State of Iowa v. Isaiah Ramon Henderson ( 2018 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 17-1388
    Filed December 5, 2018
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    ISAIAH RAMON HENDERSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Nancy S. Tabor and
    John D. Telleen (sentencing), Judges.
    Isaiah Henderson appeals his convictions for two counts of delivery of crack
    cocaine and one count of interference with official acts inflicting bodily injury.
    AFFIRMED.
    Zeke R. McCartney of Reynolds & Kenline, L.L.P., Dubuque, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ. Tabor, J., takes
    no part.
    2
    VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
    Iowa Code chapter 812 (2014) governs the confinement of people found
    incompetent to stand trial. This appeal raises issues relating to the restoration of
    competency following a finding of incompetency.
    I.     Background Proceedings
    After the State charged Isaiah Henderson with several drug-related crimes,
    his attorney filed an application for a competency hearing. See Iowa Code § 812.3.
    The district court suspended the proceedings and ordered “a psychiatric evaluation
    to determine whether the defendant [was] suffering from a mental disorder which
    prevente[ed] [him] from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings,
    or assisting effectively in the defense.” See 
    id. § 812.3(2).
    On the same day,
    Henderson executed a waiver of his ninety-day speedy trial right. See Iowa R.
    Crim. P. 2.33(2)(b). The waiver also was signed by his attorney.
    A licensed psychologist and educator determined Henderson was “not
    competent to stand trial on the charges” but was “very likely to benefit from
    restoration efforts.” At a subsequent competency hearing, the district court “found
    it appropriate to order that . . . he . . . be further evaluated” for restoration of
    competency. The court ordered the evaluation to “be performed on an inpatient
    basis at the Iowa Medical and Classification Center Forensic Psychiatric Hospital.”
    The court noted that Henderson was about to start serving a sentence on an
    unrelated charge and would “be at the Iowa Medical and Classification Center
    [(IMCC)] anyway.” Per agreement of the State and defense counsel, the court
    ordered Henderson placed in custody to serve the unrelated sentence.
    On receipt of the order, the department of corrections notified the court that
    3
    “Mr. Henderson was admitted to the Iowa Medical and Classification Center . . . to
    serve his prison sentence” on the unrelated case and “[d]ue to his placement at
    IMCC as an incarcerated individual, he is not eligible for restoration treatment
    through [the] licensed Forensic Psychiatric Hospital.”               The department
    representative expressed a “willing[ness] to revisit this order upon the completion
    of his incarceration.”
    In time, Henderson underwent a second competency evaluation.                 A
    physician again found him “not competent to stand trial” but reiterated he was a
    candidate for restoration.
    Shortly thereafter, Henderson moved for termination of his placement and
    the opportunity “to pursue restoration on an outpatient basis.” See Iowa Code
    § 812.9(1) (stating a defendant “shall not remain under placement [for restoration
    due to incompetency] beyond the expiration of the maximum term of confinement
    for the criminal offense of which the defendant is accused, or eighteen months
    from the date of the original adjudication of incompetence to stand trial, . . .
    whichever occurs first”); 812.9(2) (“When the defendant’s commitment equals
    eighteen months, the court shall schedule a hearing to determine whether the
    defendant is competent to stand trial . . . . If the defendant is not competent to
    stand trial after eighteen months, the court shall terminate the placement . . . .”).
    Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. The court reasoned:
    [T]he Defendant was ordered to the Iowa Medical and Classification
    Forensic Psychiatric Center for treatment for restoration . . . . He . . .
    entered the IMCC as a prisoner and as such was classified out to an
    appropriate facility to serve his sentence. As a prisoner, the
    defendant was not eligible to be housed in the psychiatric treatment
    facility for restoration until he had fully served his sentence. The
    Defendant has not yet completed his sentence.
    4
    Therefore the defendant has not been held for the purposes
    of restoration treatment past the 18 month period, nor has he been
    held past the maximum time that the charges he has pending in this
    case. (ie: 3 Class C felonies and 1 aggravated misdemeanor)
    Henderson discharged his unrelated sentence and began competency-
    restotarion treatment the same day. On August 17, 2016, a psychologist found
    him competent to stand trial and recommended his “return[] to court to face his
    current charges.” On September 9, the court restored Henderson’s competency
    and reinstated the proceedings.
