In re the Marriage of Humlicek ( 2022 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 21-1552
    Filed August 17, 2022
    IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF VALERIE E. HUMLICEK
    AND KEVIN G. HUMLICEK
    Upon the Petition of
    VALERIE E. HUMLICEK,
    Petitioner-Appellee,
    And Concerning
    KEVIN G. HUMLICEK,
    Respondent-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, John D.
    Ackerman, Judge.
    A former husband appeals the denial of his petition to correct, vacate, or
    modify his dissolution decree. AFFIRMED.
    Craig H. Lane, Sioux City, for appellant.
    David L. Reinschmidt of Munger, Reinschmidt & Denne, LLP, Sioux City,
    for appellee.
    Considered by Bower, C.J., Tabor, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
    (2022).
    2
    TABOR, Judge.
    When Kevin and Valerie Humlicek divorced in July 2012, they did so quickly
    and without negotiation.     Kevin signed the divorce papers three days after
    receiving them and did not consult an attorney. The parties waived the ninety-day
    waiting period and the requirement that they file financial affidavits.
    Fast forward seven years. Kevin petitioned to vacate the divorce decree,
    claiming Valerie fraudulently concealed assets which led to an inequitable property
    division. The district court found that any fraud would have been intrinsic to the
    dissolution action and as such, Kevin could not bring his claim more than one year
    after the decree. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1013(1). Because we agree Kevin’s claim
    is time-barred, we affirm.
    I.      Facts and Prior Proceedings
    Kevin and Valerie married in 1993.       Represented by counsel, Valerie
    petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Kevin in May 2012. Two days later, Kevin,
    received notice and accepted service. Kevin later testified that Valerie’s desire for
    a divorce caught him off guard and his “mind just went blank.” When the time to
    file an answer elapsed with no action, Valerie presented Kevin with a stipulation
    and agreement dividing the parties’ property.          The stipulation waived the
    requirement to disclose their financial status under Iowa Code section 598.13
    (2012). Kevin recalled being “still in shock” when he received the stipulation. And
    without talking to a lawyer, he signed it before a notary at his office. The parties
    also signed a joint motion to waive the ninety-day waiting period. Attached to the
    waiver was an affidavit signed by Kevin explaining that time was critical because
    3
    he had made an offer on a house and the financing depended on the divorce
    decree. Neither party submitted affidavits of financial status.
    Two months later, the district court approved the parties’ stipulation and
    incorporated its provisions into the decree.     The decree awarded Valerie the
    marital home, subject to the mortgage, and one rental property. Kevin received
    the “Riverside house” in Sioux City and another rental property. Kevin and Valerie
    each received one-half interest in a third rental property. The decree also awarded
    Valerie a car and a camper, while Kevin took two cars and several recreational
    and utility vehicles. Each party received their own retirement accounts. A savings
    account valued at $15,000 was divided equally between them. Each party retained
    their individual checking accounts.
    In January 2020—seven and a half years later—Kevin petitioned to correct,
    vacate, or modify the decree under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1012, or in the
    alternative to grant a new trial based on fraud or newly discovered evidence. Kevin
    argued the property division was unfair because Valerie failed to disclose assets
    during the divorce.     In his accounting of those assets, he lists premarital
    investments he made in their home; a pick-up truck Valerie purchased just before
    the divorce; various bank accounts; a health savings account; three timeshares;
    and money she received when he sold one of his guns.1
    1 Kevin also complains that after it became clear their son was not going to college,
    Valerie kept money they had paid into his college savings account. He argues
    Valerie never repaid any child support, though she said she had. Finally, he argues
    the parties agreed that he would take certain personal property, but Valerie never
    gave it to him. Because these arguments are extraneous to Kevin’s claim of asset
    nondisclosure, we do not consider them.
    4
    The court held a hearing in August 2021 and ruled that Kevin’s petition was
    untimely and did not fall under the equitable exception for claims involving extrinsic
    fraud. Kevin appeals.
