Robert Anthony Ruan, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 12-2049
Filed March 12, 2014
ROBERT ANTHONY RUAN,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cherokee County, David A. Lester,
Judge.
Robert Ruan appeals from the summary dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney
General, Ryan R. Koplin, County Attorney, and Kristal L. Phillips, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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DOYLE, J.
Robert Ruan appeals from the summary dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief, contending there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether his guilty plea to two counts of third-degree sexual abuse as a habitual
offender was knowing and voluntary. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Ruan was originally charged with two counts of sexual abuse in the third
degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1(3), 709.4(2)(b), and
709.4(2)(c)(4) (2007), class “C” felonies. The trial information was later amended
to charge Ruan with three counts of third-degree sexual abuse as a habitual
offender. Consistent with the terms of a plea agreement, Ruan pled guilty to two
counts of third-degree sexual abuse as a habitual offender, and the State
dismissed the remaining count as well as charges pending against Ruan in two
separate aggravated misdemeanor cases. The plea memorandum provided
Ruan would be sentenced to a term not to exceed fifteen years on each count, 1
to run concurrent with each other, with credit for time served, and with a
mandatory minimum sentence “required pursuant to Iowa Code §903B.1 and
§902.8.”2
Ruan appeared with counsel for the plea and sentencing hearing, where
the following colloquy took place:
1
Iowa Code section 902.9(3) provided, “An habitual offender shall be confined for no
more than fifteen years.”
2
Section 902.8 provided in part: “A person sentenced as an habitual offender shall not
be eligible for parole until the person has served the minimum sentence of confinement
of three years.”
3
COURT: Because you are charged with the same crime
under Count II and under Count III, as it is enhanced by Count IV,
I’m going to read the penalty to you one time. But they apply to
each count. Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: All right then. Two counts against you are
classified as Class C felonies. As a Class C felony—a straight
Class C felony, you would face up to a maximum term of
imprisonment of up to 10 years. But because you are pleading
guilty—you are charged and pleading guilty as a habitual offender,
there’s an enhancement to the sentence. And at sentencing, rather
than up to a maximum of 10 years imprisonment, you face up to a
maximum of 15 years imprisonment. Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: If this were not being charged as a habitual
offender, then there would be no minimum period you must serve
before being eligible for parole. But this is an enhanced charge,
and as a habitual offender, you must serve a minimum three-year
term of incarceration before you will be eligible for parole. Do you
understand the minimum sentence?
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: And do you understand that the minimum 3 years
and the maximum 15 years are a result of the sentencing
enhancement because of the charge against you of committing this
crime as a habitual offender?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
The district court accepted Ruan’s guilty plea and sentenced him in accordance
with the plea memorandum.3
Ruan filed an application for postconviction relief challenging the
voluntariness of his plea and contending he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Specifically, Ruan claimed his plea attorney misadvised him of the
mandatory minimum prison terms he faced; he alleged had he known the original
charges against him without a habitual offender enhancement did not have a
seventy percent mandatory minimum, he would not have agreed to the terms of
the plea memorandum under which he was ultimately sentenced. Ruan’s
3
The court also asked Ruan if he was “satisfied with the services of [his] attorney,” to
which Ruan responded, “Yes.”
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requested relief was that he be allowed to plead guilty to the two original
charges, without habitual offender enhancements, and be sentenced to serve
concurrent ten-year terms.
The State filed a motion for summary dismissal of Ruan’s application,
claiming the grounds urged by Ruan in his application “are in direct contradiction
to the record, court file and his guilty plea colloquy.” Ruan resisted the State’s
motion, contending “the record transcript will NOT show if he was told by his
counsel that he was facing charges that carried an enhancement,” and that
further gathering of evidence was necessary.
Following a hearing, the postconviction court entered a ruling dismissing
Ruan’s application. The court found “Ruan has failed to carry his burden of
showing that a material factual issue exists” where “Ruan’s allegations in his
application for post-conviction relief are directly contradicted by the record made
during the plea taking and sentencing hearing held in the underlying criminal
case.” Ruan appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review postconviction proceedings for errors at law. Everett v. State,
789 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Iowa 2010). This includes summary dismissals of
applications for postconviction relief. Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 560
(Iowa 2002). However, we conduct a de novo review of applications for
postconviction relief raising constitutional infirmities, including claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa
2011). “In determining whether summary judgment is warranted, the moving
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party has the burden of proving the material facts are undisputed. We examine
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.III. Discussion
Summary disposition of a postconviction application is authorized “when it
appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa Code § 822.6 (2011). Disposition under this
provision is similar to the summary judgment procedure set forth in Iowa Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.981(3). See Manning, 654 N.W.2d at 559-60.
Ruan essentially argues that summary disposition was inappropriate
because his application generated issues of material fact entitling him to an
evidentiary hearing. The State counters an evidentiary hearing is not required
where Ruan’s claim is “directly contradicted by the record” and he did not
challenge “the credibility of the record that was before the court.” Ruan’s
application is based on misinformation he alleges his counsel gave him before
the plea hearing regarding mandatory minimums applicable to the original sexual
abuse in the third-degree charges. But the record reflects that the court provided
explicit and correct information on the same subject – applicable mandatory
minimum sentences for the original charges and for the charges to which he
entered his guilty pleas.
“A plea colloquy that covers the specific ground subsequently raised in a
postconviction relief application would normally support summary judgment on
those grounds.” Castro, 795 N.W.2d at 795; see Wise v. State, 708 N.W.2d 66,
6
71 (Iowa 2006) (indicating that statements made to court in plea colloquy
establish a presumption of the true facts on the record). Where the record
directly contradicts the claim a guilty plea was unintelligent and involuntary, “the
applicant bears a special burden to establish the record is inaccurate.” See
Arnold v. State, 540 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Iowa 1995).
In dismissing Ruan’s application for postconviction relief, the
postconviction court specifically pointed out the “very detailed and meticulous
manner” in which the plea and sentencing proceeding was conducted. As the
court stated:
Reasonable minds reviewing the record of the plea and sentencing
proceedings could only conclude that Ruan was not only full[y]
informed and cognizant of the plea agreement he reached with the
State, but also was fully informed that the sexual abuse charges to
which he was pleading guilty were subject to not only a minimum
term of incarceration, but also a greater maximum term only
because he was being charged and was agreeing to plead guilty as
an habitual offender. As reflected by the transcript made during
those proceedings, Ruan acknowledged that he fully understood
that if he were not being charged as an habitual offender, his
maximum term of imprisonment would be ten years, and there
would be no minimum period of incarceration that he would be
required to serve before being eligible for parole. Finally, when
asked whether he had any questions about the possible penalties
he was facing at the time of sentencing, after all the possible
penalties were explained to him by [the court], Ruan responded,
“No, Your Honor.”
To avoid summary judgment, Ruan relies on Manning, 654 N.W.2d at 560-
61, in which the supreme court reversed the district court’s summary dismissal of
an application for postconviction relief and remanded for an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether the claims could be established. In Manning, however, the
State’s motion for summary judgment “presented nothing more than pure
allegations.” See id. at 561-62. In contrast, in this case the State presented the
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plea memorandum and the detailed colloquy that took place during the plea and
sentencing proceeding. Ruan failed to carry his “special burden to establish the
record is inaccurate.” See Arnold, 540 N.W.2d at 246.
Upon our de novo review, we find no error. We affirm the postconviction
court’s ruling dismissing Ruan’s application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.