In the Matter of the Estate of George Mrla ( 2021 )


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  •                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 20-1572
    Filed November 3, 2021
    IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GEORGE MRLA, Deceased,
    ROBERT MARION RICHARD MRLA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant.
    vs.
    ESTATE OF GEORGE MRLA and MARY GEORGIANNA HINER and GEORGIE
    ANN QUINLAIN, as Executors of the ESTATE OF GEORGE MRLA,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey A. Neary,
    Judge.
    Robert Marion Richard Mrla appeals the dismissal of his claims against the
    Estate of George Mrla. AFFIRMED.
    Michael W. Ellwanger of Rawlings, Ellwanger, Mohrhauser, Nelson & Roe,
    L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellant.
    Glenn A. Metcalf of Metcalf & Beardshear, Moville, for appellees.
    Considered by Bower, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Doyle, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
    (2021).
    2
    BOWER, Chief Judge.
    Robert Marion Richard Mrla1 (Mrla) appeals the dismissal of his claim
    against the Estate of George Mrla (the Estate). Finding no error of law, we affirm.
    This court has been frustrated in its task of appellate review because Mrla
    has ignored our rules of appellate procedure. He has failed to appropriately
    reference to “the pages of the parts of the record” in support of his statement of
    facts. See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.903(2)(f), .904(4). He has failed to “address[] how
    the issue was preserved for appellate review, with references to the places in the
    record where the issue was raised and decided.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(1).
    Nor did he provide “[a] statement addressing the scope and standard of appellate
    review . . ., citing relevant authority.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(2). Finally, Mrla’s
    briefs are not “searchable .pdf” documents as required by appellate rule
    6.903(1)(c).
    In Mrla’s reply brief, he states: “This case was dismissed on a motion to
    dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. . . . The error is the decision of the trial court.
    Plaintiff does agree with defendant’s statements regarding the standard of review.
    The narrow question before us, then, is whether the district court erred in
    dismissing Mrla’s claim in probate.
    “We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for
    the correction of errors at law.” “For purposes of reviewing a ruling
    on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the petition’s well-pleaded
    factual allegations, but not its legal conclusions.” “[W]e will affirm a
    dismissal only if the petition shows no right of recovery under any
    state of facts.” We construe the petition in “its most favorable light,
    resolving all doubts and ambiguities in [the plaintiff’s] favor.”
    1Robert Marion Richard Mrla is also referred to in the record as Richard Mrla and
    Rick.
    3
    Benskin, Inc. v. W. Bank, 
    952 N.W.2d 292
    , 298 (Iowa 2020) (alterations in original)
    (internal citations omitted).
    The September 18, 2017 claim in probate asserts:
    1. The claimant herein Robert Marion Richard Mrla . . .
    presents this claim in duplicate for filing with the clerk against this
    estate, and states that a description of this claim is as follows:
    a. There is farm equipment and machinery, which is jointly
    owned by Robert Marion Richard Mrla, Steve George Mrla, John
    James Mrla, Joseph Anthony Mrla, and George Mrla, which is
    located on the property. Robert requests an equitable division of the
    farm equipment and machinery among the individuals and the Estate
    as set forth in this paragraph.
    b. A separate Petition to Set Aside and Contest the Validity of
    the Last Will and Testament of George Mrla and the Anka Mrla and
    George Mrla Family Trust has also been filed in Woodbury County,
    . . . on September 18, 2017.
    c. A separate Petition for Breach of Contract to Make a Will
    has also been filed claiming property under contract to make a Will
    in Woodbury County, on September 18, 2017.
    2. Claimant further states that this claim is the property of this
    claimant and that the amount thereof is unpaid and justly due from
    this estate.
    A notice of disallowance of claim was mailed on April 11, 2018. Mrla had
    twenty days to request a hearing or “said claim will be forever barred.”
    On May 3, 2018, Mrla requested a hearing on the claim.               The Estate
    answered and asserted the claim was untimely because it was not made within
    twenty days as required under Iowa Code section 633.442 (2017) and is therefore
    barred A hearing was held on May 18. The court entered a ruling on May 22,
    which provides in part:
    The Executors’ Motion for Sanctions raised in their Answer,
    relate to [Mrla’s] Claim referenced in his Request for Hearing filed
    May 3, 2018 concerning the issue as to ownership of certain personal
    property described as machinery. The original claim was denied and
    the Request for Hearing filed May 3, 2018 was untimely as to the
    claim and the Executors now seek sanctions for the late filing of the
    Request for Hearing. [Mrla] has acknowledged in a Reply to Estate’s
    4
    Answer and Request for Hearing that this matter is not properly
    established as a Claim as originally thought but rather an ownership
    issue that may be better addressed with regard to a declaratory
    action within the Estate after the inventory is filed and the ownership
    issue is more clearly defined. Accordingly, [Mrla] has withdrawn his
    request for a hearing on the claim at this time but he maintains the
    ownership issue may need to be determined later following the filing
    of the Inventory by the Executors.
