In the Interest of H.G., F.G., and P.G., Minor Children ( 2021 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 21-1399
    Filed December 15, 2021
    IN THE INTEREST OF H.G., F.G., and P.G.,
    Minor Children,
    K.G., Mother,
    Appellant,
    P.G., Father,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Stephanie Forker
    Parry, District Associate Judge.
    A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
    rights to three children. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
    Molly Vakulskas Joly of Vakulskas Law Firm, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant
    mother.
    John S. Moeller of John S. Moeller, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant father.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Diane Murphy Smith, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Joseph Kertels of Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, attorney and guardian
    ad litem for minor children.
    Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and May, JJ.
    2
    TABOR, Judge.
    Just before the birth of their third child, H.G., parents Phillip and Kimberly
    received a reprieve. The juvenile court granted their requests for six more months
    to reunify with their older children, F.G. and P.G. But in the juvenile court’s view,
    the parents “frittered away” that opportunity by continuing to abuse substances and
    by hiding that fact from social workers. Now Phillip and Kimberly appeal the court’s
    termination of their parental rights. They both contest the statutory grounds for
    termination and contend it was not in their children’s best interests. Because the
    State proved that the children could not be safely returned to either parent, we
    affirm both terminations.
    Our decision to affirm follows our de novo review of the juvenile court
    record. In re A.B., 
    957 N.W.2d 280
    , 293 (Iowa 2021). We give that court’s fact
    findings “respectful consideration,” but are not bound by them. 
    Id.
     The findings of
    fact about this family are extensive—spanning twenty-nine pages and detailing two
    years of services. But the essence is evident. Both Phillip and Kimberly have
    severe substance-abuse issues that prevent them from safely parenting their three
    children—who are now one, five, and six years old. Both parents also have
    struggled with their mental health. And both parents have engaged in domestic
    violence.
    Against that backdrop, the juvenile court terminated the parents’ rights
    under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (for F.G. and P.G.), (h) (for H.G.), and (l)
    (2021) (for all three children). On the statutory grounds issue, we look for clear
    and convincing evidence from the State. In re M.W., 
    876 N.W.2d 212
    , 219 (Iowa
    2016). To satisfy that standard, the State’s proof must leave us with no “serious
    3
    or substantial doubts” about the correctness of the juvenile court’s conclusions of
    law. 
    Id.
     When, as here, the court rests its decision on more than one paragraph
    under section 232.116(1), we may affirm on any supported ground. In re D.W.,
    
    791 N.W.2d 703
    , 707 (Iowa 2010). We will address paragraphs (f) and (h), and,
    in particular, their common element challenged by both Phillip and Kimberly—that
    the children could not be safely reunited with the parents at the time of the
    termination hearing. See 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (1)(f)(4), (h)(4).
    Phillip claims the State did not prove that element because (1) he completed
    in-patient substance-abuse treatment, (2) he has a residence for the children, and
    (3) he has a history of being employed, though not a current job. None of those
    assertions undermine the State’s case.      First, Phillip’s recent sobriety, while
    encouraging, did not erase his long history of alcohol and substance abuse. Even
    after the juvenile court approved a trial-home placement in November 2020, Phillip
    relapsed several times. For example, during an unannounced drop-in in January
    2021, a social worker found him passed out with four-month-old H.G. lying beside
    him. Then in March, Phillip was arrested for public intoxication and criminal
    mischief. The next month, a social worker cancelled a visitation because Phillip
    was impaired by alcohol. True, Phillip successfully discharged from an in-patient
    treatment program in June 2021. But by the date of the July termination trial he
    had not started outpatient services or participated in AA meetings. Second, he did
    not have independent housing, instead he and Kimberly were staying with a cousin
    who had once asked them to move out. And third, he lacked employment and
    transportation. Phillip’s minimal progress was too nascent to risk a return of the
    children.
    4
    Similarly, Kimberly argues the children could be returned to her care. She
    asserts that she was attending her mental-health appointments, taking prescribed
    medications, and had an appropriate residence for the children to live. But like
    Phillip, her positive steps toward stability came late in the case. As recently as
    January 2021, she was hospitalized for a drug overdose. In February, she and
    Phillip were arrested for assaulting each other. In March, a police officer found her
    “highly intoxicated” in a local bar. Her mental-health counselor reported that her
    attendance at therapy was inconsistent in early 2021. Then in May, she did
    successfully complete an inpatient substance-abuse treatment program. Yet we
    are concerned that she has not pursued outpatient services or embraced a
    recovery community, testifying that she can maintain sobriety on her own. Like the
    juvenile court, we are “not convinced she can wipe away years of use in only a
    couple of months.” And contrary to her assertion, neither she nor Phillip had stable
    housing.   So we find the State presented clear and convincing evidence to
    terminate the rights of both parents under paragraphs (f) and (h).
    Turning to the best-interests challenges, we give primary consideration to
    the children’s safety, to the best placement for furthering their long-term nurturing
    and growth, and to their physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs. See
    In re P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d 33
    , 39 (Iowa 2010) (discussing section 232.116(2)). Phillip
    makes a cryptic argument that termination is not in the children’s best interests
    because he has a bond with them. Likewise, Kimberly contends that she shares
    a strong connection with the children and can provide excellent care for them “so
    long as her mental health and substance abuse issues are in check.” Indeed, the
    record supports the parents’ claims that they have close relationships with the
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    children. But unfortunately, Kimberly’s proviso is true too. Neither the children’s
    safety nor their long-term growth are advanced by hoping that Kimberly and Phillip
    can rise above their addictions and mental-health struggles to be dependable
    parents. See In re K.M., 
    653 N.W.2d 602
    , 606 (Iowa 2002) (noting child was
    bonded with parents but finding stability presented by termination was in her best
    interests).
    We agree with the juvenile court’s decision to terminate their parental rights
    as a first step toward a permanent placement for these three children.
    AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-1399

Filed Date: 12/15/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/15/2021