State of Iowa v. Michael Lomax , 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 461 ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 12-0977
Filed April 30, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL LOMAX,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg,
Judge.
Michael Lomax appeals his convictions for vehicular homicide and four
counts of serious injury by vehicle. AFFIRMED.
James S. Nelsen of James Nelsen P.L.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrell Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jim Ward, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
2
VOGEL, P.J.
Michael Lomax appeals his convictions for vehicular homicide and four
counts of serious injury by vehicle. Lomax asserts the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress due to the warrantless entry into the hospital
emergency room and the insufficient basis to invoke implied consent. Lomax
further claims the district court erred in denying his motion in arrest of judgment
because the State withheld impeachment evidence that an officer involved in the
case was later charged with possession of a controlled substance. We conclude
the district court properly denied Lomax’s motion to suppress because Lomax
had no expectation of privacy in a hospital emergency room and reasonable
grounds existed to invoke implied consent. We further conclude the court
properly denied Lomax’s motion in arrest of judgment as the officer’s conduct
was wholly unrelated and immaterial to Lomax’s case. Consequently, we affirm
Lomax’s convictions.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On August 28, 2011, at 3:00 a.m., Lomax was involved in a car accident
that resulted in the death of Jennifer Garcia and the serious injury of four of her
passengers. It was determined through the car’s data retrieval system that
Lomax was driving approximately 100 miles per hour at the time of the accident. 1
The accident occurred at an intersection with a stoplight, and it was later
determined Lomax accelerated through a red light.
1
Sergeant Randy Bulver, a collision reconstructionist for the Des Moines Police
Department, was able to ascertain that Lomax “was traveling in excess of 100 miles per
hour in the seconds before the crash. When the last recorded documentation was
obtained, it showed that the defendant’s speed was 130 miles per hour and that the
brakes were being applied.”
3
Officer Colin Boone conducted the initial investigation. Upon arriving at
the scene, Officer Boone observed that Garcia’s SUV was overturned and on
fire, and Lomax’s Dodge Charger was compressed to the passenger
compartment. Witnesses reported they had seen Lomax’s vehicle driving
erratically at a high rate of speed.2 Officer Boone described the scene as
“chaotic,” with various officers securing the scene, managing witnesses, and
controlling traffic. Lomax appeared to be badly injured and was trapped in his
vehicle until the medics could remove him. Neither the odor of alcohol nor empty
containers were observed in Lomax’s vehicle. Lomax was transported to the
same hospital as two of the other injured people.
On his way to the hospital, Officer Boone contacted dispatch to request
that the medical examiner be prepared to obtain a blood or urine sample from
Lomax. He was also in contact with Officer Brandon Singleton, who had been
working traffic control near the accident scene. Officer Singleton informed Officer
Boone that he had spoken with Lomax’s relatives. Specifically, Officer Singleton
recalled Lomax’s brother3 stating: “I can only assume that they’ve been out
partying. That’s why I don’t go out with them. They get f***** up and act a fool.”
Officer Boone entered the hospital trauma center, which he described as
“a big, open bay” divided by curtains. This is an area he routinely enters when
investigating an accident unless asked to step out by hospital staff, when his
presence may impede treatment. Officer Boone discovered Lomax in the left-
2
Officer Christopher Mock was the officer who interviewed the witnesses, and at the
scene, he reported to Officer Boone that witnesses had seen the Dodge Charger driving
erratically at high rates of speed.
3
Two of Lomax’s brothers were at the scene of the accident—Marcus Lester and Lonell
Kinchelow. Lester denied making this statement.
4
most area and detected the smell of alcohol, which appeared to be coming from
Lomax or from the area in which he was laying. Lomax’s family later stated they
were not permitted to enter the emergency room.
A doctor informed Officer Boone that Lomax was not capable of consent.
Consequently, Officer Boone requested that Amy Williamson, a nurse with the
medical examiner, obtain a sample of Lomax’s blood. Williamson also obtained
a urine sample from the catheter that was already in place. It was determined
Lomax’s blood alcohol content was .175.
Lomax was charged with vehicular homicide, in violation of Iowa Code
section 707.6A(1) (2011), and four counts of serious injury by vehicle, in violation
of Iowa Code section 707.6A(4). Lomax filed a motion to suppress the evidence
of his blood alcohol test. A hearing was held on March 27, 2012, and the district
court denied the motion. On March 28, 2012, a bench trial was held on the
minutes of testimony, as well as the testimony and exhibits offered during the
motion to suppress hearing. The court found Lomax guilty on all counts. A
motion in arrest of judgment was filed asserting that, because Officer Singleton
was arrested for possession of a controlled substance, a new trial should be held
in which Lomax could cross-examine Officer Singleton on his drug use. The
court heard arguments on May 11, 2012, and denied the motion, stating that
even if it did not consider the testimony of Officer Singleton, probable cause and
the statutory requirements for the invocation of implied consent supported the
blood draw. Lomax appeals.
