In the Interest of L.F., Minor Child ( 2022 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 22-0749
    Filed June 29, 2022
    IN THE INTEREST OF L.F.,
    Minor Child
    B.F., Father,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Stephen A. Owen,
    District Associate Judge.
    A father appeals the denial of his motion to close the child-in-need-of-
    assistance case. AFFIRMED.
    Jesse A. Macro, Jr. of Macro & Kozlowski, LLP, West Des Moines, for
    appellant father.
    Christine E. Branstad of Branstad & Olson Law Office, Des Moines, for
    appellee mother.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee State.
    Shannon M. Leighty of the Public Defender’s Office, Nevada, attorney and
    guardian ad litem for minor child.
    Considered by May, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
    2
    GREER, Judge.
    The father of a teenaged child1 appeals the juvenile court’s denial of his
    request to close the child–in-need-of-assistance (CINA) case, as recommended
    by the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS)—but opposed by the mother.2
    The juvenile court, after dismissing the case once, says not this time. Notably, the
    State, on behalf of DHS, indicated it would not file a response to the father’s appeal
    as it could not defend the juvenile court order. The juvenile court considered the
    motion to close the case at the permanency hearing held in March 2022, but it
    denied the motion. The father timely appeals from that order.
    To open, a panel of our court considered the juvenile court’s dismissal of
    this CINA action over a year ago. See In re L.F., No. 21-0002, 
    2021 WL 1400086
    ,
    at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2021) (reversing the juvenile court’s dismissal of the
    CINA proceeding “[b]ecause the father continues to minimize and deny the sexual
    misconduct, and because L.F. has limited ability to recognize and communicate
    any sexual misconduct she may experience”). The detailed history of the case
    was set out in that decision:
    L.F. was born in 2005. She has intellectual disabilities and
    functions at about a second-grade level. She needs at least
    occasional assistance dressing, bathing, and toileting. She cannot
    speak, but she can communicate limited concepts using an assistive
    electronic device or nonverbal signals.
    The mother and father were previously married. They had
    four children together—two boys and two girls, L.F. and her older
    sister S.F. The mother filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in
    1 These parents share legal custody of the child with the mother providing physical
    care. There are other children in this family; they are not a part of this proceeding.
    2 The State did not file a notice of appeal and informs it will not file a response
    defending the juvenile court order given DHS’s position supporting case closure.
    On the other hand, the mother timely filed a response after the case was
    transferred to us and we consider her arguments in this appeal.
    3
    February 2016. In October 2016, the mother contacted [DHS] to
    report she suspected the father sexually abused S.F. and L.F. As
    part of the investigation, the mother also reported she suspected the
    father sexually abused her female cousin K.S. DHS noted L.F., as a
    child with special needs, was “very vulnerable” and the father
    showed “very concerning sexualized behaviors,” but DHS ultimately
    determined the allegation of abuse against S.F. and L.F. was not
    founded. In December 2017, the district court entered a decree that
    dissolved the parents’ marriage, granted joint legal custody, placed
    physical care with the mother, and ordered visitation with the father
    that included supervised overnight visits with L.F.
    The family again came to the attention of DHS in July 2018
    when the mother reported a witness saw L.F.’s hand on the father’s
    crotch over his clothes and the father did nothing to move or redirect
    L.F. The juvenile court soon ordered L.F. temporarily removed from
    her father’s care. In September, DHS determined the allegation of
    abuse against L.F. was unfounded in light of an ongoing criminal
    investigation into the matter that limited the DHS investigation. In
    October, the court entered a stipulated order finding L.F. was a
    [CINA].
    On November 26, 2018, the juvenile court held a dispositional
    hearing in which the mother submitted evidence of the father’s prior
    alleged sexual misconduct. First, the mother testified that when S.F.
    was three years old, the father “accidentally” put his finger inside her
    vagina while bathing her. Second, the mother provided records from
    the father’s conviction of a sex offense in Minnesota for a 2012
    incident in which he fondled a female physician’s breast during a
    medical appointment for one of the children. Third, K.S. provided a
    letter accusing the father of multiple incidents of sexual misconduct
    in or around 2007 when K.S. was fifteen years old and staying with
    the family. According [to] K.S.’s letter, the father: encouraged K.S.
