Carl Julius Bennett v. State of Iowa ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1586
Filed September 11, 2019
CARL JULIUS BENNETT,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert,
Judge.
Carl Bennett appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
Kevin Hobbs, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
2
GREER, Judge.
Carl Bennett appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief
(PCR), arguing he is innocent and that his trial counsel was ineffective. After
reviewing the record, we agree with the district court that there is overwhelming
evidence of Bennett’s guilt and that he did not prove his attorney was ineffective.
We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A series of Carl Bennett’s bad decisions brings us to this appeal. On May
8, 2015, Bennett’s friend and neighbor, T.B., gave him a ride home from work.
During the ride, Bennett allegedly became angry at T.B., punched her in the face,
and told her he was going to steal her 2006 Saturn Vue. When they arrived at their
apartment complex, Bennett told T.B. to exit the vehicle. T.B. complied, and
Bennett drove off with the vehicle.
The next day, Bennett allegedly began driving the Vue back and forth in the
apartment complex parking lot while taunting T.B. over the phone. Candidly, he
admits he intentionally rammed the Vue into a 1998 Honda Prelude in the lot,
damaging both vehicles. Likewise, T.B. and three other residents of the apartment
complex watched Bennett ram the Prelude. To avoid the consequences of his
behavior, Bennett hid in the closet of the apartment building where he was staying
with his girlfriend, K.A. Police arrived shortly after and found Bennett. During the
struggle with the officers, and at Bennett’s request, K.A. recorded part of the
interaction on her cell phone. At the direction of the officers, she provided this
video to police. In the end, the officers secured and arrested Bennett.
3
The State charged Bennett with five counts arising out of the events on May
8 and 9.1 These charges carried a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison
and a mandatory minimum of seven years.
While the first criminal case was pending, Bennett experienced yet another
encounter with law enforcement. On November 5, police responded to a shots-
fired call. Officers observed Bennett nearby and tried to speak with him. Ignoring
their questions and directives, Bennett remained on his cell phone. As one officer
reached for Bennett’s phone, a struggle ensued. In the fray, Bennett struck an
officer twice with a closed fist. As he threatened and kicked at other officers, they
physically restrained him. Afterward, Bennett began complaining about injuries,
and the officers called medics to respond. While waiting for the medics, Bennett
tried to bite and kick the officers and made numerous threats. When medics
sought to treat him, Bennett kicked one of the medics, spat on an officer in the
ambulance, and threatened to kill other officers. One officer suffered a broken
finger during this incident.
The State charged Bennett with seven counts following the November 5
incident.2 These charges carried a maximum sentence of seventeen years in
prison.
1
The charges in the May incident were: robbery in the second degree in violation of Iowa
Code sections 711.1 and 711.3 (2015); assault causing bodily injury in violation of Iowa
Code sections 708.1 and 708.2(2); criminal mischief in the second degree in violation of
Iowa Code sections 716.1 and 716.4; assault on a police officer causing injury in violation
of Iowa Code sections 708.1 and 708.3A(3); and interference with official acts in violation
of Iowa Code section 719.1.
2
The charges in the November incident were: two counts of assault on a police officer
with intent to inflict serious injury in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1 and 708.3A(1);
two counts of assault on a health care provider in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1
and 708.3A(4); one count of assault on a police officer in violation of Iowa Code sections
4
With both criminal cases pending, Bennett accepted a plea agreement in
February 2016. As for the May incident, Bennett pleaded guilty to one count of
operating a motor vehicle without owner’s consent, assault causing bodily injury,
criminal mischief in the second degree, and assault on a police officer causing
injury. To resolve the November incident, Bennett pleaded guilty to two counts of
assault on a police officer with intent to inflict serious injury and two counts of
assault on a health care provider.
During the plea colloquy, the court reviewed: (1) each count of the plea
agreement, (2) the factual basis for each act, (3) the rights Bennett waived by
pleading, (4) Bennett’s satisfaction with his attorney, and (5) extensive details
about Bennett’s mental health. In response to the court’s inquiry, Bennett
confirmed his understanding of these matters and described his actions related to
each charge. Accordingly, the court accepted the guilty plea, and because Bennett
waived the presentence investigation report and his right to file a motion in arrest
of judgment, sentencing followed. As a result, the court sentenced Bennett to a
total term not to exceed fifteen years in prison.
On December 14, Bennett applied for PCR, amended by his appointed
postconviction counsel. In the PCR hearing, Bennett raised several complaints,
not all set out in the amended application. After considering all claimed issues, the
district court denied the application. Bennett appeals.