5
II. Standard of Review
Because Lomax asserts the district court violated his constitutional rights
when denying his motion to suppress and motion in arrest of judgment, we
review the rulings de novo. See State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Iowa
2007). While we are not bound by the district court’s factual determinations, we
may give them deference given the court’s opportunity to observe the witnesses
first-hand. State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Iowa 2001). To the extent
Lomax’s arguments rely on the interpretation of statutory requirements, we
review the court’s ruling for correction of errors at law. See State v. Palmer, 554
N.W.2d 859, 864 (Iowa 1996).
III. Motion to Suppress
Lomax asserts three ways in which the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress: (1) the warrantless entry into the hospital emergency room
resulted in a violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution and article 1, sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Iowa
Constitution,4 (2) there was an insufficient basis to invoke implied consent to test
for Lomax’s blood alcohol content, and (3) the court improperly concluded that,
even giving no weight to Officer Singleton’s testimony, evidence still existed to
support the reasonable grounds determination and statutory requirements for the
invocation of implied consent.
4
Lomax’s arguments in this section rely on the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Consequently, we will only address that claim, given the other
constitutional arguments are waived. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3).
6
A. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. We conduct a
two-part test when determining whether a search was unreasonable. First, the
person challenging the warrantless search must have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the premises searched, both objectively and subjectively. State v.
Lovig, 675 N.W.2d 557, 562–63 (Iowa 2004). If this expectation exists, we must
then determine whether the State unreasonably invaded the protected interest.
Id. at 563.
Our court has established that a defendant has a reasonable expectation
of privacy with regard to his personal belongings in a hospital. State v.
Sheppard, 325 N.W.2d 911, 914–16 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (“We think there was
sufficient police involvement in the search and seizure of defendant’s clothing
which had been packaged that the police should have first obtained a warrant
before seizing this property.”). However, our case law has yet to reach the
question of whether an emergency room is an area in which a patient has a
subjective and objective expectation of privacy. 5 The State argues patients have
no reasonable expectation of privacy because it is the hospital staff—not the
patient—who controls the movement of people in and out of the emergency
room. Therefore, the State asserts a warrant is not required for law enforcement
5
Lomax cites State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385, 386 (Iowa 1978), for the proposition that
when a private citizen engages with the government, the protections of the Fourth
Amendment still apply. In oral argument, Carter was referenced to support the assertion
that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy even in public spaces. While it is
true Fourth Amendment protections apply when law enforcement searches the
defendant’s person or personal belongings, that is not the issue presently before our
court. Rather, the issue is whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a
hospital room, and therefore, Carter is distinguishable.
7
to enter an emergency room or trauma center. Consistent with that position,
Officer Boone testified he regularly enters the emergency room with only the
approval of the attending doctors or hospital staff. However, Lomax argues a
patient has a privacy interest in an emergency room, as anyone who tries to
enter the area must be buzzed in by hospital staff. The State counters that an
expectation of privacy does not arise simply because security measures are
taken by the hospital staff to maintain supervisory control as to who may enter
any given area of the hospital. We agree with the State that, while a patient has
an expectation of privacy in their belongings brought into the emergency room,
no such expectation of privacy exists in the trauma center locale, which is under
the exclusive control of the hospital staff.
Several other states have reached the same conclusion. See
Buchanan v. State, 432 So. 2d 147, 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (“Even if
Buchanan had formed a subjective expectation of privacy, it was simply
unreasonable for him to have done so in a busy hospital emergency room where
medical personnel were constantly walking in and out and where he could have
expected to remain only a few hours.”); People v. Torres, 494 N.E.2d 752, 755
(Ill. 1986) (holding the “defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
hospital emergency room”); State v. Cromb, 185 P.3d 1120, 1126 (Or. Ct. App.
2008) (“[P]revailing social norms do not treat a hospital emergency room, even
curtained areas within it, as space in which privacy rights inhere.”); State v.
Rheaume, 889 A.2d 711, 714 (Vt. 2005) (noting an emergency room “functions
as a freely accessible area over which a patient has no control and where his
privacy is diminished”).
8
Based on this reasoning, we conclude Lomax had no reasonable
expectation of privacy while in the hospital’s emergency room. Consequently,
Lomax’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when Officer Boone entered
the area and detected an odor of alcohol arising from the area in which Lomax
was laying. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Lomax’s motion to
suppress on this basis.
B. Implied Consent
Iowa Code section 321J.6(1)(b) authorizes an officer to request a blood
test if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated and if “[t]he person has been involved in a motor
vehicle accident or collision resulting in personal injury or death.” “Reasonable
grounds” means “the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time
action was required would have warranted a prudent person’s belief that an
offense had been committed.” State v. Owens, 418 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa
1988). The reasonableness of the suspicion is considered in light of the totality
of the circumstances and “must be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and
cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.”
State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 642 (Iowa 2002) (internal citation omitted).
