Chafa v. Greenfield ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0039
Filed December 21, 2022
S.C., a minor, by her next of friend COURTNEY A. CHAFA, and COURTNEY
A. CHAFA, Individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
CITY OF GREENFIELD,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Adair County, Terry Rickers, Judge.
A parent, as the next of friend for her daughter, appeals a district court’s
order granting the city’s motion to dismiss. AFFIRMED.
Martin L. Fisher and Kyle W. Savage of The Fisher Law Firm, PC, Adair, for
appellant.
Janice Thomas and Cathy S. Trent-Vilim of Lamson Dugan & Murray LLP,
West Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Courtney Chafa, individually and as the next of friend for her daughter, S.C.,
appeals a district court order granting the city of Greenfield’s motion to dismiss.1
She claims her petition adequately set out claims of negligence and strict liability
against the city based on a dog attack. We find the court properly granted the
city’s motion to dismiss and affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Chafa filed a petition on June 11, 2021, alleging the city of Greenfield (the
city) was negligent when it failed to destroy a neighbor’s dog that was unvaccinated
for rabies prior to the dog attacking her daughter, S.C., on June 15, 2019. The
dog bit S.C. while she was mowing her family’s yard. The petition alleged that the
dog “was known to the Greenfield Police” prior to the attack.
After the city moved to dismiss, Chafa amended the petition to include a
claim of strict liability. The city filed a subsequent motion to dismiss following the
amended petition claiming Chafa’s negligence claim was barred by the public-duty
doctrine. The city also claimed it was not the owner of the dog, therefore strict
1 Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210 provides:
An action of a minor or any person adjudged incompetent
shall be brought by the person’s conservator if there is one or, if not,
by the person’s guardian if there is one; otherwise the minor may sue
by a next friend, and the incompetent by a conservator or guardian
appointed by the court for that purpose. If it is in the person’s best
interest, the court may dismiss such action or substitute another
conservator, guardian or next friend.
3
liability was precluded. The district court granted the city’s motion to dismiss on
both counts. Chafa appeals.2
II. Standard of Review
“We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for the correction
of errors at law.” Shumate v. Drake Univ., 846 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 2014)
(citation omitted). “For purposes of reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we
accept as true the petition’s well-pleaded factual allegations, but not its legal
conclusions.” Id. “We will affirm a district court ruling that granted a motion to
dismiss when the petition’s allegations, taken as true, fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.” Id.III. Discussion
Chafa contends the district court erroneously granted the city’s motion to
dismiss. She claims her petition set out adequate facts to support her claims of
negligence and strict liability.
A. Negligence
Chafa based her negligence claim on Iowa Code sections 351.26 and .37
(2019). Section 351.26 includes,
It shall be lawful for any person, and the duty of all peace
officers within their respective jurisdictions unless such jurisdictions
shall have otherwise provided for the seizure and impoundment of
dogs, to kill any dog for which a rabies vaccination tag is required,
when the dog is not wearing a collar with rabies vaccination tag
attached.
2 We note Chafa’s appellate brief lacks a statement concerning error preservation
for the issues she raises on appeal. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(1). All parties
are required to adhere to the appellate rules.
4
Section 351.37(1) provides that a dog “running at large” without a valid rabies
vaccination tag “shall be apprehended and impounded” by law enforcement.
Furthermore, the dog’s owner must vaccinate the dog within seven days, or the
dog “may be humanely destroyed.” Iowa Code § 351.37(2)-(3). Chafa claimed
the city’s “employees, included [sic] but not limited to peace officers, have
encountered this dog before, and failed to kill the animal as required by statute.”
The district court found Chafa’s claim was legally deficient because the city
owed no duty to S.C. pursuant to the “public-duty doctrine.” “[W]hether a duty is
owed under particular circumstances is a matter of law for the court’s
determination.” Morris v. Legends Fieldhouse Bar & Grill, LLC, 958 N.W.2d 817,
821 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). “[T]he public-duty doctrine examines whether
the governmentsl entity owed any enforceable duty to plaintiffs to begin with.”
