Nathan Paul Valin v. State of Iowa ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0362
Filed December 15, 2021
NATHAN PAUL VALIN,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William P. Kelly, Judge.
The applicant appeals the district court decision denying his request for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Nathan A. Mundy of Mundy Law Office, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Nathan Valin appeals the district court ruling that denied his request for
postconviction relief (PCR). Valin argues he is entitled to PCR as he could not
anticipate a change in the law and he was improperly stopped by an Iowa
Department of Transportation (DOT) motor vehicle enforcement officer who did not
have authority to stop vehicles or make arrests for violations of traffic regulations.
Valin asserts is entitled to a retroactive application of State v. Werner, 919 N.W.2d
375 (Iowa 2018). We affirm the denial of Valin’s application for PCR.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
On July 13, 2016, Officer Brian Rink, a motor vehicle enforcement officer
for the DOT, was driving a marked DOT vehicle when he was passed by a
motorcycle traveling at a high speed. Officer Rink stopped the vehicle and noticed
the driver, Valin, had an odor of an alcoholic beverage and bloodshot, watery eyes.
He tested above the legal limit for alcohol. Valin was charged with operating while
intoxicated (OWI), second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2016).
Valin filed a motion to suppress, claiming Officer Rink did not have authority
to stop him for a traffic matter. The district court denied the motion, finding:
Although [DOT peace officers] have limited authority, that does not
prevent a DOT officer from taking action if a crime is committed in
their presence. See Iowa Code [§] 804.9. Nothing prevents the DOT
officers from acting as a concerned citizen even while they are on
duty. The Defendant was speeding 91 in a 60 m.p.h. zone on an
interstate highway. This was not just a traffic violation but a clear
threat to the safety of the general public. Officer Risk testified that
he stopped the Defendant for speeding and for safety reasons. If
Risk failed to take some action there could have been an accident.
Following the court’s ruling, Valin waived his right to a jury trial and
stipulated to a trial on the minutes of testimony. He was convicted of OWI, second
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offense. On April 3, 2017, Valin was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to
exceed two years, with all but thirty days suspended. He was thereafter placed on
probation. Valin did not appeal the denial of his motion to suppress or his
conviction.
On October 19, 2018, the Iowa Supreme Court decided Werner, which held
that a DOT motor vehicle enforcement officer did not have authority to stop
vehicles or make arrests for violations of traffic regulations.1 919 N.W.2d at 378.
The court found these officers’ authority was “strictly limited by the Iowa Code to
inspecting for registration, weight, size, load and safety violations.” Id.at 379
(citation omitted). The court also rejected the State’s argument that the officer had
conducted a citizen’s arrest, noting the officer “made the stop as part of his official
duties, not as a ‘private person.’”2 Id.
On April 25, 2019, Valin filed a PCR application, requesting the court reopen
his criminal case and remand for reconsideration of his motion to suppress in light
of the Iowa Supreme Court’s ruling in Werner, which he claimed should be
retroactively applied. The district court denied his PCR application. The court
found PCR cases are “not a means for relitigating claims that were or should have
1 The Iowa Supreme Court determined in Rilea v. Iowa Department of
Transportation, that DOT officers have authority to stop motorists for suspected
violations of chapter 321J. 919 N.W.2d 380, 388 (Iowa 2018). This authority,
however, does not apply if the officer does not suspect the driver may be driving
while intoxicated. Werner, 919 N.W.2d at 380. The evidence in the present case
shows Valin was stopped for speeding, not because the officer suspected he was
impaired and, thus, this case does not involve the officer’s authority under chapter
321J. See id.
2 The court left open the question of whether motor vehicle enforcement officers
could make vehicle stops for safety purposes because it found the facts of the case
did not come within the community-caretaking doctrine. Werner, 919 N.W.2d at
378.
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been properly presented on direct appeal.” The court determined Valin did not
show sufficient reason for not raising an issue concerning the authority of a motor
vehicle enforcement officer to stop his vehicle in a direct appeal, as he had raised
the issue in his motion to suppress. The district court also determined the Werner
decision could not be applied retroactively. Valin appeals the district court’s
decision.
II. Standard of Review
“We generally review the denial of an application for [PCR] for correction of
errors at law.” Sauser v. State, 928 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Iowa 2019). “However, our
review is de novo when the basis for [PCR] implicates a constitutional violation.”
Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019). We “can affirm the district court
decision on any ground argued below and urged on appeal by the appellee, even
if the court below did not reach that issue.” Jones v. State, 938 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa
2020).
