State of Iowa v. Michael William Euchner, Sr. ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0962
Filed August 3, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL WILLIAM EUCHNER SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Ida County, Julie Schumacher
(suppression) and Zachary Hindman (trial), Judges.
A defendant appeals his drug convictions, challenging the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.
AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich (until
withdrawal) and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Badding, J., and Gamble, S.J.*
Schumacher, J., takes no part.
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2022).
2
BADDING, Judge.
While investigating an illegally parked car in an alley, two deputies smelled
marijuana coming from a nearby property owned by Michael Euchner Sr. A search
warrant was issued the next day but not executed until five days after that, at which
time law enforcement found drugs, related paraphernalia, baggies, cash, and
scales. Euchner unsuccessfully moved to suppress this evidence and was
convicted of possessing both methamphetamine and marijuana with the intent to
deliver and failure to affix a drug-tax stamp. Euchner appeals, claiming the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress because “plain smell” does not
establish probable cause and the information used to obtain the warrant was stale
by the time it was executed. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
show he intended to deliver methamphetamine or marijuana.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
At roughly 10:30 p.m. on October 27, 2018, Deputies Alex Ehlers and Kirk
Kinnaman of the Ida County Sheriff’s Office were checking on a vehicle that was
illegally parked in an alley behind Euchner’s residence. A separate building known
as “PC repair” is also located on the property.1 According to the search warrant
application, after Deputy Ehlers got out of his vehicle, he “could smell the odor of
marijuana coming from around the area of the PC repair building. [He] then walked
to the back door of the house and could also smell the odor of marijuana coming
from the back door entrance of the house as well.” Ehlers summoned Deputy
Kinnaman to the area and asked if he could smell the odor. Kinnaman responded
1Later trial testimony disclosed this was a computer repair business owned by
Euchner.
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that he could smell marijuana “coming from around the PC repair building and from
the back door area as well.” After knocking on the door to the residence and
receiving no response, Deputy Ehlers applied for a search warrant based on the
marijuana smell wafting from the property. The application detailed the deputies’
training and experience with drug cases, noting that both were K9 handlers and
familiar with the smell of marijuana. A magistrate granted the search warrant
application the next day, October 28.
The warrant was executed five days later, on November 2. As a result of
the evidence obtained from the search, Euchner was charged with various drug
crimes. Euchner filed a motion to suppress, arguing that law enforcement lacked
probable cause to believe that evidence listed on the application, “with the possible
exception of marijuana,” was located on the property and any information
supporting probable cause was stale by the time the warrant was executed. The
district court rejected both arguments in its ruling denying Euchner’s motion.
The case proceeded to a jury trial in May 2021. Deputies Ehlers and
Kinnaman testified that their investigation of Euchner started when they smelled
burnt marijuana at his property on October 27. Before the warrant was executed,
law enforcement broke up into two teams—one to secure the residence and one
to secure the business. Deputy Ehlers testified that, upon arrival at the property,
he could smell marijuana outside the computer repair building. Ehlers proceeded
to the residence with team one. Inside the home, they found Euchner, his wife,
and another couple at the kitchen table playing cards. Euchner’s son, a female,
and a minor child were found upstairs. No one was present in the business upon
team two’s breach of that building.
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After Euchner was read his Miranda rights, Deputy Ehlers asked him to
“take us to the narcotics.” Euchner led them to the computer repair building. Once
there, he pointed the officers to a desk drawer that contained two
methamphetamine pipes and a small bag of marijuana. At this point, Euchner
advised, “I’m just a consumer guys, I’m not like . . . a big bad guy.” In a separate
drawer, Deputy Ehlers found “multiple bundles of baggies,” which he testified “are
used to package narcotics,” and a baggie with methamphetamine in it. Euchner
said he used the baggies to store computer parts, but no baggies with parts were
found.
All in all, law enforcement found 21.89 grams of methamphetamine and
25.00 grams of marijuana in the computer repair building. The methamphetamine
was found among three bags in Euchner’s desk, containing respective amounts of
1.15 grams, 6.91 grams, and 13.83 grams. Deputy Ehlers testified: “Usually to the
user, a gram of methamphetamine is a lot. They’re usually sold in gram increments
or less.” Deputy Kinnaman agreed, testifying that a typical user would possess
“[u]p to a gram.”
