Architectural Wall Systems and Zurich North America v. Donald Towers ( 2014 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 13-1653
    Filed July 16, 2014
    ARCHITECTURAL WALL SYSTEMS and
    ZURICH NORTH AMERICA,
    Petitioners-Appellants,
    vs.
    DONALD TOWERS,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A. Romano,
    Judge.
    Architectural Wall Systems and Zurich North America appeal the district
    court ruling affirming the decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner.
    AFFIRMED.
    Charles A. Blades and Kent Smith of Scheldrup, Blades, Schrock, &
    Smith, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellants.
    Fredd J. Haas of Fredd J. Haas Law Offices, P.C., Des Moines, for
    appellee.
    Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
    2
    BOWER, J.
    Architectural Wall Systems and Zurich North America appeal the district
    court ruling affirming the decision of the Iowa Workers’ Compensation
    Commissioner.      The commissioner determined Donald Towers’s deep vein
    thrombosis constituted an injury to the body as a whole and awarded him a sixty
    percent industrial disability.     We find substantial evidence supports the
    commissioner’s determination the deep vein thrombosis was a spill-over injury
    affecting the body as a whole, and Towers sustained a sixty percent industrial
    disability. Accordingly, we affirm.
    I.     Background Facts and Proceedings
    In May 2009, Donald Towers joined the Glaziers, Architectural Metal, and
    Glass Workers Union to be trained as a glazier.            The training would take
    approximately three years to complete and would begin the following September.
    Before he could begin the training, however, Towers was injured when he twisted
    and fractured his right ankle while working for Architectural Wall Systems.1
    Towers classifies his position with AWS as an industrial worker/glazier, while
    AWS claims Towers was an unskilled industrial worker who was not working as a
    glazier at the time of the accident. The compensability of Towers’s injury and
    treatment is uncontested.
    Towers initially saw Dr. Jon Gehrke, who performed surgery to repair the
    broken ankle. The surgery was successful, and Towers continued to receive
    physical therapy on the ankle for some time. Towers continued to suffer from
    1
    Architectural Wall Systems and Zurich North America, the appellants in this case, will
    be collectively referred to as “AWS.”
    3
    swelling after prolonged standing, despite use of a compression stocking.
    Towers also complained of foot pain due to the hardware installed during the
    surgery. The foot pain was addressed with a shoe insert. Towers returned to an
    office job for AWS after the surgery, but later was let go for reasons unrelated to
    his injury. Dr. Gehrke imposed permanent restrictions due to the ankle injury and
    assigned impairment ratings.
    Six weeks post surgery, Towers began experiencing pain and swelling in
    his right leg. Dr. Dennis Fry diagnosed Towers with deep vein thrombosis (DVT)
    and referred Towers to Dr. Yeager for surgery. Dr. Yeager performed surgery to
    remove a blood clot and inserted a filter to prevent clots from moving to Towers’s
    heart or lungs. Towers was later hospitalized for recurrent DVT and eventually
    discharged and directed to take anticoagulants twice daily. Towers continued to
    see Dr. Yeager after discharge from the hospital. Dr. Yeager recommended
    long-term use of a support stocking and intermittent leg elevation after three to
    five hours of standing, sitting, or after the onset of pressure or pain in the leg. In
    July 2010, Towers underwent venous duplex testing for an unrelated diagnosis of
    cellulitis. The testing revealed no evidence of active DVT in the right leg and only
    old DVT in two veins.
    Dr. Yeager and Dr. Gehrke each released Towers from treatment in
    October 2010. Dr. Gehrke placed Towers at maximum medical improvement
    (MMI). Dr. Troll evaluated Towers to determine an impairment rating for his
    vascular system, which was set at five percent to the body as a whole.              In
    response to a letter from counsel, Dr. Troll later clarified the rating was five
    4
    percent of the lower extremity, not to the body as a whole. He also concluded
    the DVT was limited to the lower extremity.
    On May 25, 2011, Towers underwent an independent medical evaluation
    (IME) by Dr. Charles Mooney, who found no permanent impairment from the
    DTV, but a ten percent permanent impairment due to the ankle injury.            Dr.
