State of Iowa v. Eric Alanda Mims ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 4-13 / 12-2279
Filed March 12, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ERIC ALANDA MIMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G. Blane II,
Judge.
Eric Mims challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction of burglary in the second degree. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and David Porter, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Mullins, JJ.
2
DANILSON, C.J.
Eric Mims challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction of burglary in the second degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections
713.1 and .5(1)(b) (2011). Because the jury could reasonably determine that
Mims had the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of the items taken
from her occupied residence, we affirm the conviction.
The defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that he used the stolen items
(credit cards, insurance cards, and identification) as a means to get his car back
from the victim’s daughter, which—while “childish”—contradicts a finding of a
specific intent to permanently deprive the victim of her items. The district court
rejected the argument: “And if [the defendant] didn’t get his car keys back or
possession of his vehicle, the opposite argument is then he wasn’t going to
return [the victim’s] items to her. It was his bargaining chip. And I think the jury
can hear that evidence and make their decision.” We agree.
We conclude a rational jury could infer a specific intent to permanently
deprive the victim of property where a defendant places conditions upon the
return of the property he has no right to impose. One commentator states,
One who takes another’s property intending at the time he
takes it to use it temporarily and then to return it unconditionally
within a reasonable time—and having a substantial ability to do
so—lacks the intent to steal required for larceny. It should be noted
that it is the intent to return the property, not its actual return, which
constitutes the defense to larceny: one who takes another’s
property intending at the time of taking to deprive the owner
permanently is nevertheless guilty of larceny, though he later
(becoming frightened, or his better nature prevailing) decides to
return it and does so.
Conversely, an intent to return is a defense though some
unexpected obstacle prevents an actual return. An intent to return,
to be a defense, need not be an intent to return it to the exact spot
3
from which it was taken if the intent is to return it to a place
sufficiently near so that the owner is substantially certain to find it or
get it back. The intent to return, however, must be unconditional.
Thus it is no defense to larceny that the taker intended to return it
only if he should receive a reward for its return, or only upon some
other condition which he has no right to impose.
See Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Subst. Crim. L. § 19.5(b) (2d ed.) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted) (current through October 2013), http://westlaw.com (last
visited Feb. 20, 2014); see also People v. Davis, 965 P.2d 1165, 1169 (Calif.
1988) (concluding the defendant’s intent to claim ownership of the shirt and to
return it to store only on condition that the store pay him a “refund” constitutes an
intent to permanently deprive within the meaning of the law of larceny); Carter v.
Commonwealth, 694 S.E.2d 590, 595 (Va. 2010) (quoting LaFave commentary).
We conclude an intent to return items belonging to another on condition the
defendant has no right to assert can support an inference of specific intent to
permanently deprive the owner of the property. Moreover, a claim of right to
property taken may not serve to negate intent to a charge of burglary. State v.
Miller, 622 N.W.2d 782, 785 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000) (concluding the claim-of-right
defense provided in Iowa Code section 714.4 is only applicable to theft charges).
Here, Mims lacked both a claim of right and a right to impose a condition before
returning the property.
We therefore affirm the conviction.
AFFIRMED.