Jamie Lee Cole v. State of Iowa ( 2018 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 17-0387
    Filed October 24, 2018
    JAMIE LEE COLE,
    Applicant-Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Delaware County, Bradley J. Harris,
    Judge.
    Appeal from the denial of an application for postconviction relief filed
    pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 822 (2015). AFFIRMED.
    Thomas M. McIntee, Waterloo, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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    McDONALD, Judge.
    This case arises out of Jamie Cole’s challenge to his conviction and
    sentence for operating while intoxicated, third offense, in violation of Iowa Code
    section 321J.2 (2015). In his application for postconviction relief, Cole requested
    the district court order the Iowa Department of Corrections to place him in a
    rehabilitation facility rather than prison. In the alternative, Cole requested his guilty
    plea and conviction be vacated and he be allowed to plead anew. Following a trial
    on the merits of the postconviction application, in which Cole represented himself,
    the district court denied Cole’s application for postconviction relief. Cole timely
    filed this appeal.
    By way of background, in March 2015, Cole was charged with operating
    while intoxicated, third offense, in Delaware County. As part of a plea agreement,
    Cole pleaded guilty to the charge, and the State agreed to dismiss other counts.
    In addition, the parties agreed Cole would be placed in a chapter 321J
    rehabilitation program rather than prison. The district court agreed to be bound by
    the parties’ plea agreement. The sentencing order was in accord with the parties’
    agreement. It provided Cole was committed to the “custody of the Director of the
    Iowa Department of Corrections for placement in the 321J Program at West Union,
    administered by the First Judicial District Department of Correctional Services.”
    At the time Cole pleaded guilty to the Delaware County charge, he also had
    pending a charge in Buchanan County for operating while intoxicated. At the time
    of his plea and sentencing in the Delaware County case, the district court asked
    Cole whether he understood the court could not control the sentence in the
    Buchanan County case:
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    THE COURT: And do you understand that I can’t make any
    guarantees that you’ll receive the same sentence or consecutive or
    concurrent sentence in Buchanan County? I have no control over
    that.
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
    In April 2015, Cole pleaded guilty to operating while intoxicated, third offense, in
    Buchanan County. The sentence in that case did not require or prohibit his entry
    into the 321J rehabilitation program.
    Following his plea and sentencing in the Buchanan County case, Cole
    remained in jail while the department of corrections reviewed his application for
    admission into the rehabilitation program.     During that time, Cole indecently
    exposed himself to one correctional officer and acted aggressively toward another.
    Cole was charged with and convicted of indecent exposure because of this
    conduct. Shortly after, the department of corrections denied Cole’s application for
    the rehabilitation program, citing his recent violent actions and conviction for
    indecent exposure. Cole was then committed to the custody of the department of
    corrections and placed in prison.
    Cole filed this application for postconviction relief challenging only his
    Delaware County conviction. He contends the district court should have ordered
    the department of corrections to place him in the rehabilitation facility. In the
    alternative, he contends the district court should have vacated his guilty plea and
    conviction. Our review is for the correction of errors at law. See Perez v. State,
    
    816 N.W.2d 354
    , 356 (Iowa 2012). The court will affirm the lower court if “the law
    was correctly applied” and there was substantial evidence supporting findings of
    fact. 
    Id.
     (quoting Harrington v. State, 
    659 N.W.2d 509
    , 520 (Iowa 2003)).
    4
    We cannot conclude the district court committed legal error in denying the
    application for postconviction relief.     Cole pleaded guilty to operating while
    intoxicated, third offense, in Delaware County. In that case, he received the
    sentence for which he bargained. At the time of the plea and sentencing in
    Delaware County, Cole stated he understood the district court could not control
    what occurred in the Buchanan County case. After pleading guilty to operating
    while intoxicated in Buchanan County, Cole was convicted of indecent exposure.
    It was this additional offense conduct that precluded Cole from being placed in the
    rehabilitation program. It was Cole’s conduct that precluded the execution of his
    bargained-for sentence. As the district court noted, “The fact that applicant has
    been confined pursuant to the terms of his sentences in other cases does not affect
    the validity, constitutionality or the legality of the sentence which is the subject of
    this action.” We agree. There is no legal reason to vacate his plea, conviction, or
    sentence in the Delaware County case.
    For the first time on appeal, Cole contends his plea counsel provided
    constitutionally deficient representation in allowing Cole to plead guilty without first
    explaining it might be possible Cole would not be placed in the rehabilitation
    program. This claim was not raised in Cole’s application for postconviction relief.
    The error was not preserved for appellate review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 
    641 N.W.2d 532
    , 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that
    issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we
    will decide them on appeal.”).
    Cole appears to claim his postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing
    to assert a claim that his plea counsel was ineffective for not explaining it might be
    5
    possible Cole would not be placed in the rehabilitation program. Cole also asserts
    his postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing to subpoena Cole’s plea
    counsel to testify at the postconviction trial. These claims are without merit. Cole
    moved to represent himself in this civil proceeding. The district court granted
    Cole’s request after Cole filed a disciplinary complaint against his postconviction
    counsel. An applicant cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance when
    representing oneself. See State v. Hutchison, 
    341 N.W.2d 33
    , 42 (Iowa 1983)
    (“[T]he defendant cannot knowingly and intelligently make an election to proceed
    pro se and then, having lost his trial on the merits, seek a reversal on appeal by
    claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
    Finally, Cole contends the postconviction court failed to make necessary
    findings and conclusions in ruling on his application. When ruling on an application
    for postconviction relief “[t]he court shall make specific findings of fact, and state
    expressly its conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented.” 
    Iowa Code § 822.7
    . “[S]ubstantial compliance is sufficient.” Gamble v. State, 
    723 N.W.2d 443
    , 446 (Iowa 2006).
    We conclude the district court substantially complied with the rule. In the
    order denying Cole’s application for PCR, the court listed the issues that Cole
    raised:
    A.     A conviction or sentence was in violation of the
    constitution of the United States or the constitution and laws of this
    state.
    B.     The court was without jurisdiction to impose
    sentence.[1]
    1
    The Court’s order skips from B to D.
    6
    D.     There exists evidence of material facts, not previously
    presented or heard, that require vacation of the conviction or
    sentence in the interests of justice.
    E.     Applicant’s probation, parole or conditional release has
    been unlawfully revoked.
    F.     Applicant is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or
    other restraint.
    The court concluded that Cole “failed to provide any evidence of any of the grounds
    alleged to allow the court to grant him the requested relief.” Nothing more was
    required of the court.
    AFFIRMED.