In Re Detention of Daniel Joseph Scott ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0634
Filed May 25, 2016
IN RE DETENTION OF
DANIEL JOSEPH SCOTT,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Douglas S.
Russell, Judge.
Daniel Scott appeals the jury’s verdict finding he is not suitable for
discharge from civil commitment pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 229A (2015).
AFFIRMED.
Adam C. Gregg, State Public Defender, and Thomas J. Gaul, Assistant
Public Defender, Special Defense Unit, State Public Defender’s Office, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ
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DOYLE, Judge.
Daniel Scott appeals the jury’s verdict finding he is not suitable for
discharge from civil commitment pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 229A (2015),
asserting the district court erred in denying his motions for summary judgment
and for a directed verdict. Our review is for correction of errors at law. See In re
Det. of Stenzel, 827 N.W.2d 690, 697 (Iowa 2013); In re Det. of Hennings, 744
N.W.2d 333, 340 (Iowa 2008); see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 6.907. Summary
judgment is only appropriate when, viewing the record in the light most favorable
to the opposing party, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3); Walker v. State, 801
N.W.2d 548, 554 (Iowa 2011). A directed verdict is appropriate if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the State failed to
present substantial evidence on each element of the claim, meaning, from the
evidence presented, a jury could not reasonably infer a fact from the evidence.
See Hennings, 744 N.W.2d at 340.
A “sexually violent predator” is defined as “a person who has been
convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a
mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts
constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility.” Iowa
Code § 229A.2(12). A person is “likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence” if “the person more likely than not will engage in acts of a sexually
violent nature.” Id. § 229A.2(5).
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In this case, the record
reveals that in 1984 twenty-seven-year-old Scott took a customer
back to his tow-service business and forced her to perform oral sex
upon him. He pled guilty to third-degree kidnapping and sexual
abuse in exchange for receiving immunity from other sexual
assaults that were committed around this same time. Scott was
released from prison in the fall of 1989.
The following March, thirty-three-year-old Scott assaulted a
female acquaintance by grabbing her breast and forcing her to
place her hand on his exposed penis while he gave her a ride
home. He was convicted of assault with intent to commit sexual
abuse and sentenced to prison.
After his release from prison, Scott lost his left leg in a
motorcycle accident and began working as a taxicab driver. On
September 2, 1997, forty-year-old Scott sexually assaulted a
female passenger by grabbing her breasts in his cab. The next
day, he assaulted another female passenger in a similar manner.
Scott was convicted of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse
and third-degree sexual abuse as an habitual offender.
In re Det. of Scott, No. 06-0556, 2007 WL 3085880, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 24,
2007).
In 2006, Scott was found to be a sexually violent predator and civilly
committed. See id. at *2. He subsequently appealed that finding, and this court
affirmed. See id. at *4.
“Following the filing of an annual report in May 2009, the district court
granted Scott’s request for a final hearing on whether he was eligible for
discharge,” and a hearing before a jury was subsequently held. In re Det. of
Scott, No. 11-0653, 2012 WL 1860758, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 23, 2012). At
the time of that hearing, Scott was fifty-four years old and had many health
conditions: “Both of his legs have been amputated. He has diabetes and heart
problems—having suffered two major heart attacks—suffers from acute kidney
disorder, and wears a catheter. Scott’s medical problems are severe enough
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that he was unable to make progress in his treatment.” Id. at *2. The State
presented expert testimony opining that Scott was likely to reoffend despite his
health conditions. See id. Scott presented his own experts, one of whom opined
that “Scott’s declining health would diminish his risk of committing sexually
violent offenses.” Id. After hearing the evidence, the jury found “Scott’s mental
abnormality remained such that he was likely to engage in predatory acts
constituting sexually violent offenses.” Id. at *1. Scott appealed that finding,
arguing there was “insufficient evidence that he would likely commit sexually
violent offenses if discharged” and noting his treatment, age, and physical health
made “it unlikely he would reoffend.” Id. at *2. Viewing the record in the light
most favorable to the State, we affirmed the verdict finding Scott’s civil
commitment should continue. Id. at *2.
Following Scott’s November 2014 annual report, an annual review hearing
was held. The district court concluded Scott
met his burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
there is relevant and reliable evidence that would lead a reasonable
person to believe a final hearing should be held to determine if
either: 1) the mental abnormality of the committed person has so
changed that the person is not likely to engage in predatory acts
constituting sexually violent offenses if discharged; or 2) the
committed person is suitable for placement in a transitional release
program pursuant to section 229A.8A.
The hearing was held before a jury in March 2015, and the case was
again a battle of the experts. The State’s expert opined that Scott continues to
have a mental abnormality—antisocial personality disorder—and, despite
treatment, Scott was still more likely than not to commit acts constituting sexually
violent offenses. Even considering Scott’s physical limitations, the expert opined
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he was still more likely than not to reoffend, pointing out that Scott committed
sexual offenses even after he lost his first leg in 1992 and his particular offenses
of grabbing and touching were things he could still do while seated in a
wheelchair. The expert believed Scott still possessed several dynamic risk
factors, such as a lack of insight into his actions and lack of the ability to manage
his emotions and outbursts. Conversely, Scott’s experts, Drs. Reese and
Rypma, opined that Scott’s physical condition made Scott unlikely to reoffend.
The matter was submitted to the jury, which found that Scott’s mental
abnormality had not “so changed that he is no longer likely to engage in
predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if discharged” and that he
was not suitable for placement in a transitional release program.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we are
unable to find the court erred in denying Scott’s motions for summary judgment
and for a directed verdict. Under Iowa Code section 229A.8(1), “a rebuttable
presumption exists that the commitment should continue.” Scott’s experts
rebutted that presumption, warranting a hearing “to determine whether [Scott] no
longer suffer[ed] from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to
engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if discharged, or
the committed person is suitable for placement in a transitional release program.”
Nevertheless, given the State’s opposing position and its expert’s supporting
opinion, clearly a genuine issue of material fact existed making summary
judgment inappropriate. Consequently, the court did not err in denying Scott’s
motion for summary judgment.
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Moreover, the State’s expert testimony substantially supported the jury’s
conclusion that Scott continued to suffer “from a mental abnormality which makes
the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent
offenses if discharged” and was not suitable for placement in a transitional
release program. Although Scott’s experts offered contrary opinions, it is not this
court’s function to determine the correctness of either the theory or testimony
between experts; rather, it is for the jury to decide which expert is more credible
and whose opinion it accepts. See In re Det. of Altman, 723 N.W.2d 181, 185
(Iowa 2006); see also State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Iowa 2000) (“When
conflicting psychiatric testimony is presented to the fact finder, the issue . . . is
clearly for the fact finder to decide. The . . . trier of fact is not obligated to accept
opinion evidence, even from experts, as conclusive. When a case evolves into a
battle of experts, . . . the reviewing court . . . readily defer[s] to the [fact finder’s]
judgment as [they are] in a better position to weigh the credibility of the
witnesses.” (citations omitted.)). Here, the jury chose to accept the State’s
expert’s opinion over Scott’s experts’ opinions. Because substantial evidence
supported the jury’s verdict, the district court did not err in denying Scott’s motion
for a directed verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the verdict finding Scott’s civil
commitment should continue.
AFFIRMED.
.