Michael Lynn Heard Sr. v. State of Iowa , 918 N.W.2d 501 ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 16-0723
    Filed April 4, 2018
    MICHAEL LYNN HEARD SR.,
    Applicant-Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Greene County, Steven J. Oeth,
    Judge.
    A postconviction applicant appeals the denial of relief from his convictions
    and sentences for cocaine delivery, theft, and criminal mischief. AFFIRMED.
    Joseph C. Glazebrook of Glazebrook & Hurd, LLP, Des Moines, for
    appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary L. Miller, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ.
    2
    TABOR, Judge.
    Michael Heard Sr. appeals the dismissal of his postconviction relief (PCR)
    application. He raises several issues related to his sentencing. But because he
    has discharged his sentence, those issues are now moot. So Heard is left with a
    single viable claim—had trial counsel fully investigated Heard’s mental health and
    better informed Heard about a diminished capacity defense, Heard would have
    insisted on going to trial. Deferring to the district court’s credibility findings, we
    reject Heard’s allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel.
    In October 2010, Heard pleaded guilty to delivery of cocaine, a class “C”
    felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(2)(b) (2010). The district
    court sentenced Heard to an indeterminate ten-year suspended sentence and
    placed him on probation for five years. After Heard violated his probation in 2012,
    the district court imposed the original ten-year sentence. But after reconsideration,
    the court again released Heard on a five-year probation term.
    Then in 2014, Heard violated probation and was charged with second-
    degree criminal mischief, domestic abuse assault, and fifth-degree theft. To avoid
    the impact of a domestic-abuse-assault conviction, Heard agreed to plead guilty to
    fifth-degree theft, in violation of Iowa Code section 714.2(5) and third-degree
    criminal mischief, in violation of Iowa Code section 716.1, in return for the State’s
    dismissal of the assault charge. At the combined sentencing and probation-
    revocation hearing, the district court imposed a thirty-day term for theft and a two-
    year term for criminal mischief concurrent to his indeterminate ten-year sentence
    for drug delivery.
    3
    Heard sought postconviction relief (PCR) alleging his trial attorney was
    ineffective in three ways: (1) failing to investigate a diminished-capacity defense
    based on Heard’s diagnoses for mood disorder and major panic disorder, (2) failing
    to request an updated presentence investigation (PSI) report, and (3) failing to
    present evidence of Heard’s impairments as mitigating sentencing factors. During
    the PCR hearing Heard also complained counsel permitted him to plead guilty
    even though Heard did not understand the charges or their consequences. Heard
    alleged that had counsel performed adequately, he would have refused the plea
    agreement and demanded a trial. Heard’s counsel, Joey Hoover, testified. Heard
    also took the stand, as did his wife and son.
    The PCR court decided attorney Hoover performed competently and
    dismissed Heard’s PCR application. On appeal, Heard renews his claims that
    Hoover failed to adequately investigate a possible diminished-capacity defense,
    failed to present evidence of Heard’s mental health at sentencing, failed to request
    an updated PSI, and the cumulative effect of these failures resulted in prejudice.
    Heard also alleges he received constitutionally deficient representation from his
    PCR trial counsel because that attorney failed to challenge the district court’s
    sentencing calculation.
    While we generally review PCR proceedings for legal error, we review
    ineffective-assistance claims de novo due to their constitutional nature.      See
    Ledezma v. State, 
    626 N.W.2d 134
    , 141 (Iowa 2001). Because the district court
    had the chance to see the witnesses in person, we give weight to its conclusions
    regarding their credibility. See 
    id.
     To show he received ineffective assistance,
    Heard must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his attorneys failed to
    4
    perform an essential duty and prejudice resulted. See State v. Straw, 
    708 N.W.2d 128
    , 133 (Iowa 2006).
