gayle-gleason-and-michael-n-gleason-v-sanjit-s-korde-ted-dc-gleason ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 12-2025
Filed September 17, 2014
GAYLE GLEASON,
Plaintiff,
And
MICHAEL N. GLEASON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
SANJIT S. KORDE, TED D.C. GLEASON and
RYAN M.C. GLEASON,
Defendants,
And
THEODORE ALAN GLEASON, Trustee
of the Theodore Alan Gleason
Trust, GEORGE GLEASON,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pocahontas County, Kurt J.
Stoebe, Judge.
Beneficiary appeals an order to partition inherited real property arguing the
will’s forfeiture clause bars partition. AFFIRMED.
Michael N. Gleason, Gilmore City, appellant pro se.
Dani L. Eisentrager of Eisentrager Law, Eagle Grove, for plaintiff Gayle
Gleason.
Edwin T. Hood of Hood Law Group, Kansas City, Missouri.
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Sanjit S. Korde, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pro se.
George W. Gleason and Theodore Alan Gleason, Gilmore City, pro se.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, J.
Michael Gleason appeals the district court’s decree granting partition of
property inherited from his mother, Dorothy Gleason, and shared with his
relatives as tenants in common. Michael claims the forfeiture clause, contained
in Article VI of Dorothy’s will, removed George Gleason’s and Theodore
Gleason’s (“appellees”) rights to the property when they filed an action for
partition.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Dorothy had six children: Michael N. Gleason, David W. Gleason,
Theodore A. Gleason, Gayle F. Gleason, Margaret G. Korde, and George W.
Gleason. Dorothy passed away on November 15, 2004. At her death, Dorothy
owned a homestead in Gilmore City, Iowa, and farmland in nearby Humbolt
County, Iowa. The probate proceedings were handled pro se and the estate
closed on June 19, 2006. Margaret predeceased Dorothy and her son, Sanjit
Korde, took by representation. David passed away after the estate closed. His
two sons, Ted D.C. Gleason and Ryan M.C. Gleason, received his share.
The portions of Dorothy’s will relevant to this appeal are as follows:
ARTICLE IV
I give, devise and bequeath all real estate owned by me at
my death to my children equally and in fee simple, subject to the
following restrictions, terms and conditions, to-wit:
....
ARTICLE VI
It is my expressed desire and intent to have the provisions of
this my Last Will and Testament administered without objection by
any of my named beneficiaries. I have given this Will a great deal of
thought and firmly believe the provisions set forth herein are fair
and equitable to all beneficiaries. In the event any beneficiary shall
legally challenge this Will, making any claim against the estate or
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attempt to partition the real estate, then that beneficiary’s share
shall be forfeited and distributed to the other named beneficiaries.
This appeal centers on the disposition of Dorothy’s homestead and
farmland. The appellant’s and appellees’ pro se briefs focus heavily on the facts
underlying this case. However, much of this information is not useful on appeal
and will not be discussed. In short, Michael argues the district court failed to
comply with Dorothy’s will by allowing the appellees to partition the real property
granted by the will. The appellees respond by raising three counter arguments:
(1) Michael failed to preserve error on this issue, (2) Michael lacks standing to
pursue this appeal, and (3) the forfeiture clause Michael bases his argument on
is unenforceable.
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s decision de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907;
Garrett v. Huster, 684 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Iowa 2004). In an equity case, we are
not bound by the district court's decision, but we do give weight to the court’s
factual findings, especially its determinations of credibility. Iowa R. App. P.
6.904(3)(g); In re Estate of Roethler, 801 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Iowa 2011). We
examine the whole record and adjudicate the rights anew so long as the issue
has been properly presented and error preserved in the district court. In re
Estate of Cory, 184 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Iowa 1971).
III. ERROR PRESERVATION
Michael claims he preserved error in this case because he raised the
issue of the will’s forfeiture clause in his rule 1.904(2) motion to enlarge findings.
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The appellees claim Michael did not preserve error because he failed to raise the
issue either before or during trial and cannot do so now for the first time on
appeal.
Error preservation rules exist to provide district courts an opportunity to
avoid or correct errors and to provide a record for appellate courts. Veatch v.
Bartels Lutheran Home, 804 N.W.2d 530, 533 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). A party
ordinarily must raise an issue and the district court must rule on that issue to
ensure preservation for appellate review. Duck Creek Tire Serv., Inc. v.
Goodyear Corners, L.C., 796 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Iowa 2011). Even if a party
properly raises an issue, if the district court fails to rule on it, the party must file a
motion requesting a ruling on the issue to preserve error. Kramer v. Bd. of
Adjustment for Sioux County, 795 N.W.2d 86, 93 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). Iowa
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904 motion is one method to preserve error on an issue
if the district court failed to rule on that issue. Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d
532, 539 (Iowa 2002). Accordingly, we find Michael properly preserved error on
the issue of the will’s forfeiture clause.