    Mooney also confirmed a fifty-pound lifting restriction, previously imposed due to
    the filter, but noted the restriction could be lifted if Towers elected to have the
    filter removed. Towers has not done so.
    Another IME was conducted by Dr. John Kuhnlein.2 Dr. Kuhnlein related
    the DVT to the ankle injury and agreed with the five percent body as a whole
    impairment rating. AWS requested additional information from Dr. Kuhnlein, who
    responded, stating DVT would normally be considered a systemic condition, and
    accordingly would not be restricted to an extremity; however, in this case the
    DVT would be restricted to the lower extremity because it was the result of
    localized trauma. Dr. Kuhnlein concluded the DVT was a “localized phenomenon
    rather than a systemic or body as a whole phenomenon.”
    A deputy workers’ compensation commissioner found the DVT was limited
    to the lower extremity and therefore was not compensable as an industrial
    disability. On appeal to the commissioner, the deputy’s decision was reversed.
    The commissioner found the DVT was not limited to the lower extremity, but
    constituted an industrial disability. Relying on established agency precedent, the
    commissioner found DVT is a “spill-over” systemic disease that inherently affects
    2
    Dr. Kuhnlein’s opinions are based upon a review of the medical documents as Towers
    did not appear for his appointment.
    5
    the body as a whole. He also determined the medical opinions limiting DVT to
    the lower extremities were not persuasive because the term “lower extremity”
    used in the opinions was not synonymous with “leg” as used in the Iowa Code.
    The commissioner found Towers’s injuries resulted in a sixty percent industrial
    disability. On appeal, the district court affirmed the commissioner’s decision.
    II.    Standard of Review
    Our review of agency action is governed by Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)
    (2013). The level and type of review varies depending upon the type of error
    asserted. Lakeside Casino v. Blue, 
    743 N.W.2d 169
    , 173 (Iowa 2007).
    When the claim of error is with findings of fact, we examine whether
    substantial evidence supports those findings. Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 
    710 N.W.2d 213
    , 218 (Iowa 2006). “Substantial evidence means the quantity and quality of
    evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable
    person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the
    establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.”
    Iowa Code § 17A.19(f)(1). When the claimed error is application of law to the
    facts, we affirm unless the application was irrational, illogical, or wholly
    unjustifiable. Burton v. Hilltop Care Center, 
    813 N.W.2d 250
    , 256 (Iowa 2012).
    When the claimed error is with the commissioner’s interpretation of the
    relevant statutes, when interpretation has not been clearly vested to the
    discretion of the agency, we grant no deference and may substitute our own
    judgment. Lakeside Casino, 
    743 N.W.2d at 173
    .
    6
    III.   Discussion
    AWS raises two issues on appeal. First, the commissioner erred in finding
    Towers’s DVT is an injury to the body as a whole. Second, the commissioner
    erred in finding a sixty percent industrial disability.
    A.      Injury
    In a lengthy legal analysis, the commissioner determined Towers’s DVT
    constituted an injury to the body as a whole, rendering it compensable as an
    industrial disability. AWS claims the commissioner erred in several ways. First,
    the medical evidence establishes the DVT was confined exclusively to Towers’s
    right leg, and secondly, the commissioner’s reliance on the filter as evidence of a
    permanent condition outside the leg is improper because the filter is preventative
    and can be removed at any time.             Next, AWS argues the commissioner’s
    decision-making process was flawed because of reliance upon medical evidence
    in a separate case to conclude DVT is always a systemic issue affecting the body
    as a whole. Finally, AWS claims the commissioner improperly construed the law
    to conclude DVT is always an injury to the body as a whole.
    Whether Towers’s DVT is limited to his right leg, or affects the body as a
    whole, is critical in determining compensation for his injury. Iowa Code section
    85.34(2)(a)–(t) establishes a compensation schedule for certain permanent
    partial disabilities, including injuries to the leg. These injuries are compensated
    by reference to the employee’s average spendable weekly earnings. 
