State of Iowa v. Joseph Lee Barnes ( 2014 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 13-1851
    Filed October 29, 2014
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    JOSEPH LEE BARNES,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Karen
    Kaufman Salic, Judge.
    The    defendant     challenges   his   sentence   following   conviction   for
    harassment in the second degree. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
    AND REMANDED.
    Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant
    Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
    General, Carlyle D. Dalen, County Attorney, and William J. Hoekstra, Assistant
    County Attorney, for appellee.
    Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
    2
    MCDONALD, J.
    Joseph Barnes pleaded guilty to harassment in the second degree, in
    violation of Iowa Code section 708.7(1) and (3) (2013), arising out of a series of
    telephonic threats he made to a woman to kill the woman’s mom, dad, boyfriend,
    and minor children and to have sex with the woman’s minor children. The court
    sentenced Barnes to seven days in jail and imposed a fine of $315. The court
    also entered a sentencing no contact order prohibiting Barnes from having
    contact with the woman and her two minor children.               On appeal, Barnes
    contends (1) the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentence, and (2)
    the sentencing no contact order is illegal.
    We first address Barnes’ argument regarding the district court’s abuse of
    discretion. The district court is free to impose any sentence within the statutory
    maximum, and we will not reverse the sentence absent an abuse of discretion.
    See State v. Floyd, 
    466 N.W.2d 919
    , 924 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). “In exercising its
    discretion, the district court is to weigh all pertinent matters in determining a
    proper     sentence,   including   the   nature   of   the   offense,   the   attending
    circumstances, the defendant’s age, character, and propensities or chances for
    reform.” State v. Johnson, 
    513 N.W.2d 717
    , 719 (Iowa 1994). “[T]he failure to
    acknowledge a particular sentencing circumstance does not necessarily mean it
    was not considered.” State v. Boltz, 
    542 N.W.2d 9
    , 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). To
    establish the court abused its discretion, Barnes must show the sentencing court
    exercised its discretion “on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an
    extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Laffey, 
    600 N.W.2d 57
    , 62 (Iowa 1999).
    3
    Barnes argues the sentencing court impermissibly focused on only a
    single factor in imposing sentence: the nature of the offense, including the threat
    to the woman’s minor children. The record belies Barnes’ argument. The record
    reveals the court exercised its discretion based on the consideration of several
    permissible factors without consideration of impermissible factors.       The court
    stated it considered the nature of the offense as described in the minutes of
    testimony, the plea agreement, and the attorneys’ respective sentencing
    recommendations. Although no presentence investigation report was available
    for sentencing for this misdemeanor offense, the court inquired about the
    defendant’s criminal history. The prosecutor stated, and the defendant agreed,
    the defendant had prior felony convictions for forgery and burglary as well as five
    convictions for driving while suspended. While the court referenced the threat to
    the woman’s children, it did not identify the children as “victims” of the offense or
    state the defendant tried to communicate with the children. The court simply
    noted the mother and the children were subjects of the threat. We conclude the
    court considered only permissible sentencing factors without improperly focusing
    on a single factor. Accordingly, Barnes’ challenge to his sentence fails. See
    State v. Ramirez, 
    400 N.W.2d 586
    , 590 (Iowa 1987) (affirming sentence where
    the record demonstrated the court considered more than one permissible
    sentencing consideration).
    Barnes next contends the sentencing no contact order is illegal.
    Specifically, Barnes argues the sentencing court erroneously checked a box on
    the no-contact-order form finding Barnes committed domestic abuse assault,
    4
    which subjects him to additional collateral consequences. The text beside the
    checked box on the form states:
    If checked, the defendant has been convicted of domestic abuse
    assault under Iowa Code 708.2A. Therefore, the defendant shall
    not possess, ship, transport, or receive firearms, offensive
    weapons, or ammunition unless such rights have been restored in
    accordance with Iowa Code section 724.27. Defendant shall
    deliver all firearms to the CERRO GORDO County Sheriff or (law
    enforcement agency) on or before October 28, 2013.
    The State concedes the defendant was convicted for harassment in the second
    degree and not domestic abuse assault and the finding was in error. The State
    further concedes the sentencing no contact order should be corrected.
    Accordingly, this portion of the no contact order is vacated. This matter shall be
    remanded for the entry of a corrected sentencing no contact order.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.