708.1 and 708.3A(4); and one count of harassment in the first degree in violation of Iowa
Code sections 708.7(1) and 708.7(2).
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II. Standard of Review.
We review freestanding actual innocence claims under the Iowa
Constitution de novo. Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 797–98 (Iowa 2018);
State v. Shultsev, No. 17-1766, 2018 WL 4923139, at *1 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct.
10, 2018) (noting de novo standard of review). We review claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Iowa 2009).
III. Analysis.
In this postconviction action, Bennett argues that he is innocent of the
crimes to which he pleaded guilty and that his counsel was ineffective. With those
issues in mind, we consider this record.
A. Actual Innocence: A defendant may challenge a criminal conviction
despite a guilty plea when they claim they were innocent of the crime. Schmidt,
909 N.W.2d at 795–96 (addressing plea to going armed with a dangerous weapon
challenged because of newly discovered witness testimony about justification
defense). To succeed on an actual innocence claim, an “applicant must show by
clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the
conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant of the crimes for
which the sentencing court found the applicant guilty in light of all the evidence,
including the newly discovered evidence.” Id. at 797. Clear and convincing
evidence of innocence exists when the evidence shows no serious or substantial
doubt as to the innocence of the accused. See State v. Huss, 666 N.W.2d 152,
160 (Iowa 2003) (discussing clear and convincing standard).
To begin, Bennett maintains his innocence as to all charges that were part
of his voluntary guilty plea except for the criminal mischief charge. According to
6
Bennett, someone else assaulted T.B. at a party on May 8 and Bennett drove her
home because she was intoxicated. Bennett also claims M.F. picked him up from
work on May 8, not T.B. To prove his innocence, he claims a woman3 could have
testified that he did not assault T.B.
As for other evidence of innocence, Bennett also argues that his attorney
failed to interview two key witnesses, K.A. and L.J. Bennett points to K.A.’s
recorded interaction between himself and the police officers inside the apartment
on May 9. He believes this video would show he did not fight the officers. With
the claimed testimony from L.J., Bennett offers “proof” that during his November 5
conversation with L.J., she knew he had a splint on his left hand and she heard
him telling the officers about his mental-health issues.
Yet Bennett did not call any of these witnesses to testify under oath at the
PCR hearing nor did he submit affidavits or other evidence to corroborate his
claims. Likewise, K.A. turned the video over to the police, and Bennett’s trial
counsel acknowledged it was not helpful to the case. Nor does Bennett indicate
how L.J.’s testimony would have trumped the eyewitness testimony of the officers
and medics involved in the second incident.
In all, Bennett’s self-serving hearsay statements fail to establish his
innocence by clear and convincing evidence. See Kirchner v. State, 756 N.W.2d
202, 206 (Iowa 2008) (concluding that the applicant’s self-serving statements,
unsupported by evidence, were inadequate to establish his PCR claims).
Moreover, Bennett’s trial counsel testified that Bennett never claimed his
3
Bennett could only identify this witness by a first name.
7
innocence and did not want to go to trial. This testimony matches a letter Bennett
sent to the trial court stating in part that he was willing to take “full responsibility”
for his actions.
Bennett’s self-serving statements also conflict with his admissions during
the plea colloquy. Bennett admitted that during the May incident he (1) took the
victim’s car without her permission, (2) hit the victim causing bruises, (3) drove her
car into another car causing damage, and (4) pushed an officer into the wall during
his arrest and injured another officer who fell. As to the November incident,
Bennett admitted he (1) punched and kicked police officers intending to injure them
and (2) assaulted health care providers by spitting on them. Likewise, Bennett
confirmed that he understood the plea agreement, wanted to proceed, and
accepted he gave up his right to call witnesses at a trial.
In the end, Bennett failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that no
factfinder could convict him of the crimes involved, despite the State’s evidence of
guilt. We agree with the district court’s confirmation that “Bennett has wholly failed
to meet this rigorous [clear and convincing] standard.”
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. We begin analyzing ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims with the strong presumption that counsel’s
performance meets professional standards. State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 683
(Iowa 2000). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a claimant must show
by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that counsel failed to perform an essential
duty and (2) that prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984); accord State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008). To establish
the first prong, the claimant must show that counsel’s performance was
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unreasonable under prevailing professional norms given all the circumstances.
Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 730 (Iowa 2019).
To establish prejudice, the claimant must prove there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors. Id. at 731. The claimant must show that the
probability of a different result is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Bowman v. State, 710 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Iowa 2006) (quoting State v.
Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 882 (Iowa 2003)). We will consider what factual findings
counsel’s errors affected and whether the effect was pervasive or isolated and
trivial. Graves, 668 N.W.2d at 882–83.
As the United States Supreme Court stated,
The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s
performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often
be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure
that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense
counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
Bennett claims his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to (1) investigate
witnesses favorable to his defenses and otherwise do pretrial discovery, (2) move
to reduce his bond, (3) address his competency for trial, and (4) regularly meet
with him and properly explain the plea agreement.
1. Failure to investigate. During the PCR hearing, trial counsel outlined
overwhelming evidence mitigating against a jury trial, including Bennett’s guilty
behavior of hiding from the authorities. Independent eyewitnesses to the May
incident corroborated the State’s theory, and a video captured Bennett’s assault
9
on the arresting officers. As to the November 5 incident, the officers and medics
were eyewitnesses to—and victims of—Bennett’s assaults. The notes from trial
counsel’s client conferences do suggest Bennett offered names of witnesses with
factual versions conflicting with the trial information. Yet at the PCR hearing,
Bennett failed to prove that these witnesses would actually testify as he claimed or
present evidence corroborating these hearsay statements. See Sims v. State, 295
N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1980) (noting that a PCR applicant failed to demonstrate
how proffered testimony of witness would have effected trial outcome). Thus,
Bennett cannot show prejudice based on trial counsel’s lack of investigation.
2. Failure to move to reduce bond. Bennett bonded out after the May
incident. Of course, he wanted the same result after the November incident. Given
Bennett’s long history of assaultive behavior,4 as well as a new allegation of
assaulting law enforcement, Bennett’s expectation of success at a second bond
hearing was a fantasy. See State v. Kellogg, 534 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Iowa 1995)
(stating courts may consider “whether the defendant would pose a danger to others
or to the community if released” when setting conditions for release on bond).
Bennett cannot show prejudice on his counsel’s failure to seek a bond reduction.
3. Failure to address his competency. Bennett testified he has
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, and borderline
personality traits. After his arrest for the first offenses, Bennett wrote the presiding
judge to request leniency, discussed his hallucinations and propensity to hear
4
Bennett’s criminal history includes convictions of eleven assault charges, seven of which
involved police officers, one charge of operating without owner’s consent, one theft
charge, and six criminal mischief charges.
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voices, and suggested probation for the crimes.
To assure Bennett’s competence, his trial counsel reviewed Bennett’s
mental-health records from various providers, included the mental-health advocate
in client meetings, and confirmed Bennett understood the terms of the plea. At the
plea hearing, Bennett and his counsel recited Bennett’s underlying mental-health
history to the court. In particular, the district court carefully outlined and discussed
Bennett’s ability to understand the court, the charges imposed, and the possibility
of available defenses besides a general denial. Because Bennett addressed each
topic with verbal responses, the district court properly assessed Bennett’s
competency, demeanor, and understanding of the proceedings. As with the other
claims of ineffectiveness, Bennett has failed to show prejudice.
4. Failure to communicate and explain plea agreement. From the
beginning of the representation, trial counsel confirmed that Bennett urged a plea
deal and no trial. That strategy appears in the letter Bennett sent to the presiding
judge. Given the potential charges and maximum sentence, Bennett’s criminal
history, and the violent nature of the charges, taking a plea agreement was a
rational and reasonable decision. See Cole v. State, No. 15-0344, 2016 WL
7395722, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016) (finding no prejudice where there
was “little evidence [the defendant] would have rejected the plea agreement,” the
State's case against the defendant appeared strong, and the defendant had
“received substantial concessions in exchange for his guilty plea”).
That said, Bennett complains now he did not understand the difference
between consecutive and concurrent sentencing when entering his plea. Evidence
at the PCR proceeding suggests that trial counsel conferenced before the plea and
11
sentencing proceedings with Bennett and others to address the plea conditions.
Similarly, Bennett and the trial court discussed the terms of the agreement, and
Bennett’s criminal history suggests he had experience with the application of those
concepts in earlier unrelated plea deals. Finally, the court emphasized Bennett’s
right to confer with counsel at any step of the proceedings, but he never requested
a conference. Instead, Bennett confirmed his understanding and answered a
series of questions about each charge. Nothing in this record supports the notion
that trial counsel’s representation falls short of the professional norms or that there
was any prejudice to Bennett.
IV. Conclusion.
For all of the above stated reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of
Bennett’s application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.