The marijuana was found in a mason jar in the bottom drawer of Euchner’s
desk. Two digital scales were also found in the desk, one of which had a green,
leafy substance on it. And officers found $1394.00 in cash at the business, mostly
consisting of $1.00 bills, $320.00 in quarters, $85.60 in dimes, and $65.30 in
nickels. At the residence, officers uncovered a marijuana roach in the nightstand
of an upstairs bedroom. The roach was inside one of the pill pouch baggies like
those found in the business building.
5
After Euchner was arrested and the search ended, he was interviewed by
Deputy Ehlers. During the interview, Euchner told the deputy he would do
controlled buys for the police, touting his ability to get “pounds of
methamphetamine.” This led Deputy Ehlers to believe that Euchner had been in
the “game for a while. He has higher connections. Your general user does not
have that connection.”
The jury ultimately found Euchner guilty of possession of methamphetamine
with intent to deliver, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and failure to
affix a drug-tax stamp. Following the guilty verdicts, Euchner moved for a new trial
and renewed a motion for judgment of acquittal he made at trial, both of which
were denied at the time of sentencing.
II. Standards of Review
Appellate review of a challenge to a search warrant for an alleged lack of
probable cause is de novo, based on the totality of the circumstances. See State
v. McNeal, 867 N.W.2d 91, 99 (Iowa 2015). Challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a conviction are reviewed for correction of errors at law. State
v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 517 (Iowa 2022).
III. Analysis
A. Search Warrant
In challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, Euchner
argues the search warrant was not supported by probable cause because the
“plain smell” doctrine is unreliable and the “information in this case was stale” given
the time between the issuance of the warrant and its execution. Though Euchner
intertwines his arguments about plain smell and staleness, we view them as
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separate issues—the former on the initial existence of probable cause and the
latter on the dissipation of probable cause due to passage of time. We accordingly
address them separately, starting with the plain-smell doctrine.
1. Does the search warrant pass the smell test?
When examining challenges to probable cause to support a warrant, we “do
not make an independent determination of probable cause.” McNeal, 867 N.W.2d
at 100. Instead, we merely determine “whether the issuing judge had a substantial
basis for concluding probable cause existed.” Id. (quoting State v. Gogg, 561
N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 1997)). “[W]e draw all reasonable inferences to support
the judge’s finding of probable cause and give great deference to the judge’s
finding”—“[c]lose cases are decided in favor of upholding the validity of the
warrant.” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 364).
This is not a close case. Euchner simply argues the plain-smell doctrine
“should be rejected on the basis of unreliability,” pointing to what he says are
undetectable differences between the odor of legal and illegal items containing
THC, as well as “the mobility of odors.” But we cannot reject a doctrine that has
been adopted by our supreme court, see State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700
(Iowa Ct. App. 1990), as this one was in State v. Watts, 801 N.W.2d 845, 850 (Iowa
2011).
In Watts, our supreme court considered whether an officer’s detection of an
“overpowering odor of raw marijuana coming from inside the apartment” coupled
with his experience in investigating controlled substances offenses was “enough
to sustain the warrant by themselves.” 801 N.W.2d at 853. The court found it was,
noting that the United States Supreme Court has held:
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If the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he
finds the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently
distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never
held such a basis insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant.
Indeed it might very well be found to be evidence of most persuasive
character.
Id. at 854 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948)). The Watts
court stated it had “followed this reasoning” in past cases “and held that a trained
officer’s detection of a sufficiently distinctive odor, by itself or when accompanied
by other facts, may establish probable cause.” Id. (emphasis added) (collecting
cases).
Euchner tries to distinguish Watts, arguing it “is inapplicable to the instant
matter, as in that case the police were in a common hallway when they detected
the odor of marijuana, and were able to isolate the apartment from which the odor
was emanating.” The deputies here were able to do the same thing, even though
they were outside. Both smelled marijuana “coming from around the area of the
PC repair building” and “from the back door entrance of the house as well.” And
both were “qualified to know the odor,” Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13, given their training
and experience with marijuana cases as described in the search warrant
application. We have found similar facts sufficient to establish probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant of a home. See State v. Wemer, No. 15-0094,
2016 WL 740443, at *1, *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016) (finding facts arising
from officer’s “initial approach to the home”—the smell of marijuana—“alone
furnished probable cause for the search warrant”). A majority of other courts have
as well. See Watts, 801 N.W.2d at 854–55 (collecting cases); see also State v.