    to sit on his lap in a hot tub; stayed in and around K.S.’s room for an
    extended time right before she planned to undress to take a shower
    and go to sleep; and rode with K.S. on a four-wheeler and fondled
    her breasts when they were alone. Fourth, S.F., who was seventeen
    years old at the time of the hearing, provided a letter and testified to
    allegations the father engaged in sexual misconduct toward her. S.F.
    alleged the father: cuddled and spooned S.F. in bed and on the
    couch; frequently walked into the bathroom while S.F. was
    showering; looked down S.F.’s shirt and stared at her buttocks while
    she was bent over; and repeatedly pressed his body against hers as
    he walked past. Additionally, S.F. said the father continued bathing
    L.F. and told S.F. to lie and say she was bathing L.F.
    On November 28, 2018, the juvenile court issued the
    dispositional order at issue here. The court found the father “has a
    very concerning history of . . . sexualized contact primarily involving
    minor females.” The juvenile court noted there is no supporting
    4
    evidence for the allegations of sexual misconduct presented at the
    hearing—other than the Minnesota incident that resulted in
    conviction—but the court specifically found the father groped K.S.
    and digitally penetrated S.F.’s vagina. The court also noted a 2016
    psychosexual evaluation of the father concluded he does not have a
    serious mental impairment and is treatable. The court continued the
    CINA adjudication with a long-term goal of establishing a safe
    relationship with both parents, and the court allowed L.F. to visit the
    father with full supervision and restrictions preventing the father from
    assisting L.F. with toileting, bathing, or dressing.
    The juvenile court held a series of permanency review
    hearings and issued corresponding orders over the next several
    months. Beginning with the May 13, 2019 permanency order, the
    court allowed L.F. to visit the father at DHS’s discretion. DHS
    developed a safety plan that allowed for supervised visitation and
    largely kept the court’s initial restrictions in place. By the time of the
    final hearing on December 21, 2020, DHS primarily provided the
    safety plan and at least monthly meetings with the family. DHS also
    allowed either the paternal grandmother or the father’s live-in friend
    to supervise L.F.’s visitations with the father. On December 21, the
    court issued its order dismissing the CINA action and closing the
    case. The mother appeals.
    
    Id.
     at *1–2 (footnotes omitted). In that earlier proceeding, the juvenile court found
    the purposes of the CINA order had been accomplished and the child was no
    longer in need of supervision, care, or treatment under Iowa Code section
    232.103(4)(a) (2018). Id. at *2. After the mother appealed and based on that
    record, our court reversed the juvenile court and returned the case for continued
    DHS supervision and court oversight. Id. at *3–4. The main concern in the first
    appeal related to the father’s “concerning behavior,” his “boundary violations,” and
    his avoidance of “taking full responsibility for his sexual behaviors.” Id. at *2–3.
    Given the child’s limited ability to communicate and self-protect and the father’s
    minimization and denial of sexual misconduct, our court found juvenile court
    supervision remained a need.          Id.       The case was remanded for further
    proceedings. Id. at *4.
    5
    With that directive from the court of appeals and after a permanency review
    hearing on July 9, 2021,3 the case returned to juvenile court oversight and visits
    continued as had been set before the appeal.4 In September 2021, the father
    moved to “close the case” and again urged that the purposes of the previous orders
    were accomplished and continuation of supervision was “unjustified and
    unwarranted.” In late March 2022, another permanency review hearing was held,
    and the juvenile court considered the “motion to close the case,” filed under Iowa
    Code section 232.103(2)(b) (2022). In April, the juvenile court ordered the CINA
    adjudication to continue. The father appeals the April order denying case closure.
    We review CINA proceedings de novo. In re D.D., 
    955 N.W.2d 186
    , 192
    (Iowa 2021). We give weight to the juvenile court’s findings but are not bound by
    them. 
    Id.
     Overall, our principal concern is the best interests of the child. In re
    L.H., 
    904 N.W.2d 145
    , 149 (Iowa 2017). There must be clear and convincing
    evidence to support the grounds asserted.        See 
    id.
       In determining the best
    interests of the child, “we look to the parent[’s] past performance because it may
    indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future.” In re
    J.E., 
    723 N.W.2d 793
    , 798 (Iowa 2006) (quoting In re C.K., 
    558 N.W.2d 170
    , 172
    (Iowa 1997)).
