State of Iowa v. Jeffery Lee Pearson ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1549
Filed August 3, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JEFFERY LEE PEARSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Dustria A. Relph
(guilty plea) and Stacy Ritchie (sentencing), Judges.
Jeffery Pearson appeals his conviction and sentence for domestic abuse
assault and assault causing bodily injury or mental illness. CONVICTIONS
AFFIRMED, SENTENCES VACATED, AND REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING.
Eric W. Manning of Manning Law Office, P.L.L.C., Urbandale, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.
In August 2021, Jeffery1 Pearson filed separate petitions to plead guilty to
domestic abuse assault, second offense, and assault causing bodily injury. In his
written guilty pleas, Pearson admitted to committing domestic abuse assault
against his wife and assault causing bodily injury against her friend. The written
guilty pleas also provided a factual basis for the pleas.
The district court accepted the pleas. In doing so, the court found them to
be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The court also found a factual
basis for the pleas. The court scheduled the matter for sentencing.
Four days after the pleas were accepted, Pearson filed a pro se request for
bond reduction, in which Pearson asserted the guilty plea “is not what I want” and
“I am not guilty.” A few days later, Pearson’s counsel filed a written motion to
withdraw the guilty plea. Following a hearing, the court found no grounds to
withdraw the plea and denied Pearson’s motion. The court later sentenced
Pearson to 365 days in jail with all but 100 days suspended on each count, ran the
sentences consecutively, and ordered him placed on probation upon his release
from custody. Pearson appeals both the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea and his sentence.
I. Challenge to the Plea
A defendant generally has no right to appeal from a guilty plea unless “the
defendant establishes good cause.” Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2021). Pearson
does not explicitly address good cause in his brief to us. Nevertheless, we will
1 The appellant’s first name is spelled as both “Jeffery” and “Jeffrey” throughout
the record. The trial information and notice of appeal use “Jeffery,” and so do we.
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evaluate whether good cause exists for us to consider both of Pearson’s issues.
See State v. Hoxsey, No 20-1531, 2022 WL 108559, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 12,
2022) (considering sua sponte whether good cause exists to hear the defendant’s
appeal from a guilty plea); id. at *2–3 (Ahlers, J., concurring) (discussing the
problems that may arise when a defendant does not address good cause); see
also State v. Davis, 971 N.W.2d 546, 554 (Iowa 2022) (acknowledging that a
defendant “should have discussed section 814.6(1)(a)(3)” in his brief “to show he
met the good-cause requirement,” but nevertheless finding good cause when the
issue raised is one for which good cause has been found to exist). “Good cause”
is defined “broadly.” State v. Newman, 970 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Iowa 2022). “‘[G]ood
cause’ in section 814.6 means a ‘legally sufficient reason’” and “is context specific.”
Id. (citations omitted).
As to Pearson’s challenge to his guilty plea, he only asserts his plea lacked
a factual basis. This court previously found a no-factual-basis claim does not
constitute good cause to appeal from a guilty plea. See State v. Manirabaruta,
No. 20-0025, 2021 WL 4890937, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2021) (“Until further
directed by our supreme court, we decline to find good cause to grant Manirabaruta
a right to appeal based on his claim of no factual basis for his guilty plea.”). Seeing
no reason to depart from our prior holding, Pearson has not established good
cause for us to consider his challenge to his guilty plea.2
2 We note a defendant may seek discretionary review for “[a]n order denying a
motion in arrest of judgment on grounds other than an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.” Iowa Code § 814.6(2)(f). However, Pearson does not request
discretionary review, and, as explained below, Pearson did not file a motion in
arrest of judgment.
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We lack authority to consider Pearson’s challenge to his guilty plea for
another reason. A defendant must file a motion in arrest of judgment “to challenge
the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding” on appeal. Iowa R. App. P. 2.24(3)(a);
see also Iowa R. App. P. 2.8(2)(d) (stating the court must “inform the defendant
that any challenges to a plea of guilty based on alleged defects in the plea
proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment and that failure to so
raise such challenges shall preclude the right to assert them on appeal”).
Pearson’s brief to us explicitly states his “motions were not a Motion in Arrest of
Judgment, but rather a withdrawal of the written pleas of guilty.” Iowa courts
recognize “a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and motion in arrest of judgment are
different motions.” State v. Belieu, 314 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Iowa 1982); see also
Iowa Rs. App. P. 2.8(2)(a) (motion for withdrawal of guilty plea), 2.24(3) (motion in
arrest of judgment). Pearson appeals the adequacy of his plea proceeding,
specifically alleging the court erred in finding a factual basis to support his guilty
pleas. Because Pearson did not file a motion in arrest of judgment, he is precluded
from challenging the court’s finding of a factual basis to support his guilty pleas on
appeal. See State v. Oldham, 515 N.W.2d 44, 46–47 (Iowa 1994) (finding the
defendant, who filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea due to his claimed lack of
specific intent to commit burglary, was precluded from appealing his guilty plea
because he did not file a motion in arrest of judgment); see also Newman, 970
N.W.2d at 869 (finding a defendant cannot establish good cause to appeal if
“Iowa’s appellate courts are without authority to provide relief on such claim”).