    (Emphasis added.)
    On July 9, 2020, Mrla filed a “motion for status hearing,” asserting the Estate
    had not filed a disallowance of his “claim in probate” for breach of contract. The
    Estate filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Mrla resisted the motion to
    dismiss, contending his claim in probate “contained three components: (a) A claim
    that certain farm equipment and machinery which the Estate claimed was part of
    said Estate was in fact owned by other individuals; (b) That the will should be set
    aside; (c) That the Estate was obligated to [Mrla] for breach of contract.” He
    asserted the notice of disallowance only referred to the machinery component.
    The probate court entered its ruling on October 27, noting the issue raised
    in the Estate’s motion to dismiss “is whether Iowa Code 633.442 bars, as a matter
    of law, the claim or matters alleged to be preserved with reference to the claim,
    and therefore deprives the court of jurisdiction because there is no viable claim.”
    The court concluded, “Regardless of whether [Mrla’s] claim in probate consisted
    of one claim with two references to additional petitions in the case, or three distinct
    components of a claim, the April 11, 2018 Notice of Disallowance triggered the
    time constraints outlined in Iowa Code 633.442.”
    The court also observed:
    [B]y the clear language of the claim, [Mrla] clearly was merely
    referencing the fact that there were two separate petitions filed in
    5
    separate actions in addition to the claim related to the equipment.
    This reference does not create a separate stand-alone claim in
    addition to the action filed separately. Moreover, [Mrla] withdrew his
    claim without condition or reservation. The withdrawal of the claim
    was a withdrawal of the claim in its entirety, despite how it is now
    characterized. Accordingly, no matter how you slice it, the request
    for hearing was filed late and outside the time limits permitted by
    Iowa Code section 633.442 which necessarily strips this court of
    jurisdiction over the claim and if that was not enough, the claim was
    withdrawn by [Mrla] which also renders the claim no longer viable,
    and as indicated above, the plain language of the claim clearly only
    makes a claim related to the farm machinery and equipment and only
    references the other separate filings and does not allege separate
    claims for those matters.
    Construing Mrla’s September 18, 2017 claim in the light most favorable to
    him, dismissal is warranted because the claim shows no right of recovery for
    breach of contract under any state of facts. Mrla continues to argue there were
    three components of his “claim in probate” and, because the notice of disallowance
    only referred to the machinery claim, there remains a viable breach of contract
    claim. We cannot agree.
    Mrla’s September 2017 filing states “this claim is as follows: a. There is farm
    equipment and machinery, . . . which is located on the property. [Mrla] requests
    an equitable division of the farm equipment and machinery among the individuals
    and the Estate as set forth in this paragraph.” The claim was rejected. We agree
    with the probate court that Mrla’s mere reference to a separately filed petition does
    not create “a separate stand-alone claim in addition to the action filed separately.”
    The separate actions came to this court on appeal, and we held the court
    erred in finding good cause for the delay in service and reversed the court’s denial
    of a motion to dismiss. See In re Estate of Mrla, No. 18-1067, 
    2019 WL 1933999
    ,
    at *4–6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 1, 2019).
    6
    Mrla acknowledges in his brief that he could not refile his petition for breach
    of contract because it was barred by statutory time limits.2 He then states without
    citing any authority he “could still pursue his claim in the Estate.” The Estate
    asserts that because Mrla filed a separate action for breach of contract, which is
    allowed by section 633.415, he cannot also submit a claim in probate. We agree.
    [O]ur probate code establishes two alternative, mutually exclusive
    methods of enforcing claims against an estate.
    One method of enforcing such a claim is by commencement
    or continuation of a separate action pursuant to section 633.415.[3]
    As we have already noted, the filing of a complaint under this section
    is “in lieu of” filing a claim in the estate. “In lieu of” has been defined
    to mean “instead of,” “in place of,” and “in substitution for.” It does
    not mean “in addition to.”
    Wolder v. Rahm, 
    249 N.W.2d 630
    , 633 (Iowa 1977) (emphasis added) (citations
    omitted).
    While our reasoning is slightly different than the lower court’s, we come to
    the same conclusion—the court was without jurisdiction over Mrla’s allegations of
    breach of contract as a claim in probate. We therefore affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    2  See 
    Iowa Code § 633.410
    (1) (stating “[a]ll claims against a decedent’s estate,
    . . . founded on contract or otherwise, are forever barred against the estate, the
    personal representative, and the distributees of the estate, unless filed with the
    clerk within . . . four months after the date of the second publication of the notice
    to creditors”).
    3 “A separate action based on a debt or other liability of the decedent may be
    commenced against a personal representative of the decedent in lieu of filing a
    claim in the estate.” 
    Iowa Code § 633.415
    (2). Section 633.417 provides, “The
    provisions of sections 633.438 through 633.448 are not applicable to actions
    continued or commenced under section 633.415.”
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-1572

Filed Date: 11/3/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/3/2021