State of Iowa v. Athena Kennedy ( 2014 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 13-1507
    Filed October 15, 2014
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    ATHENA KENNEDY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Gary D. McKenrick,
    Judge.
    A criminal defendant challenges the reasonableness of a restitution order.
    AFFIRMED.
    Timothy J. Tupper of Tupper Law Firm, Davenport, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
    General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Joseph Grubisich, Assistant
    County Attorney, for appellee.
    Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
    2
    TABOR, J.
    The district court ordered Athena Kennedy to pay $6465.35 in victim
    restitution following her guilty plea and sentencing for burglary in the third
    degree. She contends the amount lacks evidentiary support and she should only
    be responsible for $2500 in damages resulting from her crime. Because the
    restitution figure set by the court had a reasonable basis in the evidence, we
    affirm.
    The State charged Kennedy with burglary in the third degree, in violation
    of Iowa Code section 713.1 and 713.6A(1) (2013), and criminal mischief in the
    second degree, in violation of sections 716.1 and 716.4, stemming from a
    February 2013 home invasion. Kennedy entered a guilty plea to the burglary
    charge and received a suspended five-year sentence.
    The district court held a restitution hearing under Iowa Code section
    910.31 on September 4, 2013. The State submitted a statement of pecuniary
    damages from the victim listing stolen and damaged property in the amount of
    $11,479. The State also offered the testimony of the victim, whose duplex was
    burglarized, and her sister, who saw the damaged furnishings. In addition, the
    State offered a receipt documenting the value of some of the electronics and
    furniture items the victim alleged she lost in the crime. Kennedy testified that
    1
    This section reads:
    At the time of sentencing or at a later date to be determined by the court, the
    court shall set out the amount of restitution . . . and the persons to whom
    restitution must be paid. If the full amount of restitution cannot be determined at
    the time of sentencing, the court shall issue a temporary order determining a
    reasonable amount for restitution identified up to that time.
    
    Iowa Code § 910.3
    3
    during the burglary she only broke two televisions, valued at $1500 and $800
    respectively, and damaged approximately $200 worth of miscellaneous items.
    On September 5, 2013, the court entered an order requiring Kennedy to pay the
    burglary victim restitution in the amount of $6465.35. Kennedy now appeals.
    We review restitution matters for correction of legal error. State v. Hagen,
    
    840 N.W.2d 140
    , 144 (Iowa 2013).          We would find a restitution order to be
    excessive if it did not bear a reasonable relationship to the damage caused by
    the offender’s criminal conduct. State v. Bonstetter, 
    637 N.W.2d 161
    , 168 (Iowa
    2001).     Once the State proves the causal connection, Iowa Code section
    910.1(3) allows recovery of “all damages” that the State can show by a
    preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Wagner, 
    484 N.W.2d 212
    , 216
    (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).
    Kennedy’s appeal rests on the strength of her own testimony. Her only
    argument is that the court should have adopted her damage estimates over
    those of the victim. The district court expressly rejected Kennedy’s version in the
    restitution order, saying it “did not find the testimony of the defendant to be
    credible in any respect based on the Court’s observations of the defendant
    throughout the hearing and her highly antagonistic and abrasive attitude openly
    displayed toward the victim and the witnesses who testified on the victim’s
    behalf.”    Conversely, the court believed the State’s witnesses.      Because our
    review is only for correction of errors at law, we will not reweigh the evidence nor
    assess witness credibility in the place of the trial judge, who had the chance to
    4
    personally observe the witnesses. See EnviroGas, L.P. v. Cedar Rapids/Linn
    Cnty. Solid Waste Agency, 
    641 N.W.2d 776
    , 785 (Iowa 2002).
    Generally, restitution is determined in the same manner as damages in a
    civil case. State v. Watts, 
    587 N.W.2d 750
    , 751–52 (Iowa 1998). A fact finder’s
    method of calculating damages usually inheres in the award and is not subject to
    challenge. 
    Id. at 752
    . The end amount need only be within the “reasonable
    range of the evidence.” 
    Id.
     (upholding restitution amount so long as it is “neither
    speculative nor imaginary”). Here, the district court ordered a specific amount of
    restitution—$6465.35—without revealing its method of calculation.         But the
    award was neither speculative nor uncertain. We can infer the district court
    relied on the receipts entered into evidence to reach the amount awarded. See
    
    id.
     Because the restitution amount determined by the court had a reasonable
    basis in the evidence, we will not disturb it.
    AFFIRMED.