State of Iowa v. Deanthony Allen Echols ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1300
Filed June 29, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DEANTHONY ALLEN ECHOLS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Tom Reidel, Judge.
A defendant challenges his prison sentence. AFFIRMED.
Raya D. Dimitrova of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Badding, JJ.
2
TABOR, Judge.
The sentencing court considered Deanthony Echols’s disrespect toward his
childrens’ mothers “very disturbing.” Echols pleaded guilty to two counts of
domestic abuse assault and harassment in the first degree. The court sentenced
Echols to a prison term not to exceed two years. He now claims the court abused
its discretion in not granting probation. Because the court weighed many factors,
including the need to deter future violence against the two victims, we find a proper
exercise of discretion and affirm the sentence.
I. Facts and Prior Procedures
Twenty-four-year-old Echols has a child in common with both P.D. and S.R.
In separate incidents, Echols committed acts of aggression against both women.
In May 2020, Echols confronted S.R. at her home, bludgeoned her car, bit
her neck, and struck her with a chair. The State charged Echols with domestic
abuse assault with a weapon.1
Then in September, Echols messaged P.D: “I’m just coming to your house
to kill you.” After P.D. contacted police, the State charged Echols with harassment
in the first degree. And there is more.2 One month later, Echols showed up at
P.D.’s home “purportedly to retrieve items belonging to him.” According to the
1 The State also charged Echols with criminal mischief in the second degree but
dismissed that charge as part of the plea agreement.
2 The State also brought charges for two other incidents. First, Echols allegedly
tackled and strangled P.D., leading to a charge of domestic abuse assault
impeding air or blood flow causing bodily injury. Next, he attacked P.D. in her bed,
leading to a charge of burglary in the first degree. The State dismissed both those
charges as part of the plea agreement.
3
minutes of testimony, while there, he struck P.D. in the face, causing a laceration.
The State charged Echols with domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury.3
In all, Echols faced seven charges stemming from his criminal acts directed
at S.R. and P.D. The State and Echols reached a plea agreement. The State
dismissed four counts, and Echols pleaded guilty to three offenses: (1) domestic
abuse assault with a weapon, (2) domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury,
and (3) harassment in the first degree.
At the sentencing hearing, Echols asked the court for two days of credited
jail time, minimum fines, and work release. As part of the plea agreement, the
State did not recommend a particular sentence.
Even without the State’s recommendation, Echols’s mistreatment of these
victims disturbed the court. The court reasoned:
We have two counts, two different cases, both involving domestic
abuse, and they each involve different victims. . . . [Y]ou don’t seem
to understand that when you’re in a relationship, that is a person the
legislature has deemed to require be worthy of additional protections,
and that that should be the case. I understand that you have had a
certain relationship with both of these women at different times, and
they probably have a greater right to expect you to treat them more
respectfully than what you have done.
Given those circumstances, the court did not find probation to be an appropriate
sentence. So the court sentenced Echols to two indeterminate two-year prison
terms, to run concurrently. It challenged Echols to become a better parent:
If you want to continue to be a person who perpetrates domestic
violence and be in and out of jail or prison for the remainder of your
life, or if you want to be a good father and a good significant other to
whomever you’re in a relationship with. Ultimately, that decision will
be yours.
3The State also charged Echols with theft in the fourth degree but dismissed the
charge as part of the plea agreement.
4
Echols now appeals his sentence. He “bears the burden of establishing
‘good cause’ to pursue an appeal of [his] conviction based on a guilty plea.” State
v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020). Good cause exists when a defendant
appeals the sentence rather than the guilty plea. Id. at 105.
II. Standard of Review
We review Echols’s sentence for an abuse of discretion. See id. at 103.
We will find an abuse if the court exercises its discretion on grounds clearly
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d 328,
331 (Iowa 2003). Unless the court fails to exercise its discretion or considers
inappropriate matters, we rarely find abuse. State v. Pappas, 337 N.W.2d 490,
494 (Iowa 1983). In other words, we entertain a strong presumption in favor of the
sentencing court’s decision. Id. Echols bears the “heavy” burden of overcoming
this presumption. See id.III. Analysis
A sentencing court must examine “all pertinent information” and then
determine an authorized sentence providing the “maximum opportunity for the
rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from further
offenses by the defendant and others.” Iowa Code § 901.5 (2020). It should
consider the societal goals for sentencing a criminal offender, like rehabilitation
and community protection. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).
And it must consider an offender’s age, chances of reform, employment status,
family circumstances, character and propensity, the nature of the offense,
attending circumstances, and other relevant factors. Id. at 725.
5
Echols claims that the sentencing court relied on the nature of his offenses
at the expense of other necessary factors. See State v. Dvorksy, 322 N.W.2d 62,
67 (Iowa 1982). He contends that rather than weigh all the factors, the court
focused on the disrespect of the victims underlying the domestic abuse assaults
and relied on boilerplate statements for the remaining considerations.
We disagree with Echols’s contentions. The sentencing court weighed the
necessary factors when sentencing Echols. For instance, the court acknowledged
Echols’s age, just not as a mitigating circumstance. That is, the court told Echols
that he was old enough to behave better: “You’re 24 years old. You should know
that violence of this type is inappropriate.” The court also noted that the offenses
“each involve different victims.” Those attending circumstances were proper
considerations. See State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 435 (Iowa 2005) (“The
existence of two victims is clearly a circumstance of the crime.”).
True, the offenses’ disrespectful natures disturbed the sentencing court.
And in that vein, the court found a prison term necessary to “deter this type of
conduct in the future.” But “[p]art of the court’s sentencing responsibility was to
determine whether its sentence would deter defendant from future offenses.” See
State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 1983). The court did not abuse its
discretion in highlighting the nature of the offense and attending circumstances. A
court need not mention each sentencing factor it considered. State v. Bradley,
No. 21-1149, 2022 WL 1488545, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2022) (citing State
v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)). Resentencing is not necessary.
AFFIRMED.