Kazmierczak, 771 S.E.2d 473, 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (collecting cases).
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In light of these cases, which applied the plain-smell doctrine to searches
of homes, Euchner’s argument about Iowa’s recognition of the “special sanctity” of
homes versus automobiles is not up to snuff. He contends a “more stringent
standard under the Iowa constitution is warranted as Euchner’s home and
business were searched (as opposed to an automobile).” But he has not
articulated what that “more stringent standard” would be. See State v. Simmons,
714 N.W.2d 264, 272 (Iowa 2006) (declining to depart from Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence where defendant “has not asserted and we have not found a basis
to distinguish the protection afforded by the Iowa Constitution from those afforded
by the federal constitution”). In any event, there is no state or federal constitutional
violation when a search warrant is issued based on probable cause. See, e.g.,
Gogg, 561 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 1997). We find that is the case here considering
the totality of the circumstances detailed above, along with all reasonable
inferences to support the magistrate’s probable-cause finding.
2. Was the search warrant stale?
Euchner nevertheless argues that the actual search was not supported by
probable cause at the time it was conducted because “the information was too
remote in time to be reliable.”2
2 We note that most of the caselaw considers staleness as it relates to the time
between when evidence was observed and issuance of a search warrant. See,
e.g., Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 362–63, 368; State v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666, 670
(Iowa 1996); State v. Gillespie, 503 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Iowa 1993); State v.
Woodcock, 407 N.W.2d 603, 605 (Iowa 1987); State v. Kaufman, 265 N.W.2d 610,
616 (Iowa 1978); State v. Cassady, 243 N.W.2d 581, 582 (Iowa 1976); State v.
Bean, 239 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 1976); State v. Strough, No. 10-1544, 2011 WL
4578406, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2011).
However, the timing of when a warrant is executed is in play in some other
cases, which apply analyses like that used in the above cases. See State v.
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“Because probable cause requires a reasonable belief that evidence of a
crime will be found on the premises to be searched, it is important the information
upon which this belief is based be current and not remote in time.” Id. at 367. But
“[t]he passage of time alone is not determinative.” Id. “Whether information is
stale depends on the circumstances of each case.” Randle, 555 N.W.2d at 670.
Those circumstances include:
(1) [T]he character of the crime (whether an isolated event or an
ongoing activity), (2) the character of the criminal (nomadic or
stable), (3) the nature of the thing to be seized (perishable, easily
destroyed, not affixed and easily removable, or of enduring utility to
the holder), and (4) the place to be searched (mere criminal forum of
convenience or secure operational base).
Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 367 (internal citations omitted).
On the first factor, Euchner points out that his “situation was an isolated
event” and there were “no allegations of ongoing criminal activity.” He is correct
that this was an isolated event. And, on the third factor, he is also correct that
“[d]rugs are readily consumable or transferable.”3 Grogg, 561 N.W.2d at 367.
“[W]here an isolated observance of a drug offense is involved, ‘probable cause
diminishes quickly,’ due in large part to the fact that drugs are ‘readily consumable
or transferable.’” Strough, 2011 WL 4578406, at *3 (quoting Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at
Paterno, 309 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1981); State v. Crawford, No. 01-1868, 2003
WL 118364, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2003).
3 The second factor—Euchner’s stability in the community—makes it more
reasonable to assume that evidence would remain on his property unlike a
defendant who was nomadic. See Shoemaker v. State, 451 A.2d 127, 136 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1982). And, as Euchner acknowledges, the fourth factor
considering the place to be searched does not weigh in favor of or against his
staleness claim.
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367). That said, “[w]hether the criminal activity is continuous or isolated does not
matter if the passage of time . . . is not significant.” Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 367.
