Brian Rawlings v. Mike Peschong ( 2014 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 13-1866
    Filed October 29, 2014
    BRIAN RAWLINGS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    vs.
    MIKE PESCHONG,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, James A.
    McGlynn, Judge.
    The plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
    defendant. AFFIRMED.
    Patrick W. O’Bryan of O’Bryan Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Guy R. Cook and Adam D. Zenor of Grefe & Sidney, P.L.C., Des Moines,
    for appellee.
    Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Tabor, J., and Miller, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2013).
    2
    MILLER, S.J.
    The plaintiff, Brian Rawlings, appeals the grant of summary judgment in
    favor of the defendant, Mike Peschong. The district court found Rawlings failed
    to present a genuine fact question on his claim Peschong breached an oral
    contract and then held Peschong was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    On appeal, Rawlings contends the court erred in determining he was judicially
    estopped from alleging Peschong failed to obtain a valid insurance policy on his
    home. Because Rawlings waived his challenge to the district court’s finding that
    he failed to dispute the existence of a valid insurance policy, we affirm.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    Rawlings built a home in Marshalltown in 1993, and was awarded the
    home when he and his wife divorced. In May of 2007, Rawlings asked Peschong
    to procure an insurance policy on the home. Rawlings believed he had a valid
    insurance policy with State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (State Farm).
    On January 29, 2008, Rawlings’s home was destroyed by a fire. Rawlings
    submitted a claim with State Farm for losses caused by the fire. State Farm
    denied the claim in a letter dated November 5, 2008, stating its investigation
    determined the fire loss was not a result of an accidental direct physical loss as
    required under the policy.
    On January 28, 2009, Rawlings filed suit against State Farm, seeking to
    recover under his insurance policy.       He voluntarily dismissed the action on
    January 20, 2010.
    Rawlings again filed suit against State Farm on August 25, 2011. The
    district court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm on February 17,
    3
    2012, because the action was filed after the policy’s one-year limitation period
    had expired. This court affirmed the dismissal on appeal. Rawlings v. State
    Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 12-0435, 
    2012 WL 2407690
    , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June
    27, 2012).
    Rawlings alleges that in mid-2012, he learned he did not have a valid
    policy with State Farm. As a result, on January 29, 2013, he filed the current
    action against Peschong. His petition alleges he is entitled damages under nine
    theories of recovery: breach of oral contract, unjust enrichment, failure to procure
    a valid policy, failure to provide a duty of care, conspiracy to commit fraud, fraud,
    malpractice, concealment, and negligence.
    Peschong filed a motion for summary judgment on July 11, 2013, and the
    motion was heard on September 16, 2013. In its October 25, 2013 ruling, the
    court determined that only the breach of oral contract claim was timely filed and
    legally recognizable.    However, it found Rawlings had failed to dispute the
    existence of a valid insurance policy by failing to file any affidavits supporting his
    position and resting on “his mere allegations.” The court further noted Rawlings
    had alleged the existence of a valid insurance policy in the prior litigation against
    State Farm, which State Farm had never denied and on which the district court
    and the court of appeals had relied in their decisions. While the court refused to
    apply the doctrine of res judicata to find a valid insurance policy existed, it further
    held the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevented Rawlings from asserting a
    different position in the current litigation than he had in his litigation against State
    Farm.
    4
    II. Scope and Standard of Review.
    We review a grant of summary judgment for correction of errors at law.
    Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 
    850 N.W.2d 353
    , 362 (Iowa 2014). In so doing, we review
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
    Id.
     The moving
    party bears the burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute
    and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sabin v. Ackerman, 
    846 N.W.2d 835
    , 839 (Iowa 2014).          Summary judgment is not appropriate if
    reasonable minds could draw different inferences from the evidence and reach
    different conclusions. 
    Id.
    III. Discussion.
    Rawlings sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in
    determining he was judicially estopped from asserting a valid insurance policy did
    not exist. This was one of two bases on which the court found Rawlings failed to
    show a genuine fact dispute regarding the existence of a valid insurance policy.
    As Peschong notes, Rawlings does not dispute the other basis for granting
    summary judgment—the court’s finding he failed to present evidence showing a
    genuine fact dispute over the existence of a valid insurance policy.
    Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of
    material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law.   Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 362.       An issue is “genuine” if a reasonable
    factfinder could return a verdict or decision for the nonmoving party based on the
    record evidence. Id. A fact issue is in dispute if reasonable minds can differ on
    how the issue should be resolved. Boelman v. Grinnel Mut. Reins. Co., 
    826 N.W.2d 494
    , 501 (Iowa 2013).        If the nonmoving party has no evidence to
    5
    support a determinative element of that party’s claim, summary judgment is
    properly granted. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 362.
    On appeal, Rawlings does not contest the finding that he failed to dispute
    the existence of a valid insurance policy by showing material facts to support his
    claim. “‘[T]he scope of appellate review is defined by the issues raised by the
    parties’ briefs.’ Issues not raised in the appellate briefs cannot be considered by
    the reviewing court.”   ALCOA v. Musal, 
    622 N.W.2d 476
    , 479 (Iowa 2001)
    (citations omitted). “Moreover, issues are deemed waived or abandoned when
    they are not stated on appeal by brief . . . .” Hubby v. State, 
    331 N.W.2d 690
    ,
    694 (Iowa 1983). Rawlings has waived error on the question of whether he
    presented evidence to dispute the existence of a valid insurance policy. The lack
    of such evidence on this material fact was a proper basis for the granting of
    summary judgment in favor of Peschong, and accordingly, we need not address
    Rawlings’s judicial estoppel argument.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-1866

Filed Date: 10/29/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021