State of Iowa v. Nicholas Paul Augustine ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-2003
Filed July 16, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NICHOLAS PAUL AUGUSTINE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Gary G. Kimes,
Judge.
Nicolas Augustine appeals the entry of his Alford guilty plea and the denial
of his motion in arrest of judgment and request to withdraw the plea.
AFFIRMED.
Patrick W. O'Bryan of O’Bryan Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean Pettinger, Assistant Attorney
General, Stephanie Koltookian, Student Legal Intern, John Criswell, County
Attorney, and Douglas A. Eichholz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, J.
Nicholas Augustine appeals following his Alford plea of guilty to
intimidation with a dangerous weapon as a class “D” felony. Iowa Code § 708.6(2011). He claims the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made and there
was not a factual basis to support the plea. He asserts the district court erred
twice: first, by accepting such a plea, and second, by refusing the let him
withdraw the plea. He asks us to set the plea aside and allow him to go to trial.
We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
On April 27, 2012, Augustine was outside his home when he saw a car
approaching. The car was driven by a department of human services (DHS)
employee visiting Augustine’s home as part of her employment duties.
Augustine, whose home had been robbed a few days prior, believed the car may
have belonged to the robbers. He grabbed a shotgun from his shed and decided
to confront the driver of the car. He was loading the weapon as he approached
the car, and he yelled at the driver to stop. The driver saw Augustine and the
shotgun and drove away. Augustine fired on the car as it departed, and then
used his wife’s van to chase the DHS employee. During the chase, Augustine
called law enforcement ostensibly to report that he was in pursuit of someone he
believed to be a burglar. The police instead apprehended Augustine.
The State charged Augustine with four offenses by trial information:
attempt to commit murder, intimidation with a dangerous weapon as a class “C”
felony, criminal mischief, and possession of marijuana. Before trial, the State
3
amended the trial information by dropping the attempted murder charge and
adding a sentencing enhancement for the use of a dangerous weapon.
The State offered to drop the criminal mischief charge, the possession
charge, and the sentencing enhancement if Augustine would plead guilty to a
single count of intimidation with a dangerous weapon, amended to a lower “D”
non-forcible felony classification. Augustine agreed to enter an Alford plea on
advice from counsel. The district court accepted the plea on August 28, 2013.
On November 22, Augustine filed a motion in arrest of judgment to withdraw his
plea. The district court denied the motion on December 18 and sentenced
Augustine to serve an indeterminate five-year term. Augustine now appeals both
the acceptance of the plea and the denial of his motion in arrest of judgment.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
Insofar as Augustine’s claim concerns the entry of his guilty plea, our
review is for correction of errors at law. State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2d 237, 239
(Iowa 2006). Insofar as his claim concerns the denial of his request to withdraw
the plea in his motion in arrest of judgment, we review for abuse of discretion.
State v. Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1998). “Abuse of discretion exists
only where a defendant shows the trial court’s sound discretion was exercised on
grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.”
Id.III. Discussion
A. Knowing and Voluntary Plea. Because a guilty plea also constitutes the
waiver of several constitutional rights, the defendant must make the plea
voluntarily and with “a full understanding of the consequences.” State v. Boone,
4
298 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Iowa 1980). In an Alford plea, the defendant asserts his
innocence but pleads guilty in recognition of a likelihood of a less favorable
outcome at trial. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31–32 (1970); Young
v. Brewer, 190 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 1971). In the context of an Alford plea,
the standard is “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Alford, 400 U.S.
at 31.
Augustine now asks us to find that his plea was not voluntary and
intelligent because “he did not feel there was a great likelihood” that he would be
convicted and that he “gained no real benefit” from the plea. 1 He notes that he
feared his counsel was not prepared for trial and that he was on medication for
depression at the time of the plea. However, Augustine’s colloquy with the
district court was sufficient to demonstrate that he understood precisely what
rights he was waiving and what the consequences of his guilty plea would be.
There is no evidence of compulsion to plead or of any confusion on Augustine’s
part. The district court did not err in accepting the Alford plea.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Augustine’s
request to withdraw his plea. Our supreme court has noted that a defendant
cannot render his plea involuntary post facto simply because he has changed his
mind. See Speed, 573 N.W.2d at 597–98. Augustine’s testimony in support of
his motion prior to sentencing failed to demonstrate that there was any confusion
about the material function of the Alford plea, and Augustine admitted that the
1
On appeal, Augustine does not dispute the adequacy of the colloquy at the plea
hearing, and he raised none of these issues at the time the plea was entered.
5
“plea offer was really generous.” The court’s exercise of its discretion was
reasonable and proper.
B. Factual Basis. Augustine asserts that the district court should not have
accepted the plea because there was no factual basis to support his guilt of the
offense to which he pleaded. For a district court to accept a guilty plea or an
Alford plea, there must be a determination that there is a factual basis to support
the charge, but the evidence need not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
See State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 62 (Iowa 2013); State v. Schminkey, 597
N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999).
The charge of intimidation with a dangerous weapon as a “D” felony
required the State to present a factual basis for two elements: (1) Augustine
threatened to shoot a dangerous weapon at a vehicle occupied by a person; and
(2) the circumstances of the threat gave rise to a reasonable expectation that the
threat would be carried out. See Iowa Code § 708.6; State v. Lane, 743 N.W.2d
178, 184 (Iowa 2007). It is not contested that Augustine approached a car
occupied by a DHS employee while yelling at the driver and loading a shotgun.
Neither is it contested that he fired upon the car as it drove away. Augustine’s
only affirmative assertion as to the lack of a factual basis is that he “was not
attempting to harm or intimidate” the driver. This claim is not relevant to the
analysis of the statutory elements of the crime.
There was a sufficient factual basis for the district court to accept
Augustine’s Alford plea, and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to allow Augustine to withdraw the plea on that basis.
6
IV. Conclusion
Augustine’s claim that his plea was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
is not supported by the colloquy and sentencing transcripts in the record. His
claim that there was no factual basis for the plea is contradicted by the clear and
uncontroverted evidence. The district court properly accepted the plea and did
not abuse its discretion in rejecting the motion in arrest of judgment to withdraw
the plea.
AFFIRMED.