receive the report “soon.” Dr. Keller also informed the
district court of Bennett’s transfer back to Polk County on February 9 “to continue
the next step in his court process.”
Then on February 14, 2017, Dr. Arnold Andersen6 filed a report in the district
court.7 Dr. Andersen referenced the previous diagnoses related to Bennett but
found Bennett competent to stand trial using the standard of preponderance of
evidence to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. During the competency
evaluation in February, Dr. Andersen found Bennett able to understand the
charges against him and the consequences of those charges. Dr. Andersen
opined that there was no evidence Bennett could not follow the proceedings of a
trial because of any interference from his psychiatric diagnoses.
On February 16, the court held an unreported pretrial conference. At that
conference, the district court scheduled a plea hearing for February 22.
At the plea hearing, which took place as scheduled, Bennett pled guilty to
two counts of robbery in the second-degree. As part of the plea agreement, the
other charges were dismissed. In an order filed on the same date, the district court
confirmed Bennett was restored to competency at a February 16 competency
6 Dr. Andersen is a professor emeritus in the Department of Psychiatry at the
University of Iowa College of Medicine.
7 The report states it was based on an interview with Bennett that was conducted
on February 7.
6
hearing and reinstated the criminal proceedings. In April, the district court
sentenced Bennett under the terms agreed upon by the State and Bennett in the
plea agreement—two ten-year terms of incarceration to be served consecutively.
In June 2019, Bennett applied for PCR. The PCR trial was held and later,
on June 16, 2020, the district court dismissed the PCR application. Bennett filed
a timely appeal.
II. Analysis.
A. Standard of Review.
PCR proceedings are normally reviewed for errors at law. Everett v. State,
789 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Iowa 2010). But if the underlying claim involves an alleged
constitutional violation, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, we review de
novo. Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 2014).
“Under the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court
has declared that the conviction of an incompetent defendant violates due
process.” State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Iowa 2018). “We have
emphasized that whether to hold a competency evaluation presents a legal
question.” Id. at 780. We review de novo whether the district court violated
Bennett’s due process right when it failed to hold a competency evaluation before
he pled guilty. See id. at 778.
B. Competency Determination.
Bennett asserts that on the day he returned to the district court to enter his
pleas of guilty, the district court’s first order of action had to be scheduling a
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competency hearing.8 Bennett highlights this failure by pointing to the State’s
request for a competency determination that evolved under Bennett’s theory
without the benefit of a hearing. At the plea hearing, the State said:
I just remembered an issue we need to address. We actually
should have addressed it last Thursday.
Proceedings were stayed because Mr. Bennett was
incompetent, and I think that just kind of slipped off all of our radar
last Thursday when we entered a pretrial order without finding him
competent.
To make the record “clear,” the following discussion occurred:
THE COURT: So that the record is clear, there is a written
report from the Department of Corrections dated February 7, 2017.
This report was authored by Arnold E. Andersen, M.D., Department
of Psychiatry at the University of Iowa College of Medicine, the
summary of which is that the mental health physician found that Mr.
Bennett was indeed competent to stand trial. That letter is of record
already. So I appreciate the reminder, but I think the record is clear
for us to proceed.
STATE: I’m just concerned that we don’t actually have an
order finding him competent. What I’m interpreting is that you’re
finding him competent to proceed.
THE COURT: There’s no question based upon that report that
I find that he is competent.
The plea hearing continued with a full colloquy and Bennett’s pleas of guilt to the
two charges.
A challenge to a defendant’s competency to enter a guilty plea is a
challenge to the adequacy of the guilty plea proceeding because the defendant’s
competency affects the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of the guilty plea.
See State v. Lucas, 323 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Iowa 1982) (stating a claim that a
8 Following receipt of the June 2016 Dr. Huston report, the district court scheduled
a competency hearing and directed that Bennett to be evaluated at a state facility.
Then in a pretrial conference in September 2016, after receiving Dr. Assad’s
report, the district court confirmed on the record that Bennett was not competent
to stand trial and ordered the restoration treatment.
8
competency hearing was required “goes to the very heart of the court’s
determination that the plea was entered voluntarily, intelligently, and
understandably”).
An inquiry into competency involves several factors, including: “(1) the
defendant’s irrational behavior, (2) any demeanor at the trial [or a hearing] that
suggests a competency problem, and (3) any prior medical opinion on the
defendant’s competency to stand trial.” State v. Edwards, 507 N.W.2d 393, 395
(Iowa 1993) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975)). To resolve any
question of mental competency, the district court must make an inquiry before
accepting a guilty plea. See State v. Boge, 252 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Iowa 1977).