    3 Between the closing of the CINA case on December 21, 2020, and the reversal
    of that order in April 14, 2021, the father went about four months without
    supervision by DHS. There were no allegations of any problems during those
    months, so permanency review hearings were set to occur every nine months, the
    safety plan was to continue, and DHS would provide any necessary services. At
    the time of this permanency hearing, the child was fifteen and a half years old. The
    juvenile court noted the parents were “headed to district court in the autumn to
    address [the mother’s] motion to modify custody.”
    4 As of June 2020, the father’s visits comported with the custody ordered visitation.
    6
    By stipulation, the CINA adjudication related to a failure to supervise under
    Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2).5 Although two grounds were initially alleged,
    the other ground—that the child had been or was imminently likely to be sexually
    abused by a parent—was withdrawn. See 
    Iowa Code § 232.2
    (6)(d).6 No one
    appealed the order of adjudication following disposition. See In re Long, 
    313 N.W.2d 473
    , 477 (Iowa 1981) (concluding a pre-dispositional order for adjudication
    is not a final order appealable as a matter of right). Thus, the father emphasizes
    that the case is not over sexual abuse, but was filed as a failure-to-supervise case
    and, under that rubric, the case is resolved. He argues since our previous decision,
    he accepted responsibility for his behaviors and, as confirmed by his therapist, did
    the necessary work in therapy. To be sure, from the July 2021 hearing until the
    March 2022 hearing on the motion to close, the child appeared to be doing well
    and enjoyed visits, showing no fear of her father. DHS felt she looked to her father
    for guidance and attention. The report also confirmed the child’s communication
    skills have improved. With that backdrop, DHS requested case closure. No one
    reported any new concerns and so DHS was conducting only monthly checks on
    the family.   The DHS social work case manager felt permanency had been
    achieved for L.F. and, with the achievement of maximum benefits for the family,
    there were no new or different services DHS could offer.
    5 Under section 232.2(6)(c)(2), a child can be adjudicated CINA if the child has
    suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harmful effects from “[t]he failure of the
    child’s parent . . . to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child.”
    6 Section 232.2(6)(d) relates to a child “[w]ho has been, or is imminently likely to
    be, sexually abused by the child’s parent, guardian, custodian, or other member of
    the household in which the child resides.”
    7
    But this time, the juvenile court disagreed and summarized the status of the
    case in detail in its April order. Several matters troubled the juvenile court. Some
    of those matters concerned the mother as well. Pointing to the March 2022 DHS
    report, the mother quotes from the text that the child still has difficulty recognizing
    boundaries or concerns for her own safety coupled with a limited ability to
    communicate. With those concerns still at hand, she contends the protection
    afforded under CINA proceedings is necessary. Yet, the child returned to the care
    of both parents in June 2020 and no reports of abuse or neglect have surfaced.
    Even though he denies sexual misconduct, the father admitted to past poor
    choices that he claims to have addressed in therapy. DHS maintains the father
    followed all conditions and expectations required to meet the safety plan crafted
    for the child. As a part of the proceedings before the juvenile court, the father’s
    therapist opined that the CINA case should be closed as the father will voluntarily
    adhere to the safety plan and therapy. The father sees his therapist monthly, and
    she specializes in treating sex offenders.
    Still, the juvenile court saw red flags. While the father referenced a safety
    plan he would put in place, developed with the help of his therapist, he surprisingly
    could not describe it for the juvenile court at the hearing. And he did not present
    the plan in writing for consideration by the court. As to the father, the juvenile court
    found his testimony to be “guarded” and that he seemed to “avoid details in his
    answers.” See In re T.P., No. 19-0162, 
    2019 WL 3317346
    , at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
    July 24, 2019) (“[W]e defer to the juvenile court’s credibility finding that the
    mother’s denial was ‘completely unbelievable.’”).        Those impressions became
    more important over the father’s answers about his therapy and the safety plan he
    8
    claimed to have in place. Even with the clear crossing of sexual boundaries, the
    father continues to deflect his responsibility, noting that in therapy he talks about
    how certain actions can affect other people and “how even some of the simplest
    action can be taken wrong.”
