State of Iowa v. Dawayne M. McGowan ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-2055
Filed July 30, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DAWAYNE M. McGOWAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark R. Fowler,
District Associate Judge.
Dawayne McGowan appeals the judgment and sentences imposed upon
his convictions following his two pleas of guilty to driving while barred as a
habitual offender in violation of Iowa Code section 321.561 (2013). AFFIRMED.
Lauren M. Phelps, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Robert C. Bradfield, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Bower, JJ.
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DANILSON, C.J.
Dawayne McGowan appeals the judgment and sentences imposed upon
his convictions following his two pleas of guilty to driving while barred as a
habitual offender in violation of Iowa Code section 321.561 (2013). He contends
trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm his convictions and preserve his claims of
deficient counsel for possible postconviction-relief proceedings.
On March 4, 2013, McGowan was recognized by Davenport police officers
while he was driving. He was stopped when they checked and discovered his
license was barred. On March 21, 2013, the State filed a trial information
charging McGowan with driving under suspension while barred as a habitual
offender.
On March 16, 2013, a Davenport police officer located a vehicle that had
been reported stolen, and McGowan was sitting in the driver’s seat. The officer
checked McGowan’s driver’s license status and learned he was currently barred.
On March 26, 2013, the State filed a trial information charging McGowan with
operating without the owner’s consent and driving under suspension while barred
as a habitual offender.
Pursuant to plea agreements, McGowan entered written guilty pleas to
two counts of driving while barred. In the case involving the March 4 incident, the
plea agreement provided the State would recommend a fine of $1000, costs, and
365 days incarceration, with all but fourteen days suspended. In the case
involving the March 16 incident, the agreement provided the State would dismiss
the charge of operating without owner’s consent, recommend a $1000 fine and
365 days incarceration, with all but sixty days suspended. The district court
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entered judgment upon the written pleas and imposed the sentences as
recommended, to run concurrently.
McGowan appeals, contending his trial counsel was ineffective in a
number of respects. As to the March 4 charge, he contends his counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the police officer’s initial identification of him, for
failing to move to dismiss due to lack of notice of disbarment, and for failing to
object to entry of the written guilty plea. As to the March 16 charge, McGowan
maintains counsel was ineffective in failing to file a written motion to withdraw
and in failing to object to entry of the written guilty plea.
Because ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims have their basis in the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we review them de novo.
State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Iowa 2012).
We generally do not resolve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal. Id. If we determine the claim cannot be addressed on appeal, we
must preserve it for a postconviction-relief proceeding. See State v. Clark, 814
N.W.2d 551, 567 (Iowa 2012). This record is inadequate to address McGowan’s
claims. Consequently, we affirm his convictions and preserve his ineffectiveness
claims.
AFFIRMED.