    II.       Scope and Standards of Review
    We review a motion to modify a final order for fraud under Iowa Rule of Civil
    Procedure 1.1012 for errors at law. In re Marriage of Cutler, 
    588 N.W.2d 425
    , 429–
    30 (Iowa 1999) (citing former Iowa R. Civ. P. 252(b)). This is true even if the
    judgment was rendered in an equity case. In re B.J.H., 
    564 N.W.2d 387
    , 391 (Iowa
    1997). By contrast, we review an independent equitable action to modify a decree
    based on fraud de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of Hutchinson, 
    974 N.W.2d 466
    , 474 (Iowa 2022).          We give weight to the district court’s factual
    determinations but are not bound by them. Hutchinson, 974 N.W.2d at 474.
    III.      Analysis
    When a dissolution decree is not appealed, “its property division is not
    subject to modification unless it falls under one of two exceptions.” Hutchinson,
    974 N.W.2d at 469. First, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1012(2) enables a court
    to “correct, vacate or modify” a decree due to “fraud practiced in obtaining it.” But
    the window for seeking that remedy is one year. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1013(1).
    Waiting more than seven years, Kevin moved too late to file an action at law. See
    Hutchinson, 974 N.W.2d at 474. But, second, common law allows him to bring an
    independent action in equity beyond the one-year deadline if the fraud underlying
    his claim is extrinsic to the original matter. See id. at 469; Carter v. Carter, 
    957 N.W.2d 623
    , 645 (Iowa 2021). By contrast, if the fraud is intrinsic, the equitable
    5
    action is unavailable and rule 1.1013 continues to bar claims made after one year.
    See Hutchinson, 974 N.W.2d at 475.
    Recently, our supreme court reiterated the difference between intrinsic and
    extrinsic fraud.2 Id. at 476. Intrinsic fraud “inheres in the issues submitted to and
    decided by the court.” Id. (quoting Stearns v. Stearns, 
    187 N.W.2d 733
    , 735 (Iowa
    1971)). It occurs within the trial and affects the court’s determination of the issues
    presented.      See 
    id.
       Oft cited examples include “perjury, . . . false or forged
    instruments, or . . . concealment or misrepresentation of evidence.”        Mauer v.
    Rohde, 
    257 N.W.2d 489
    , 496 (Iowa 1977) (citation omitted). Extrinsic fraud does
    not involve the merits of a case but “prevent[s] a fair submission of the
    controversy.”     In re Marriage of Short, 
    263 N.W.2d 720
    , 723 (Iowa 1978).
    Examples feature “a bribed judge, dishonest attorney representing the defrauded
    client, or a false promise of compromise.” Mauer, 
    257 N.W.2d at 496
    .
    After examining the two fraud types, our supreme court held that “asset
    nondisclosure on a stipulation is intrinsic fraud.” Hutchinson, 974 N.W.2d at 481.
    As in Hutchison, Kevin’s allegations involve intrinsic, not extrinsic, fraud.3 Kevin
    asserts Valerie concealed facts about their financial holdings. Even if true, such
    fraud would have occurred inside the divorce action and related to the issues
    2 Critics bemoan the “unsound” distinction between the two fraud types, describing
    them as “difficult to understand and apply.” Hutchinson, 974 N.W.2d at 487 n.10
    (McDonald, J., dissenting) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. &
    Proc. Civ. § 2861, at 426 (2012)). Nonetheless, our supreme court accepts the
    distinction, so we operate under that framework.
    3 We recognize neither the parties nor the district court had the advantage of the
    Hutchinson analysis at trial or during briefing. But that case clarified existing law
    on asset nondisclosure in dissolution cases—law which the district court
    understood and correctly applied.
    6
    decided by the court. See id. Therefore, an equitable action was unavailable to
    Kevin.4 Because he did not challenge the alleged fraud within one year of the
    decree, the court correctly determined his claim is time-barred.
    AFFIRMED.
    4 Because we find the alleged fraud was intrinsic, we need not decide whether
    Kevin could have discovered the concealed assets if he had exercised reasonable
    diligence. Hutchinson, 974 N.W.2d at 475.