    Henderson filed a series of motions to dismiss the matter with prejudice.
    The court declined to take action until Henderson served the parties and
    coordinated a hearing date. On January 31, 2017, Henderson’s attorney filed a
    notice reasserting his speedy trial rights.    Shortly therafter, his attorney also
    requested a hearing on the motions to dismiss.
    At the hearing, the district court told Henderson, “[Y]ou are trying to count
    the time that you were in prison for another case. [The statute] only refers to the
    case that you’re found incompetent for.” The court denied the motions.
    Two months later, Henderson pled guilty to two counts of delivery of crack
    cocaine and interference with official acts causing bodily injury. See Iowa Code
    §§ 124.401(1)(c); 719.1(1)(e).     The district court accepted the plea and later
    imposed sentence.
    On appeal, Henderson argues (A) “the decision by the Iowa Medical
    Classification Center to deny treatment . . . while he served an unrelated sentence
    was a violation of [his] due process rights”; (B) “the district court erred by denying
    [his] motion to terminate his placement pursuant to Iowa Code section 812.9”; and
    5
    (C) his “right to a speedy trial was violated.” The State preliminarily responds that
    Henderson waived his right to raise these challenges when he entered his guilty
    plea. We find the State’s argument dispositive on the first two issues.
    II.    Guilty Plea Waived Right to Challenge Delay in Competency
    Restoration
    “A valid plea waive[s] all defenses and the right to contest all adverse
    pretrial rulings,” subject to the exception that a “defendant may attack his or her
    plea when the plea itself contains intrinsic irregularities or the trial information
    charges no offense.”     Schmidt v. State, 
    909 N.W.2d 778
    , 775 (Iowa 2018).
    Convicted defendants also may “attack their pleas when claiming actual innocence
    even if the attack is extrinsic to the pleas.” 
    Id. at 789;
    State v. Bendickson, No. 18-
    0229, 
    2018 WL 4915912
    , at *3 n.4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2018) (stating Schmidt
    overruled “cases holding that defendants may only attack the intrinsic nature—the
    voluntary and intelligent character—of their pleas”).        And a defendant may
    challenge pre-plea actions by counsel on “a showing that the pre-plea ineffective
    assistance of counsel rendered the plea involuntary or unintelligent.” Castro v.
    State, 
    795 N.W.2d 789
    , 793 (Iowa 2011).
    Henderson does not assert the plea itself contained intrinsic irregularities or
    the trial information charged no offense. Nor does he raise a free-standing claim
    of actual innocence under Schmidt. We turn to whether pre-plea actions by
    Henderson’s attorney rendered the plea involuntary or unintelligent. See 
    id. Henderson began
    receiving treatment to restore his competency long
    before he entered his plea. After he was restored to competency, he filed several
    motions to dismiss based on the delay in receiving competency-restoration
    6
    treatment and his attorney assisted him in obtaining a hearing on the motions. As
    noted, the district court determined the statutory eighteen-month period to obtain
    competency treatment excluded time served on the unrelated charge.
    The plea proceeding went forward only after Henderson was restored to
    competency and only after his attorney assisted him in resolving his motions to
    dismiss based on the delay in competency-restoration treatment. Neither the
    motions nor the district court’s resolution of them implicated the knowing and
    voluntary nature of the plea. It follows that counsel’s pre-plea actions with respect
    to the delay in restoring competency did not implicate the knowing and voluntary
    nature of the plea.
    Henderson’s present due process challenge to the delay in competency-
    restoration treatment does not fall into any of the established exceptions to the
    doctrine that “[a] valid plea waive[s] all defenses and the right to contest all adverse
    pretrial rulings.” 
    Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 775
    .      Henderson’s challenge to the
    district court’s pretrial rulings on the same issue also does not fall into any of the
    exceptions to the waiver doctrine. Accordingly, we conclude Henderson’s guilty
    plea amounted to a waiver of his right to raise the issue on appeal.
    III.   Speedy Trial
    Henderson’s attorney did not move to dismiss the trial information on
    speedy trial grounds following Henderson’s restoration to competency. Henderson
    contends he was ineffective in failing to do so. The State argues Henderson’s
    guilty plea amounted to a waiver of this challenge. We disagree.
    “A plea bargain may provide a basis for waiver of the speedy trial right.”