Breese v. City of Burlington, 945 N.W.2d 12, 18 (Iowa 2020). It is commonly said
that, under this doctrine, “a duty [owed by the government] to all is a duty to none.”
Fulps v. City of Urbandale, 956 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa 2021) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted). More specifically,
[T]he public-duty doctrine generally comes into play only when there
is a confluence of two factors. First, the injury to the plaintiff was
directly caused or inflicted by a third party or other independent force.
Second, the plaintiff alleges a governmental entity or actor breached
a uniquely governmental duty, usually, but not always, imposed by
statute, rule, or ordinance to protect the plaintiff from the third party
or other independent force. Even then, the existence of a special
relationship will negate the public-duty doctrine.
Id. at 473–74. The doctrine most often applies when the plaintiff’s claims are based
on the government entity’s act of “nonfeasance,” that is, “a government failure to
adequately enforce criminal or regulatory laws for the benefit of the general public
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. . . or a government failure to protect the general public from somebody else’s
instrumentality.” Id. at 475 (quoting Breese, 945 N.W.2d at 21).
Here, the district court correctly found the doctrine applied and precluded
Chafa’s negligence claim. The injury to S.C. was caused by a third party—the
neighbor’s dog attacking her.
Second, Chafa claims the city breached a duty imposed by sections 531.26
and .37 by failing to apprehend and either vaccinate or destroy the dog. Thus,
according to Chafa, the city breached a duty imposed by statute for the general
public’s safety—everyone benefits when there are fewer rabid dogs on the loose.
Further, we note this case is one of classic nonfeasance—Chafa’s allegations
relate to the city’s failure to enforce a statute. See Breece, 945 N.W.2d at 21
(“What is clear is that we have generally applied the public-duty doctrine when the
allegation is a government failure to adequately enforce criminal or regulatory laws
for the benefit of the general public.”). This establishes the applicability of the
public-duty doctrine. Additionally, because that duty applies to the public at large
and Chafa has not presented any other facts suggesting otherwise, there is no
special relationship between Chafa and the city. See Rass v. State, 729 N.W.2d
444, 446 (Iowa 2007) (finding that an individual on government owned property
was an invitee and therefore a special relationship existed);3 Summy v. City of Des
Moines, 708 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Iowa 2006) (finding a golfer at a municipal golf
3 Chafa disagrees with the district court’s reliance on Raas due to factual
differences between that case and the present one. However, Chafa failed to
identify any facts in her petition that would give rise to a special relationship.
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course had a special relationship with the city), overruled on other grounds by
Alcala v. Marriot Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 708 n.3 (Iowa 2016).
Chafa claims the public-duty doctrine is inapplicable because the alleged
duty the city breached was not “uniquely governmental.” See Fulps, 956 N.W.2d
at 473. She notes that section 351.26 provides, “It shall be lawful for any person .
. . to kill any dog” lacking a rabies vaccination tag. (Emphasis added.) However,
that section is permissive as to the general public, while it is mandatory to peace
officers. See Iowa Code § 351.26 (“It shall be . . . the duty of all peace officers
. . . .”). Laypersons are not required to apprehend and destroy dogs lacking tags;
they are merely protected from liability if they choose to do so. Id. In contrast,
only government officials have the affirmative duty to destroy such dogs. Id. Thus,
the duty Chafa claims the city breached is a uniquely governmental one.
Because the public-duty exception demonstrates the city owed Chafa no
duty to protect her or her family from dogs identified by statute in sections 351.26
and .37, Chafa failed to set out a claim for which relief could be granted. The court
properly granted the city’s motion to dismiss as to Chafa’s negligence claim.4
B. Strict Liability
Chafa claims the district court erred by granting the city’s motion to dismiss
her strict liability claim. In particular, she claims that as the owner of the
unvaccinated dog with dangerous propensities, the city is liable for the attack. The
district court determined that the city was not the dog’s owner under
4 Chafa also asks us to abandon the public-duty doctrine in its entirety. However,
our supreme court noted only months ago, “the public-duty doctrine remains ‘alive
and well in Iowa.’” Est. of Farrell v. State, 974 N.W.2d 132, 137 (Iowa 2022)
(citation omitted).
