Robert D. Mordini v. Iowa State Patrol, Jeff Ritzman, and Roxann Ryan ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0350
Filed August 3, 2022
ROBERT D. MORDINI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA STATE PATROL, JEFF RITZMAN, and ROXANN RYAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.
A plaintiff appeals from a district court ruling granting summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. AFFIRMED.
Jacob van Cleaf of Van Cleaf & McCormack Law Firm, LLP, Des Moines,
for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jeffrey C. Peterzalek, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellees.
Considered by Greer, P.J., Badding, J., and Danilson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2022).
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DANILSON, Senior Judge.
Robert Mordini appeals from a district court ruling granting summary
judgment in favor of his former employer, the Iowa State Patrol, and his former
supervisors, Jeff Ritzman and Roxann Ryan. We affirm the judgment of the district
court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The summary judgment record reveals the following undisputed facts.
Mordini began working for the Iowa State Patrol in 1993. In early 2015, after
several promotions, Mordini was assigned to an investigative role with the
professional standards bureau (PSB). In that capacity, Mordini was supervised by
Ritzman and Ryan and received “excellent” performance reviews. However,
according to Mordini, when he expressed an opinion that some cases “weren’t
handled appropriately” and issued reports “in which he found that officers had
committed wrongdoings,” he “began to face escalating commentary” from his
supervisors.
In any event, Mordini was soon offered an opportunity to “run[] a district,”
which he declined because it required him to move. In September 2015, Mordini
was reassigned to the position of administrative sergeant at the department of
public safety (DPS) headquarters. Mordini’s new position was a “Lateral lntra-
Agency Transfer,” with the “same” salary, class, and payroll number. In December
2015, Mordini states that he spoke to then Lieutenant Governor Reynolds about
“bullying, cronyism, and fiscal management issues of the DPS.”
In February 2016, Mordini filed an application for disability benefits.
According to Mordini, critical remarks by his supervisors, along with “being
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assigned less desirable duties,” aggravated an “underlying medical condition,”1
which “trigger[ed] the need to file for disability” because he was no longer
physically able to work. Mordini’s application was approved, and he was placed
on medical disability retirement in June 2016.
Mordini subsequently initiated this lawsuit, raising whistleblower claims of
retaliation, harassment, constructive discharge pursuant to Iowa Code
section 70A.28 (2016), and a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
against the Iowa State Patrol, Ritzman, and Ryan. The defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment, claiming in part that “there was no adverse action against
Mordini”; Mordini was “not constructively discharged”; and “Mordini’s general non-
specific hostile work environment claims [we]re insufficient to meet the
outrageousness standard.”
Following a hearing, the district court entered an order granting the
defendants’ motion. Mordini appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review rulings granting summary judgment for correction of errors at
law. EMC Ins. Grp. v. Shepard, 960 N.W.2d 661, 668 (Iowa 2021). “On motion
for summary judgment, the court must: (1) view the facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, and (2) consider on behalf of the nonmoving party every
legitimate inference reasonably deduced from the record.” Garrison v. New
Fashion Pork LLP, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2022 WL 2347783, at *4 (Iowa 2022)
(quoting Morris v. Legends Fieldhouse Bar & Grill, LLC, 958 N.W.2d 817, 821
1 As Mordini’s attorney explained, “Mr. Mordini suffers from a condition called
diverticulitis. It causes pain when he’s put under certain forms of stress.”
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(Iowa 2021)). “Summary judgment is proper when the moving party has shown
‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting EMC Ins. Grp., 960 N.W.2d at 668).
III. Discussion
Mordini’s claims for alleged violations of Iowa Code section 70A.28 require
proof of three elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; (2) he
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) he was discharged as a reprisal
for his protected disclosure. See Zwanziger v. O’Brien, No. 11-1548, 2012 WL
4513836, at *1 n.4 (Iowa App. Ct. Oct. 3, 2012) (citing Yockey v. State, 540 N.W.2d
418, 422 (Iowa 1995)). On appeal, Mordini focuses on his becoming disabled in
relation to the end of his former employment to support his claim of constructive
discharge. He argues that he suffered an adverse employment action as the
defendants’ actions caused him to file for disability because he was no longer able
to work due to his deteriorating health. According to Mordini, “[i]nflicting disability
on an employee is sufficiently adverse employment action to rise to the level of
constructive discharge.” Assuming the truth of Mordini’s contention, here no
reasonable fact finder could conclude Mordini was constructively discharged under
these facts.
A constructive discharge “exists when the employer deliberately makes an
employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an
involuntary resignation.” Haberer v. Woodbury Cnty., 560 N.W.2d 571, 575 (Iowa
1997) (quoting First Jud. Dist. Dep’t of Corr. v. Iowa Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 315 N.W.2d
83, 87 (Iowa 1982)). “The test for constructive discharge is objective: The fact-
finder must conclude that ‘working conditions would have been so difficult or
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unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would be
compelled to resign.’” Id. (quoting First Jud. Dist. Dep’t of Corr., 315 N.W.2d at
87). Some factors to consider include “(1) a change in grade, (2) inconsistent with
or outside the scope of his job description, (3) a decrease in pay or prestige, [or]
(4) impossible to do.” See id. at 577 (detailing factors that “bear on a constructive-
discharge claim”).
Here, it is undisputed that Mordini’s pay and benefits were not reduced
when he was reassigned to the position of administrative sergeant at the DPS
headquarters in September 2015. The district court found that his reassignment
“constituted a minor change in working conditions.” See Farmland Foods, Inc. v.