IV. Standing
The appellees claim Michael lost standing to pursue this appeal when, on
April 30, 2013, and while this appeal was pending, he conveyed all his rights and
interest in the inherited property to his sister Gayle by a warranty deed. Michael
responds by admitting he did completely convey his rights in the property, though
he notes Gayle re-conveyed the property to him on June 12, 2013. Michael
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argues he made a mistake and, because he retained a future interest in the
property, he retained standing.
A party has standing to sue if that party has a “sufficient stake in an
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.”
Citizens for Responsible Choices v. City of Shenandoah, 686 N.W.2d 470, 475
(Iowa 2004) (citation omitted). A complaining party must (1) have a specific
personal or legal interest in the litigation and (2) be injuriously affected. Id.Having a legal interest and being injuriously affected are separate requirements
for standing. Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 698 N.W.2d 858, 864 (Iowa 2005).
Standing may be lost if the claim on which it is based becomes moot. Iowa Civil
Liberties Union v. Critelli, 244 N.W.2d 564, 567–68 (Iowa 1976). The
requirements for standing must exist at the commencement of the litigation and
throughout its existence or the issue will become moot. Baker v. City of Iowa
City, 750 N.W.2d 93, 97–98 (Iowa 2008) (citing U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty,
445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980)).1
When Michael conveyed all of his rights and interest in the property to
Gayle he lost a personal and legal interest in this dispute. Once Michael lost his
interest it could not be regained. Therefore, Michael no longer has standing to
pursue this claim.
Nevertheless, even though Michael does not have standing to pursue this
appeal, we exercise our discretion and address the merits of his claim. Given the
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We supplement our standing requirements by drawing from federal law on standing.
Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Iowa 2008).
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Bleak House2 level of litigation underlying this appeal, we believe addressing the
merits, though not required to do so, will bring the case to a more satisfactory
conclusion.
V. The Provisions of Dorothy’s Will
Michael claims the district court erred by not considering the forfeiture
clause contained in Article VI of Dorothy’s will, which he claims acts to remove a
beneficiary’s right to the real property. He claims the appellees’ right to the
property estate should be removed since they filed an action to partition and sell
the property. The appellees counter by stating Article VI is unenforceable.
We must first construe the provisions of Dorothy’s will under the well-
established principles of will construction. A testator’s intent must be derived
from: “(a) all of the language contained within the four corners of the will, (b) the
scheme of distribution, (c) the surrounding circumstances at the time of the will’s
execution and (d) the existing facts[.]” In re Estate of Roethler, 801 N.W.2d 833,
842 (Iowa 2011) (citing In re Estate of Rogers, 473 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa 1991)).
“In determining intent, the question is not what the testator meant to say, but
rather what is the meaning of what the testator did say.” Id.Article IV of Dorothy’s will states: “I give, devise and bequeath all real
estate owned by me at my death to my children equally and in fee simple . . . .”
The will continues by placing “restrictions, terms and conditions” on the fee
simple devise. Testimony at trial by Gary Groves, the attorney who met with
Dorothy and prepared her will, shows Dorothy intended to transfer title in fee
2
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971) (1853).
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simple to the beneficiaries. Gary advised Dorothy on how a trust could work to
enforce the restrictions she wished to impose on her real estate. Dorothy
rejected the idea of a trust due to its costs and burdens. As the district court
stated: “She preferred to transfer title in fee to her children and express her
wishes in the will. She simply relied on her children to follow these wishes. . . .
She executed this will knowing that her directions were unenforceable.”
Our well-established precedent shows “that a testator cannot make an
absolute devise of property in fee, and in a subsequent clause of h[er] will defeat
or destroy h[er] gift or limit the enjoyment of the thing given.” Iowa City State
Bank v. Pritchard, 202 N.W. 512, 513 (Iowa 1925); Culver v. Hess, 14 N.W.2d
692, 694 (Iowa 1944) (“[I]n construing wills generally the devise of real estate
granting a fee-simple estate will not be affected or impaired by a subsequent
clause placing limitations on such devise and reducing it to an estate less than
fee simple, and that having once transferred the entire fee-simple estate, the
entire interest therein is disposed of, and subsequent limitations are repugnant
thereto and void.”). An exception to this general rule exists for testamentary
provisions acting to postpone or prohibit partition for a reasonable time. See
Elberts v. Elberts, 141 N.W. 57, 58 (Iowa 1913) (upholding testamentary
provision postponing partition of a farm for ten years). Dorothy’s testamentary
prohibition on the partition of her real estate does not list any time frame after
which partition is allowable. Therefore, Dorothy’s limit on the partition of her real
estate does not fit into this exception.
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Dorothy devised her real estate to her beneficiaries in fee simple; any
subsequent language in her will merely expresses her wishes and desires but
does not have legal significance. Article VI and the other provisions in Dorothy’s
will acting to limit the beneficiaries’ fee simple interest in the property are
unenforceable under Iowa law. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.