    State v. Taylor, 
    881 N.W.2d 72
    , 79 (Iowa 2016) (citing State v. Utter, 
    803 N.W.2d 7
    647, 654–55 (Iowa 2011)). But an allegation that counsel was ineffective in failing
    to file a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds may survive a guilty plea. 
    Utter, 803 N.W.2d at 653
    , overruled by on other grounds by 
    Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 778
    .
    The question is “whether . . . trial counsel breached an essential duty prior to [the]
    guilty plea [in failing to file a motion to dismiss] and whether this breach rendered
    [the] plea unintelligent or involuntary.” 
    Id. at 652.
    We     conclude    Henderson’s      ineffective-assistance-of-counsel     claim
    premised on the failure to move for dismissal on speedy trial grounds survives the
    guilty plea. We will address the merits.
    “[T]o provide reasonably competent representation when a criminal
    defendant asserts his or her speedy trial rights, counsel must ensure that the State
    abides by the time restrictions established in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33.
    Counsel’s failure to do so amounts to a failure to perform an essential duty.” 
    Id. at 653.
    A.     Ninety-Day Speedy Trial Right
    Rule 2.33(2)(b) states:
    If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived the
    defendant’s right to a speedy trial the defendant must be brought to
    trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must order
    the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be
    shown.
    Henderson argues counsel’s waiver of his rights under this provision “was
    neither knowing nor voluntary.” In his view, “the speedy timeline was not running
    anyway due to the stay [in proceedings based on his incompetency] and Trial
    Counsel had no valid basis to waive speedy trial—with or without Appellant’s
    8
    informed consent.” The treatment delay, he asserts, “resulted in a violation of that
    speedy trial right regardless of the validity of the stay.”
    Henderson executed the ninety-day waiver of his speedy trial rights on the
    same day the district court granted his application for a competency evaluation.
    The waiver was indeed duplicative of a statutory waiver.             See Iowa Code
    § 812.4(1) (“Pending [a competency] hearing, no further proceedings shall be
    taken under the complaint or indictment and the defendant’s right to a speedy
    indictment and speedy trial shall be tolled until the court finds the defendant
    competent to stand trial.”).    But after Henderson’s competency was restored,
    Henderson withdrew the waiver. Henderson pled guilty within ninety days of the
    withdrawal.   See State v. Hamilton, 
    309 N.W.2d 471
    , 475 (Iowa 1981) (“We
    therefore hold as a rule of this court that when a waiver of the right to a speedy
    trial is withdrawn, the defendant must be tried within ninety days from the date of
    withdrawal unless good cause to the contrary be shown.”). Henderson’s ninety-
    day speedy trial right was not violated.
    In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the fact that Henderson’s
    attorneys did not immediately reassert Henderson’s ninety-day speedy trial rights
    following his restoration to competency. On this record, we are convinced the
    delay in reasserting the right fell at Henderson’s feet. See State v. McPhillips, 
    580 N.W.2d 748
    , 756 (Iowa 1998) (“The desire to obtain more time for the defense to
    prepare for trial rather than force the State to trial within the speedy-trial period is
    a strategic decision this court will not second guess.”). Henderson filed a plethora
    of motions, including motions to remove his attorneys, which required time to
    consider. In the face of these motions, it came as no surprise that he personally
    9
    signed pretrial-conference records reaffirming his earlier waiver of his speedy trial
    rights.
    On our de novo review of the record, we conclude counsel did not breach
    an essential duty in waiving Henderson’s ninety-day speedy trial rights.
    B.    One-Year Speedy Trial Right
    “All criminal cases must be brought to trial within one year after the
    defendant’s initial arraignment . . . unless an extension is granted by the court,
    upon a showing of good cause.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(c). Henderson contends
    the right was violated when “the District Court and the IMCC” delayed the
    competency proceedings. But, as noted above, the district court was statutorily
    obligated to suspend further proceedings.         See Iowa Code §§ 812.3(1)–(2);
    812.4(1); 812.5(2).
    The total time between the filing of the trial information and Henderson’s
    guilty plea, excluding the tolled period, was 278 days. Accordingly, Henderson’s
    one-year speedy trial right was not violated and counsel did not breach an
    essential duty in failing to file a motion to dismiss on this ground.
    We affirm Henderson’s judgment and sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-1388

Filed Date: 12/5/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/5/2018