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section 351.28, which imposes liability for damages done by dogs on “[t]he owner
of [the] dog.”5
Chafa essentially claims that a number of code provisions, when read
together, produce the result of rendering dangerous dogs ownerless. First, Iowa
Code section 351.25 notes that “[d]ogs not provided with a rabies vaccination tag
shall not be deemed property.” Section 351.33 commands, “It shall be unlawful
for any person to own or have a dog in the person’s possession . . . which has not
been vaccinated against rabies.” Section 351.28 provides that “the owner,” which
means “the legal owner,” of a dog is liable for any damages it causes. See Fouts
ex rel. Jensen v. Mason, 592 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 1999). Thus, according to
Chafa, the code makes it impossible for those who own dogs lacking a rabies
vaccination and accompanying tag to be held liable for damages caused by the
dogs because the dogs are not lawfully owned and are not property.
We disagree with Chafa’s claims for several reasons. First, even taking the
analysis as true—which we do not—it is unclear how her neighbor’s lack of lawful
ownership in the dog means the city is the dog’s legal owner. Chafa’s analysis
would merely render the dog ownerless. Second, our supreme court has already
addressed that, “[p]resumably, establishing legal title [to a dog] is not an absolute
requirement.” Id. Instead, “the plaintiff can still prove the defendant is the owner
of the dog by showing that (1) the dog was in the defendant’s possession, and (2)
5 After disputing the legal grounds the district court relied on in its analysis of
statutory liability, Chafa claims on appeal that she was actually bringing a common
law strict liability claim. However, the district court never ruled on such a claim.
And Chafa failed to file a motion to reconsider, enlarge or amend pursuant to Iowa
R. Civ. P. 1.904(2). As such, her common law strict liability claim is unpreserved
for review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002).
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the defendant was harboring the dog on the defendant’s premises as owners
usually do with their dogs.”6 Id. Chafa never alleges the city was “harboring the
dog on the defendant’s premises as owners usually do.” Indeed, her petition
acknowledges that it was the “neighbor’s dog” that attacked S.C. on the family’s
property. And as the district court aptly noted, it is illogical to say the city was
negligent in failing to apprehend the dog while simultaneously claiming the city had
sufficient control to be considered its owner.
Because Chafa cannot as a matter of law establish the city owned the dog,
as is required to impose liability under Iowa Code section 351.28, she failed to set
out a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court properly granted the
motion to dismiss.
As noted by the district court, under notice pleading, nearly every case will
survive a motion to dismiss. Smith v. Smith, 513 N.W.2d, 728, 730 (Iowa 1994).
Our supreme court highlighted the pitfalls to granting a motion to dismiss.
We recognize the temptation is strong for a defendant to strike a
vulnerable petition at the earliest opportunity. Experience has however
taught us that vast judicial resources could be saved with the
exercise of more professional patience. Under the foregoing rules
dismissals of many of the weakest cases must be reversed on appeal.
Two appeals often result where one would have sufficed had the
defense moved by way of summary judgment, or even by way of
defense at trial. From a defendant’s standpoint, moreover, it is far from
unknown for the flimsiest of cases to gain strength when its dismissal is
reversed on appeal.
6 We note that Chafa contends Fouts is inapposite because it dealt with legally
owned, vaccinated dogs. However, the issue as presented by Chafa is who owned
the dog that lacked a rabies vaccine tag, thus calling into question legal ownership.
Fouts firmly addressed the issue of identifying ownership when legal ownership is
unclear.
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Cutler v. Klass, Whicher & Mishne, 473 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa 1991).
Like the district court, we recognize the limitations on granting a motion to
dismiss under notice pleading. But a dismissal is a foregone conclusion when the
petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This is such a case.
For the above stated reasons, we determine dismissal was appropriate under both
the negligence and strict liability claims. Accordingly, we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.