Several facts support the conclusion Officer Boone had reasonable
grounds to believe Lomax was operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Primarily,
Officer Boone detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Lomax in the
emergency room. Furthermore, witnesses at the scene stated they had seen the
vehicle Lomax was driving, a Dodge Charger, traveling erratically at a high rate
of speed. The severity of the accident supported this observation, given Officer
9
Boone’s testimony that, in his experience, accidents of this magnitude only
involve cars traveling very fast. The crash also occurred at 3:00 a.m., a time of
night known to law enforcement to be associated with intoxicated drivers. See
State v. Rosenteil, 473 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Iowa 2000) (observing that the “wee
hours of the weekend” are a time “notorious for drunken driving”), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 2000). The totality of
these circumstances, which include the smell of alcohol on Lomax at the hospital,
the timeframe of the accident, and witnesses’ observations that Lomax was
driving fast and erratically, are consistent with intoxicated driving. Consequently,
Officer Boone had reasonable grounds to conclude Lomax was operating a
vehicle while intoxicated, and the district court properly denied his motion to
suppress.6
C. Officer Singleton’s Testimony
Furthermore, the district court did not err in determining it need not rely on
Officer Singleton’s testimony when deciding whether the blood and urine
samples were obtained in compliance with Iowa Code section 321J.6. The only
unique contribution by Officer Singleton to the investigation consisted of an
6
In his brief, Lomax consistently refers to the fact that Officer Boone called dispatch to
request that a medical examiner be ready to draw Lomax’s blood before Officer Boone
arrived at the hospital. This, Lomax claims, is the time at which the reasonable grounds
determination was made, and at that point in the night, Officer Boone did not have
reasonable grounds to invoke implied consent. However, the statute requires the
reasonable grounds determination to be made at the time action is required. See
Owens, 418 N.W.2d at 342. Here, action was required when Lomax was at the hospital,
given he was grievously injured at the scene and could not provide a blood sample or
otherwise consent to testing. It was at the hospital when Officer Boone detected the
smell of alcohol on Lomax’s person, which, combined with the other information Officer
Boone possessed, gave rise to the reasonable grounds determination. It was only after
this that Nurse Williamson drew a sample of Lomax’s blood and collected the urine
sample. Consequently, Officer Boone’s conduct complied with the statutory
requirements of Iowa Code section 321J.6.
10
unsubstantiated conclusion by Lomax’s brother that Lomax had been partying.7
It was not a statement that Lomax had in fact been consuming alcohol the night
of the accident—Officer Singleton himself stated, “I believe it was just an
assumption that [the brother] made.” This did not negate Officer Boone’s
observation of the horrendous damage at the scene, the knowledge that Lomax’s
car was seen traveling erratically at a high rate of speed, or his detection of the
odor of alcohol emanating from Lomax’s person. Therefore, the reasonable
grounds determination did not hinge on Officer Singleton’s statement to Officer
Boone, and the district court properly denied Lomax’s motion to suppress.
IV. Motion in Arrest of Judgment
Lomax’s final argument asserts the district court erred in denying his
motion in arrest of judgment. Lomax claims the State withheld exculpatory
information—the arrest of Officer Singleton for possession of a controlled
substance—which resulted in a Brady violation.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), held that a due process
violation occurs when the prosecution suppresses evidence favorable to the
defendant that is material either to guilt or punishment. This includes both
directly exculpatory evidence as well as impeachment evidence. United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). To prove a Brady violation, the defendant
must show: (1) the prosecution withheld evidence willfully or inadvertently, (2) the
evidence was favorable to the defense for either its exculpatory or impeachment
value, and (3) the evidence was material. Cornell v. State, 430 N.W.2d 384, 385
7
Officer Singleton also testified about his activities immediately following the accident as
well as described the scene, but this was corroborated by other evidence and testimony.
11
(Iowa 1988). Evidence is material to the issue of guilt when there is a reasonable
probability its disclosure would have changed the outcome of the proceeding.
State v. Jones, 817 N.W.2d 11, 22 (Iowa 2012).
Here, Lomax failed to establish Officer Singleton’s arrest was material,
given there is no reasonable probability the disclosure of this information would
have altered the outcome of the case. The district court specifically stated:
Even considering or giving no weight whatsoever to Officer
Singleton . . . the Court finds that upon a review of its notes and the
record in the matter that the evidence given by the other officers,
including Officer Boone, was sufficient to support the probable
cause and statutory requirements for the invocation of the implied
consent law.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that, regardless of Officer
Singleton’s contribution to the case, sufficient evidence existed to support both
the reasonable grounds determination as well as the convictions. Therefore, any
impeachment evidence with regard to Officer Singleton would not have altered
the outcome of the proceedings. Moreover, it is not even clear the State had a
duty to disclose this information to Lomax, considering Officer Singleton’s arrest
was unrelated to Lomax’s case. See, e.g., United States v. Rosner, 516 F.2d
269, 280 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding no Brady violation occurred even though the
prosecution failed to disclose an undercover agent’s perjury in an unrelated
case). Consequently, we conclude no Brady violation occurred, and the district
court properly denied Lomax’s motion in arrest of judgment.
Having considered Lomax’s arguments, we affirm the opinion of the
district court.
AFFIRMED.