    Iowa Code §85.34
    (2). If, however, the injury is not confined to one of the scheduled areas,
    7
    the injury is compensated industrially by consideration of the employee’s lost
    earning capacity. 
    Id.
     § 85.34(2)(u).
    The medical testimony in this case reaches a uniform conclusion. Each
    doctor, whether treating or providing an IME, concluded the DVT was confined to
    Towers’s right lower extremity. The clots did not travel elsewhere in the body,
    and the specific cause of the DVT—trauma to the ankle—restricts the condition
    to the lower extremity. There is no medical testimony establishing the DVT as a
    permanent impairment to the body as a whole, and the one doctor who set a
    whole body impairment rating later amended his conclusion and restricted the
    injury to the lower extremity.3      AWS is correct that all the medical evidence
    supports their position the injury was confined to the lower extremity.               That,
    however, does not resolve the case.
    The commissioner is empowered to determine the weight each medical
    opinion should be assigned, taking into account the completeness of the opinions
    and the circumstances under which the opinion was given.                     Dunlavey v.
    Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 
    526 N.W.2d 845
    , 853 (Iowa 1995). “This does not
    mean the fact finder may arbitrarily or totally reject the offered testimony, simply
    that he has the duty to weigh it and determine its credibility.” Langford v. Kellar
    Excavating & Grading, Inc., 
    191 N.W.2d 667
    , 669 (Iowa 1971). We do not agree
    with AWS that the commissioner totally rejected the medical opinions offered in
    this case.
    3
    The commissioner relies upon Dr. Troll’s five percent body-as-a-whole impairment
    rating in assessing the degree of industrial disability. There is no five percent body-as-a-
    whole impairment rating, as Dr. Troll later amended his opinion finding a five percent
    impairment to the lower extremity only.
    8
    The medical opinions use the term “lower extremity” to describe the site of
    the DVT.       Unfortunately, our legislature did not use the same medical
    terminology in crafting section 85.34(2), which uses the narrower term “leg” to
    describe the scheduled injury. As pointed out by the commissioner, an injury
    could be to the hips or pelvis, both of which are included in the broader definition
    of “lower extremities” according to the AMA Guides Fifth Edition, employed by
    the agency in this case, but which would not be a part of the “leg” for section
    85.34(2) purposes. Of particular importance here is the permanent placement of
    the filter outside of Towers’s leg, the presence of which requires the placement of
    permanent restrictions that impact Towers’s earning capacity. Dr. Yeager did not
    recommend removal of the filter because it remained well aligned in a follow up
    x-ray.    Towers testified the filter has not been removed because the risk of
    removal is greater than the risk of leaving the filter in place.4 Placing the medical
    opinions in relation to the relevant statutory language, we find the commissioner
    was entitled to find the ongoing placement of the filter is evidence of an ongoing
    disability outside of the leg, yet within the lower extremity as used in the medical
    opinions.
    We also find Towers’s DVT represents a spill-over injury, compensable as
    an injury to the body as a whole. When there is an injury to a scheduled member
    and also to parts of the body that are not scheduled members, the whole injury is
    compensated on the basis of the unscheduled injury.          Mortimer v. Fruehauf
    Corp., 
    502 N.W.2d 12
    , 17 (Iowa 1993). No one questions Towers suffered a
    4
    Towers also testified there is a recall on the filter, yet removal remains the more
    dangerous option.
    9
    scheduled member injury.            We agree with the commissioner’s factual
    determination that the injury went beyond the scheduled member—the leg—and
    into other unscheduled areas, including his hip and pelvis. Permanent placement
    of the filter is sufficient evidence of this, as is the permanent restrictions resulting
    from the filter.5 Towers will also permanently wear a compression stocking to
    address recurrence of DVT. The commissioner’s determinations are supported
    by substantial evidence, and application of the law to those facts was rational.
    B.      Amount of Industrial Disability
    AWS claims the commissioner’s award of a sixty percent industrial
    disability is not supported by substantial evidence and is the product of an
    irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable application of the law to the facts.
    “The extent of industrial disability is a question of fact . . . for the
    commissioner.”      Bearce v. FMC Corp., 
    465 N.W.2d 531
    , 537 (Iowa 1991).