In Gogg, the supreme court rejected a staleness claim only because the
passage of time between an informant’s observations and issuance of the search
warrant—six days—was not a significant amount of time. Id. at 368. Similarly, in
Paterno, the supreme court rejected a staleness claim when an informant’s
observations occurred on June 19, a warrant application was submitted on June
21, and the warrant was executed on June 26. 309 N.W.2d at 421–24. The court
acknowledged the “case dealt with the presence of controlled substances on a
single instance” and “in such cases probable cause ordinarily does not continue
for an extended period of time.” Id. at 424. Yet the court found probable cause
continued to exist “at the time of the issuance and execution of the warrant,” noting
“probable cause does not require absolute proof that the contraband was in the
place in question at the very moment the warrant was issued and executed.” Id.;
accord Crawford, 2003 WL 118364, at *2 (finding a reasonable person could
believe that if stolen property and clothes used in a robbery were at the property
when the warrant was issued, it would not have been removed by the time of the
search eight days later).
Based on these cases, we conclude that although this was an isolated event
and the evidence sought was easily removable, the passage of six days was not
significant enough to render the warrant stale.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Making the argument that he was a drug user and not a drug dealer,
Euchner claims the evidence was insufficient to show he intended to deliver the
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methamphetamine and marijuana. He points to his explanation that the baggies
were intended to be used for storing computer parts; the possibility “that users
b[u]y larger quantities for their own consumption”; the nature of the currency found;
the evidence of personal use, like the methamphetamine pipes and marijuana
roach; the possibility that the scales were used for weighing gunpowder; and the
lack of a ledger, prior controlled buys, and cutting agents.
While there may have been alternate explanations for the items found at
Euchner’s property, that is not the question before us. See State v. Musser, 721
N.W.2d 758, 761 (Iowa 2006) (noting it is not the job of the court in reviewing a
motion for judgment of acquittal “to resolve conflicts in the evidence,” “determine
the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence” (citation omitted)).
Instead, in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view “the
evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable
inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.’” State v. Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d
174, 180 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 490 (Iowa 2017)).
“We will uphold the verdict if substantial evidence in the record supports it.” Id.Evidence is not insubstantial just because it might support a different conclusion;
the only question is whether the evidence supports the finding actually made. See
State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021).
As Euchner recognizes, possession of drugs with intent to deliver “may be
inferred from the manner of packaging the drugs, from large amounts of
unexplained cash, as well as from the quantity of drugs.” State v. Adams, 554
N.W.2d 686, 692 (Iowa 1996) (internal citations omitted). All of these
circumstances were present here.
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In Euchner’s desk, law enforcement found 21.89 grams of
methamphetamine, spread between three bags containing 1.15 grams, 6.91
grams, 13.83 grams, and 25.00 grams of marijuana in a mason jar. Both Deputy
Ehlers and Kinnaman testified those amounts were well beyond what a normal
user would possess. The different weights of the methamphetamine also mattered
to Deputy Ehlers, who testified it showed “that it’s starting to get separated” for
resale. He explained dealers typically take larger amounts of methamphetamine—
like the bag with 13.83 grams—and then use a scale to “break those amounts
down to smaller amounts” they put into baggies to sell.
Deputy Ehlers testified that he also “found multiple bundles of baggies
that . . . are used to package narcotics” in Euchner’s desk and no baggies with
computer parts in them—just a baggie with a marijuana roach and another with
methamphetamine. He found two digital scales near the drugs in the business
building, one of which had a leafy green residue on it, and $1394.00 in cash.
Though the deputies recognized most dealers would have cash in denominations
larger than one-dollar bills, Ehlers testified, “Currency is currency.” He also said
the smaller amounts of money suggested that Euchner had just purchased the
stock, so all the money was in the drugs. Finally, when Euchner said he would
conduct controlled buys for the police, he told Ehlers that he could get “pounds of
methamphetamine.” This led the deputy to believe Euchner had connections in
the drug trade and was more than just a user.
In sum, though Euchner tried to explain away these indicators of drug
dealing, “the jury was not required to accept the defendant’s version of the events.”
Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 343 (cleaned up). Viewing the evidence in the light most
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favorable to the State, we conclude there is sufficient evidence that Euchner
possessed the methamphetamine and marijuana with the intent to deliver.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the denial of Euchner’s motion to suppress and find sufficient
evidence supported the challenged verdicts.
AFFIRMED.