    To support the findings, the juvenile court thoughtfully summarized the
    history of the case and detailed over thirty-seven pages the impressions, relevant
    facts, and legal authorities that lead to the decision. Observing the father, the
    juvenile court found him to be “evasive” and specifically noted:
    What is a court to make of a man convicted upon his own
    admission of a sex-related crime, with a concerning history of
    boundary issues with female youth and a daughter without any
    capacity for self-protection? Upon this court’s thorough review of the
    last several years of information in this case, the answer appears to
    be continued supervision.
    This is a case that, at a minimum, involves supervision of
    boundaries. That would not have ever been necessary unless the
    risk of inappropriately crossing boundaries existed. The risk posed
    is two-fold, the father’s history of overstepping boundaries with adult
    and minor females and the child’s lack of self-protective capacities.
    These pose safety hazards that the court’s aid and supervision have
    addressed and continue to address.
    [The father] has, according to his uncontroverted testimony,
    addressed boundaries and safety in therapy with [his therapist]. As
    he plainly stated, he recognizes the harm that inattention to
    boundaries has caused, although he suggested it was [the child] who
    needs the boundaries checked as well. He goes on to acknowledge
    that he wished he handled “it” better.
    Therein lies a problem. [The father] acknowledges issues, but
    only partially recognizes the risks. When he does he generally
    attempts to spread the responsibility for causing or mitigating the risk
    to others, including [the child]. He feigns confusion on cross-
    examination by the [S]tate over the facts originally asserted in the
    statement of facts. He denies any specific[] facts concerning
    crossing boundaries with S.F., but also admits some wrong while
    also professing accountability.
    Overall, the court found the “nature of the harm is failure to supervise and
    respect appropriate boundaries.” The juvenile court felt continued supervision was
    9
    warranted. In this unique situation, the court hit the nail on the head. See, e.g., In
    re T.V., No. 02-1746, 
    2003 WL 21543784
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 10, 2003)
    (holding that showing sex videos to a young child justified further oversight and
    services). By continuing the CINA case, the juvenile court found the “minimal,
    semi-supervised and liberal visitation provided strikes an appropriate balance
    between safety and the negligible negative results for [the child].” We agree. The
    DHS caseworker acknowledged the child continued to require “100 percent
    supervision” and there were no changes in the child’s ability to “recognize
    boundaries or concerns for her own safety.” Specifically, the case worker testified:
    Q. Would she—you indicated that she would be able to tell
    someone in the home and “I don’t want to do that”; correct? A. Yes.
    Q. Would she be able to—would she be able to tell someone
    later on that an individual made her do something that she did not
    want to do? . . . . A. I don’t believe that [the child] would be able to
    go into that detail. I do believe, in observing [the child], that she could
    express that she’s upset, and that would continue until somebody
    knew what she was talking about or trying to explain. [The child]
    doesn’t just stop when, you know, you’re like, “Okay, stop.” She’ll
    just continue in that emotion.
    Q. Would you agree with me that based on your experience,
    [the child] would not be able to understand that a touch was good or
    bad unless it hurt her? A. Or unless she was able to say it was
    uncomfortable, like made her feel uncomfortable; so if it was
    something pleasurable, she wouldn’t be able to describe the
    pleasure. She wouldn’t be able to describe what happened. If that
    makes sense.
    “[C]hild protection statutes ‘are designed to prevent probable harm to the
    child and do not require delay until after harm has occurred.’” L.H., 904 N.W.2d at
    152 (quoting In re L.L., 
    459 N.W.2d 489
    , 494 (Iowa 1990)). Here, given the
    testimony of the DHS caseworker coupled with the history of crossing sexual
    boundaries with little responsibility for those actions, we find protections for the
    child are necessary and we need not wait for any crossing of the boundaries to get
    10
    there. Id. at 150 (noting “we liberally interpret the phrase ‘imminently likely’”
    because the abuse is not required “to be on the verge of happening before
    adjudicating a child as one in need of assistance”). Because we do not find much
    has changed since our earlier decision and agree with the juvenile court that
    “sustaining the [permanency] goal and planning for ongoing permanency under the
    unique circumstances of this case requires the court’s aid,” we affirm the juvenile
    court’s decision.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-0749

Filed Date: 6/29/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/29/2022