III. Discussion
Valin asks the court to reopen his criminal case under section 822.2(1)(g)
(2019). This section provides that a person may file a PCR application if “[t]he
conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of
alleged error formerly available under any common law, statutory or other writ,
motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy, except alleged error relating to restitution,
court costs, or fees under section 904.702 or chapter 815 or 910.”
Section 822.2(2) states:
This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any
remedy, incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of direct
review of the sentence or conviction. Except as otherwise provided
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in this chapter, it comprehends and takes the place of all other
common law, statutory, or other remedies formerly available for
challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used
exclusively in place of them.
Under section 822.2, PCR proceedings “are not an alternative means for
litigating issues that were or should have been properly presented for review on
direct appeal.” Berryhill v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1999). “Thus, we
have consistently held that any claim not properly raised on direct appeal may not
be litigated in a [PCR] action unless sufficient reason or cause is shown for not
previously raising the claim, and actual prejudice resulted from the claim of error.”
Id.; see also Renier v. State, No. 16-1876, 2017 WL 4570480, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Oct. 11, 2017). When an issue has not been raised in a direct appeal, and no
reason for failing to raise the issue has been shown, the issue may not be litigated
in a PCR proceeding. See Staples v. State, No. 10-1616, 2013 WL 988907, at *4
(Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2013). Valin does not allege his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the denial of his suppression motion, citing Millam
v. State, 745 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Iowa 2003), and relying on the general standard
that attorneys are not required to anticipate a change in the law.
There is an exception in PCR cases for issues based upon “factual or legal
matters which were excusably unknown at the time of the trial and appeal.”3
Nguyen v. State, 707 N.W.2d 317, 323 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Berryhill, 603 N.W.2d
3 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is also an exception to the rules of
error preservation. Everett v. State, 789 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Iowa 2010). Valin does
not claim that his failure to raise the issue concerning the authority of a motor
vehicle enforcement officer to stop his vehicle on direct appeal was due to
ineffective assistance of counsel.
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at 245). There must be a showing of actual prejudice resulting from the failure to
previously raise the issue. Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 271 (Iowa 1991).
Valin claims he could not have raised the issue concerning the authority of
a motor vehicle enforcement officer to stop his vehicle in a direct appeal after he
was sentenced on April 3, 2017, because Werner was not decided until
October 19, 2018. He contends that the issue comes within the error-preservation
exception for “factual or legal matters which were excusably unknown at the time
of the trial and appeal.” See Nguyen, 707 N.W.2d at 323. Lastly, Valin argues he
is entitled to retroactive application of the Werner holding. We address the
retroactivity of Werner, as it is dispositive to Valin’s appeal.
“[T]he threshold question in considering whether federal due process
requires a judicial decision be applied to postconviction relief proceedings is
whether the decision is substantive or procedural.” Goosman v. State, 764 N.W.2d
539, 542 (Iowa 2009) (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352–53 (2004)).
“A rule is substantive rather than procedural if it alters the range of conduct or the
class of persons that the law punishes.” Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353; accord
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 198 (2016) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 314–21 (2002)) (“Substantive rules include ‘rules forbidding criminal
punishment of certain primary conduct,’ as well as ‘rules prohibiting a certain
category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or
offense.’”).4
4While Montgomery relied on a “watershed provision,” the United States Supreme
Court later held that there are no exceptions for watershed rules to the principle
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The Werner court held motor vehicle enforcement officers are prohibited
from effectuating a citizen’s arrest while acting in their official capacity. This holding
cannot be interpreted as “forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary
conduct,” nor is it a rule “prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of
defendants because of their status or offense.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 198.
Valin does not argue he was not speeding or that he was not intoxicated. If Valin
had been stopped and arrested by a law enforcement officer, such as a deputy or
state trooper, his conviction would have been permissible even after Werner.
When a rule affects the conduct of the police, not defendants, it is procedural, not
substantive. Cf. Garcia v. Comm’r of Corr., 84 A.3d 1, 6–7 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014)
(finding a judicial opinion to be not substantive because it “applie[d] to the conduct
of police” and because “it does not narrow the conduct or class of persons
punishable pursuant to a criminal statute”). We determine that the decision
announced by the Werner court clarified a procedural rule rather than a substantive
rule. Accordingly, Valin’s claim fails. See Goosman, 764 N.W.2d at 542.
IV. Conclusion
Valin is not entitled to a retroactive application of Werner. We affirm the
denial of Valin’s PCR application.
AFFIRMED.
that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure ordinarily do not apply
retroactively on federal collateral review. Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S.Ct. 1547,
1560 (2021).