Dubuque Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 672 N.W.2d 733, 742 (Iowa 2003). But according
to Mordini, the “adverse action” by the defendants was not limited to “the two offers
of transfer.” Rather, Mordini alleged the defendants moved him to “a remote
location so that he would be out of sight out of mind”; “regularly check[ed] [his]
payroll and daybook”; asked “other workers why they interacted with [him] on
Facebook or liked things [he] posted”; and assigned him “less desirable duties,”
including tasks “normally associated . . . with secretarial staff.” Mordini stated he
“had to take vacation time to leave so [he] could avoid going stir crazy” because
he was “so bored sitting in the office” with “no job duties.” He further alleged he
“began to suffer more greatly from [his] diverticulitis” “[a]s a result of how much
harassment [he] was facing.”
Thus, Mordini claims a factual issue exists whether a reasonable person in
his position would have felt compelled to resign, or as Mordini presents his claim
in this case, to file for disability. See Haberer, 560 N.W.2d at 575 (setting forth
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standard of review). On this issue, the district court found: “Even presuming that
a claim of disability is the equivalent of resignation, the facts alleged are not
sufficiently extraordinary and egregious. . . . Although less than ideal, [Mordini’s]
working conditions would not have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable
person in [his] position would be compelled to resign.” We agree. And while
perhaps Mordini was dissatisfied he no longer had an investigatory role for the
DPS, “[t]he change in duties . . . was simply one of the ‘frustrations, challenges,
and disappointments [that] inhere in the nature of work.’” See id. (third alteration
in original) (citation omitted). Moreover, Mordini provides only his conclusory
opinion that his office was moved to a remote location without facts to support his
allegation.
Mordini also believed his “supervisors were aware of [his] diverticulitis and
its tendency to become worse when stressed as a result of [his] request for leave
or accommodations.” At the hearing on the motion, Mordini’s attorney detailed his
argument as follows:
Our allegation is that this was done as the supervisors were
aware of his diverticulitis with the intent—they were not only aware
of it, but that certain things that cause it to flare up, become more
problematic, and he would have to take time off. They would have
to approve this time off associated with his diverticulitis. That the
intent for them was to cause his condition to become so inflamed that
he couldn’t continue his job.
And they succeeded in that. Mr. Mordini eventually suffered
enough from that and his other health conditions that he was forced
to apply for disability, to be found disabled and unable to continue
his job.
We’re not challenging that he was determined incapable.
What we are arguing is that he was determined incapable of going
on because they put him in that circumstance. They literally took
advantage of the knowledge that they gained as his supervisors to
put him in a situation where he couldn’t go any further because he
was in too much pain.
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Contrary to Mordini’s arguments, he presented nothing other than a
conclusory statement to indicate any supervisor knew he was experiencing “flare
ups” of his diverticulitis due to stress such that he could not “continue to perform
his job duties,” as he alleged. Mordini claimed, “My supervisors were aware of my
diverticulitis and its tendency to become worse when stressed as a result of my
request for leave or accommodations.” At best on this record, we perhaps can
infer a supervisor knew of his health issue because leave was approved, but there
is no evidence that any supervisor knew stress would impact his health any more
than any individual. If such evidence existed, it was not made a part of this record.
Further, the facts do not show the critical remarks by Ritzman and Ryan to
be “unusually aggravated” or amounting to a “continuous pattern,” as required
“before the situation will be deemed intolerable.” See id. at 576 (“In general, single,
trivial, or isolated acts of [misconduct] are insufficient to support a constructive
discharge claim.” (citation omitted)); Wright v. Ross Holdings, LLC, No. 14-1106,
2015 WL 1848534, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2015) (noting a constructive
discharge “has not occurred ‘unless the employer has been given a reasonable
chance to resolve the problem’” (quoting Van Meter Indus. v. Mason City Hum.
Rts. Comm’n, 675 N.W.2d 503, 511 (Iowa 2004)). See also generally Haberer,
560 N.W.2d at 576 (“An employee may not be unreasonably sensitive to his or her
working environment . . . . [An employee is not] guaranteed a working environment
free of stress.” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Nor did Mordini
point to evidence to support a finding that his supervisors “would not respond fairly”
to his alleged employment-related health concerns. See Wright, 2015 WL
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1848534, at *4 (“We are not persuaded by Wright’s argument that based on past
inappropriate comments by Schmidt she believed Ross Holdings would not
respond fairly.”); see also Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Sols., LLC, 897 N.W.2d
553, 599 (Iowa 2017) (“The general rule is that a reasonable employee must
remain and fight [grievances] on the job.” (citation omitted)).
On the basis of this record, reasonable minds would not be able to find the
defendants’ actions caused Mordini to be unable to fulfill the duties of a peace
officer such that he had to file for disability and was constructively discharged.
Mordini “was not discharged, constructively discharged, or even demoted.” See
Huffman v. AADG, Inc., No. 09-1007, 2010 WL 624855, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
Feb. 24, 2010) (rejecting claim of constructive discharge where employee
“complain[ed] about his employer’s alleged failure to find him work in lieu of paying
temporary disability benefits”). Upon our review, we find no error in the district
court’s conclusion that there was no constructive discharge.2 We affirm the
judgment of the district court.3
AFFIRMED.
2 Mordini’s brief specifically addresses the district court’s order with regard to
constructive discharge. However, our analysis above would also apply to his claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, as the facts do not show outrageous
conduct by the defendants. Cf. Smith v. Iowa State Univ. of Sci. & Tech., 851
N.W.2d 1, 26 (Iowa 2014) (setting forth the elements for a viable claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, including “outrageous conduct by the defendant”).
3 Because we find summary judgment was proper, we need not address Mordini’s
argument regarding any relief he can receive for his claims under the “current
version of Iowa Code section 70A.28.”