The statutory process to determine competency requires these considerations and
steps:
If at any stage of a criminal proceeding the defendant or the
defendant’s attorney, upon application to the court, alleges specific
facts showing that the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder
which prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge,
understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the
defense, the court shall suspend further proceedings and determine
if probable cause exists to sustain the allegations. The applicant has
the burden of establishing probable cause. The court may on its own
motion schedule a hearing to determine probable cause if the
defendant or defendant’s attorney has failed or refused to make an
application under this section and the court finds that there are
specific facts showing that a hearing should be held on that question.
Iowa Code § 812.3(1) (2019). Because an earlier competency evaluation
determined Bennett not to be competent to stand trial, the State had the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Bennett’s competency had been
restored. See State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 338 (Iowa 2019). After a finding of
incompetency, the presumption of competency returns when a subsequent
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evaluation results in a medical opinion that the defendant’s competency is
restored. See State v. Snethen, 245 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Iowa 1976); State v.
Chatman, No.19-0856, 2020 WL 7021709, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2020).
“[O]ur task is to examine the information before the trial court to determine
if at the relevant time an unresolved question of the defendant’s competency
reasonably appeared.” State v. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Iowa 1979). On our
de novo review, we find the district court appropriately resolved the question of
competency prior to accepting Bennett’s pleas of guilty. The district court had the
benefit of medical evidence on February 16, as district court reviewed Dr.
Andersen’s recent findings. “[U]sing the standard of preponderance of evidence
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” on February 14, Dr. Andersen found
Bennett’s competency to stand trial had been restored. Then Bennett attended
the February 16 pretrial conference. Although not reported, the order following
that proceeding provided:
On February 16, 2017 the Defendant appeared in in person and with
counsel before this Court for a hearing on the issue whether the
defendant is competent to stand trial pursuant to Iowa Code Sections
812.4 and 812.5. The State of Iowa appeared by counsel Tomas
Rodriguez. The Court having heard the evidence and argument of
counsel finds Defendant is competent to stand trial, as established
by the psychiatric evaluation which is filed in this case under seal.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the stay previously
imposed in this case is lifted, and this criminal proceeding is
reinstated.
The same district court judge observed Bennett both at the pretrial conference and
at the guilty plea proceeding. With that contact, the district court could consider if
it reasonably appeared Bennett was appreciating the charges and understood the
proceedings. After reviewing the guilty plea proceedings, we find nothing in the
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record signaling Bennett’s incompetence to stand trial. In sum, on our de novo
review, we find Bennett’s competency was restored and that his guilty pleas were
appropriately given and accepted by the district court.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Because the PCR themes centered on the issue of competency, we
address those concerns. To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim, an applicant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that:
“(1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and (2) prejudice resulted.” State
v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008). With a plea of guilty, criminal
defendants who seek PCR must establish the pleas would not have been entered
but for the breach of duty by counsel. Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa
2011). The test for prejudice is if, but for counsel’s errors, Bennett would not have
pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985). During the PCR trial, Bennett raised several arguments related
to his competency. He continues these arguments in the appeal. Drilling down to
the alleged failure of trial counsel, Bennett complains his counsel should have
raised the issue of his incompetence before he pled guilty and asked the district
court to order a second competency opinion.
In the ruling at the PCR stage, the district court rejected Bennett’s themes
and found “[b]ased on Dr. Andersen’s report and Bennett’s demeanor, the court
made the determination that Bennett was competent to enter a guilty plea.” The
PCR court found “[t]here is no evidence in the record to support the assertion that
Bennett’s competency restoration was unsuccessful and that a second opinion
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was necessary.”9 Because Bennett obtained a hearing on his competency just
days before the guilty plea was accepted and we agree with the finding of
competency, trial counsel had no duty to request yet another competency
evaluation or hearing. See State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Iowa 2009)
(“Only through a case-by-case analysis will a court be able to determine whether
counsel in a particular case breached a duty in advance of a guilty plea, and
whether any such breach rendered the defendant’s plea unintelligent or
involuntary.”). Trial counsel will not be found to have breached a duty for failing to
pursue a meritless issue. State v. Brothern, 832 N.W.2d 187, 192 (Iowa 2013).
The PCR court ruled that Bennett failed to meet his burden to show his trial
counsel’s representation was not within the normal range of competence. See
State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Iowa 2001). We agree and affirm the dismissal
of the PCR application.
III. Conclusion.
Because of the competency determination made shortly before the plea
proceeding, we find Bennett’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to
challenge the plea or raise issues of Bennett’s competency.
AFFIRMED.
9 The PCR court reviewed the guilty plea transcript and confirmed it showed
Bennett understood the questions from the district court, answered the questions
appropriately, and never indicated he did not understand. The PCR court also
noted the district court fully reviewed all details of the plea agreement and Bennett
made no objection and, again, asked no questions.