    The bulk of Heard’s appellate claims relate to sentencing. But, as Heard
    concedes, he discharged his sentence on February 8, 2017.1 The State argues
    the sentencing claims are moot. An issue is moot “if it no longer presents a
    justiciable controversy because the issues involved are academic or nonexistent.”
    Homan v. Branstad, 
    864 N.W.2d 321
    , 328 (Iowa 2015) (quoting Iowa Bankers
    Ass’n v. Iowa Credit Union Dep’t, 
    335 N.W.2d 439
    , 442 (Iowa 1983)). When
    determining if an issue is moot, we question if “an opinion would be of force and
    effect with regard to the underlying controversy.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Women Aware v.
    Reagan, 
    331 N.W.2d 88
    , 92 (Iowa 1983)). Because Heard already discharged his
    sentences, an opinion would be of no force and effect.2 Accordingly, we dismiss
    those claims as moot. See State v. Wilson, 
    234 N.W.2d 140
    , 141 (Iowa 1975)
    (determining challenge to sentencing condition was moot because the sentence
    was already discharged).
    Heard’s only surviving claim alleges attorney Hoover failed to adequately
    investigate Heard’s mental-health issues as possible support for a diminished-
    capacity defense. Heard claims had Hoover more fully developed the diminished-
    1
    “Matters that are technically outside the record may be submitted in order to establish or
    counter a claim of mootness. We consider matters that have transpired during the appeal
    for this limited purpose.” In re L.H., 
    480 N.W.2d 43
    , 45 (Iowa 1992).
    2
    Heard’s sentencing challenges do not present issues warranting review in spite of
    mootness. See State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 
    639 N.W.2d 226
    , 234 (Iowa 2002) (noting
    moot claims can be considered after considering the “(1) the private or public nature of the
    issue; (2) the desirability of an authoritative adjudication to guide public officials in their
    future conduct; (3) the likelihood of the recurrence of the issue; and (4) the likelihood the
    issue will recur yet evade appellate review” (citation omitted)). Heard did not file a reply
    brief to address the mootness issue.
    5
    capacity defense and explained it to him, he would have refused the plea
    agreement and insisted on going to trial. To prevail, Heard must show Hoover
    failed to meet the standard of a reasonably competent attorney. See Ledezma,
    
    626 N.W.2d at 142
    . We begin with an assumption Hoover performed competently
    and require Heard to show otherwise. See 
    id.
    Heard did not prove Hoover’s representation fell below reasonable
    competency. Hoover testified he reviewed a psychological evaluation of Heard in
    preparation for a diminished-capacity defense, which would have negated the
    specific intent elements of the offenses charged. Hoover also testified he advised
    his client about the pros and cons of accepting the proposed plea agreement
    versus raising a diminished-capacity defense at trial. Specifically Hoover warned
    Heard that juries “tend to not like that defense.” Hoover used a recent high-profile
    Iowa case to illustrate his point.       But Hoover did not suggest a jury would
    necessarily reject the defense in Heard’s case. Hoover testified had Heard opted
    for a trial, he would have presented the diminished-capacity defense. In support
    of the defense, Hoover intended to call, and in fact had subpoenaed, the
    psychologist who drafted Heard’s evaluation. Hoover testified he was “confident”
    Heard understood the consequences of the plea agreement or the attorney “would
    not have allowed the plea to go forward.” In his testimony, Heard disagreed with
    his attorney’s recollection of events.
    The PCR court gave credence to attorney Hoover’s testimony, and we defer
    to that credibility finding.   See Ledezma, 
    626 N.W.2d at 141
    .        The attorney
    adequately investigated a diminished-capacity defense and provided Heard an
    honest assessment of its chances of success. Heard made an informed decision
    6
    to “enter pleas and probation violation admissions.” On this record, Heard cannot
    to show Hoover failed to perform an essential duty.3 See 
    id. at 142
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    Heard also argues he received ineffective assistance due to the cumulative impact of
    counsel’s omissions. But because only one issue is not moot, there are not claims to
    consider in aggregate.