Finding no good cause for Pearson’s challenge to his guilty plea, we reject
his challenge to his guilty plea, affirm his convictions, and proceed to address his
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sentencing challenge.
II. Challenge to the Sentence
As to Pearson’s challenge to his sentence, our supreme court has found
“good cause exists to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the
defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.” State v.
Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020). Accordingly, Pearson has established
good cause to challenge his sentence, so we address the merits of that issue.
Pearson asserts that the district court abused its discretion by not fully
suspending the terms of incarceration. He also argues that his sentence violates
his constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment, claiming his
sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crimes. We find it unnecessary to
address these challenges to the sentence because we find the sentence illegal
and vacate it for another reason.
As noted, the district court sentenced Pearson to serve 365 days in jail with
all but 100 days suspended on each count, with the sentences to be served
consecutively. Even though neither party raised the issue of the legality of this
sentence, we have the discretion to raise the issue of legality on our own, and we
choose to do so here. See State v. Wieneke, No. 20-0126, 2021 WL 219222, at
*1 (Iowa Jan. 22, 2021) (noting an illegal sentence can be corrected at any time,
normal rules of error preservation do not apply, and the appellate court has
discretion to correct an illegal sentence when it comes to the court’s attention).
With the stacking of consecutive sentences, the district court effectively
imposed a 730-day jail sentence with all but 200 days suspended. This is an illegal
sentence because “[s]entencing is wholly a creature of statute” and “[a] sentence
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not authorized by statute is illegal and void.” Id. (citations omitted). No statute
permits imposition of a jail sentence for more than one year. See State v. Morris,
416 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Iowa 1987) (noting “a clear legislative intent that no
defendant should be held in a county jail facility for more than one year”). In fact,
our sentencing statutes prohibit it. Specifically, Iowa Code section 903.4 requires
that “[a]ll persons sentenced to confinement for a period of more than one year
shall be committed to the custody of the director of the Iowa department of
corrections,” and section 901.8 dictates that “if consecutive sentences are
specified in the order of commitment, the several terms shall be construed as one
continuous term of imprisonment.” These two sections work in unison to require
consecutive sentences that result in a total term of imprisonment in excess of one
year to be served in the custody of the director of the Iowa Department of
Corrections rather than the county jail. See State v. Patterson, 586 N.W.2d 83, 84
(Iowa 1998).
Our supreme court confronted a situation nearly identical to Pearson’s in
Patterson. Id. In Patterson, the district court sentenced the defendant to serve
180 days in the county jail on each of two charges with the sentences to be served
concurrently. Id. at 83. The court also sentenced the defendant to serve 240 days
in the county jail on a third charge, with that sentence to be served consecutively
to the 180-day sentence on the other charges. Id. The court suspended the
sentences and placed the defendant on probation. Id. On appeal, our supreme
court noted that, by operation of Iowa Code section 901.8, the consecutive nature
of the sentences imposed resulted in a 420-day sentence. Id. at 84. Because 420
days “exceeds the one-year period referred to in section 903.4,” the sentences
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were required to be served in the custody of the director of the department of
corrections and not in the county jail. Id. The fact that the sentences were
suspended did not change the result, because, “[w]hile the suspension of the
sentences prevents or delays their execution, it does not alter their character as
sentences of confinement.” Id. The district court is obligated to “correctly
designate the proper place of confinement in the event [probation is later revoked].”
Id.The identical reasoning and outcome apply here. With the imposition of
consecutive sentences, Pearson received a 730-day sentence of confinement. It
was illegal to order him to serve that sentence in the county jail rather than in the
custody of the director of the department of corrections, even though enough of
the sentence was suspended that the currently unsuspended portion of the
sentence is less than one year. As the sentence imposed is not permitted by law,
it must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing before a different
judge. See id. (requiring vacation of sentence and remand for resentencing under
these circumstances); Morris, 416 N.W.2d at 690 (same). Due to this result, we
find it unnecessary to address Pearson’s other challenges to his sentence.
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III. Conclusion
Finding no good cause to grant a right to appeal based on lack of factual
basis supporting Pearson’s guilty pleas, we deny his challenge to his guilty pleas.
Finding good cause for his challenge to his sentences, we reach that issue and
find the district court imposed an illegal sentence of more than one year in jail.
Therefore, we affirm Pearson’s convictions, vacate the sentences imposed, and
remand for resentencing before a different judge.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED, SENTENCES VACATED, AND REMANDED
FOR RESENTENCING.