    Industrial disability measures the individual’s lost earning capacity.          Myers v.
    F.C.A. Services, Inc., 
    592 N.W.2d 354
    , 356 (Iowa 1999).                  The amount of
    industrial disability is determined by comparing the worker’s pre- and post-injury
    earning capacity. Hill v. Fleetguard, Inc., 
    705 N.W.2d 665
    , 673 (Iowa 2005).
    “We determine loss of earning capacity by considering the employee’s functional
    5
    This is not to say we agree that all DVT injuries are automatically or presumptively to
    the body as a whole. The commissioner relies upon a single Iowa Supreme Court case
    to conclude as such. See Blacksmith v. All-American, Inc., 
    290 N.W.2d 348
     (Iowa
    1980). In Blacksmith, the court examined a worker suffering from phlebitis of the left leg,
    an inflammation of the vein wall, which was compensated industrially. 
    Id.
     at 353–55.
    The commissioner used this case to infer our supreme court would consider any similar
    vascular injury to the lower extremity to be an injury to the body as a whole. We do not
    necessarily agree Blacksmith lends itself to such a conclusion, however because we
    have found support for the commissioner’s ultimate conclusion on another basis, we
    need not reach the issue.
    10
    impairment, age, education, work experience, qualifications, ability to engage in
    similar employment, and adaptability to retraining to the extent any of these
    factors affect the employee’s prospects for relocation in the job market.” 
    Id.
    Towers is forty-six years old. He earned below-average grades in school,
    did not finish high school, has little specialized training, and has a limited earning
    capacity. Prior to his injury, Towers was earning $11.07 an hour as an unskilled
    industrial laborer, though with benefits his union compensation package totaled
    $28.80 per hour. If he had been able to complete the glazier apprenticeship
    program, his eventual wage would have been, with benefits, $38.50 per hour.
    Towers presently delivers auto parts for $8.00 an hour.6 Towers testified the
    union informed him they would be unable to place work for him as a glazier with
    his current restrictions. There is uncertainty in the record as to whether Towers
    would be able to work as a glazier or not. AWS, who does not have a position
    available for Towers, offered evidence of glazier job requirements that could
    accommodate Towers’s restrictions. In the AWS job description, the maximum
    lifting requirement was only forty pounds, with all work indoors on flat surfaces.
    Towers testified this was an inaccurate job description and did not represent the
    typical glazier job requirements for smaller firms that might offer him work.
    AWS relies primarily upon the fact Towers’s future as a glazier was
    speculative.   He had not begun the apprenticeship program, though he was
    working in a shop that employs glaziers.           Towers classifies his job as an
    6
    Towers’s present employer offers fewer benefits. A small amount is placed into
    retirement and Towers has elected to decline company health insurance. It is difficult to
    calculate how his present wage compares to the total compensation package he
    received at AWS, or would have received as a journeyman glazier.
    11
    industrial shop worker/glazier, while AWS calls him an industrial shop worker. An
    AWS employee testified that Exhibit 13 was an accurate job description for
    Towers while he was employed at AWS. Exhibit 13 describes the position as
    “Industrial Work – Glazier.” As a result, there is substantial evidence to conclude
    Towers was on the path to becoming a glazier and was hired in that capacity.
    Viewed in that light, the injury substantially impacted his earning capacity. Not
    only is he unable to reenter the apprenticeship program and become a glazier,
    but his permanent restrictions limit his capacity to engage in manual labor, the
    only work for which he is reasonably suited. Whether we would arrive at the
    same precise level of industrial disability as the commissioner is immaterial.7 We
    find substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s findings.
    AFFIRMED.
    7
    The commissioner does overstate Towers’s status in one respect. Dr. Troll’s five
    percent whole-body impairment rating, which was later amended to apply only to the
    lower extremity, is cited as proof of functional capacity. The citation, however, is in a
    section of the commissioner’s appeal decision discussing whether Towers suffered a
    whole-body injury. But because the rest of the analyses of Towers’s functional capacity
    and earning potential are accurate, we find the over statement to be immaterial.