State of Iowa v. Michael John Fangman ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0256
Filed January 11, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL JOHN FANGMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
Monica Zrinyi Ackley, Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse.
AFFIRMED.
Daniel A. Dlouhy of Dlouhy Law, P.C., East Dubuque, Illinois, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Michael Fangman appeals his conviction for sexual abuse in the third
degree. He contends his counsel was ineffective. He also claims insufficient
evidence supports the conviction. Fangman’s claims of ineffective assistance
must be brought in a separate postconviction-relief action. We conclude the
conviction is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Fangman’s conviction stems from events that occurred the night of
November 27, 2020. G.M. was at her friend J.H.’s house. Both J.H. and G.M.
were fifteen years old. J.H., two of J.H.’s siblings, her mother, and her step-father,
Fangman, age thirty-seven, lived in the home. J.H. testified that Fangman had
provided her alcohol, specifically, lemonade flavored vodka and Cayman Jack, a
bottled margarita drink, earlier in the day. G.M. also remembered Fangman
providing lemonade flavored vodka to them.1 J.H.’s mother was at work that
evening.
After spending some time on social media, J.H. and G.M. began drinking
the vodka and other drinks. J.H. testified that she and G.M. finished an entire
bottle of vodka and each drank several other beverages. G.M. testified that it was
the most alcohol she had ever consumed. J.H. and G.M. both testified that
Fangman knew they were drinking because he saw them consuming the alcohol.
Fangman informed law enforcement he had provided J.H. alcohol before and that
on occasions she stole it from him. On the evening in question, Fangman was
1 The jury returned not guilty verdicts for Counts III and IV concerning supplying
alcohol to J.H. and G.M.
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playing video games with one of J.H.’s younger siblings in the basement.
Fangman continued to play video games by himself after the younger child went
to sleep.
At some point in the evening, G.M. shared she was feeling nauseous from
the alcohol. J.H. took G.M. to the basement restroom. The restroom shares a wall
and ventilation with J.H.’s basement bedroom. After G.M. vomited repeatedly, J.H.
requested Fangman’s assistance in taking care of G.M. G.M. continued to vomit.
Fangman told J.H. she could go to sleep and he would take care of G.M. J.H. left
the bathroom.
G.M. testified that after J.H. left, Fangman began to grope her breasts. After
that, he began to rub her vagina. Fangman performed oral sex on G.M. and then
penetrated her vagina with his penis. G.M. stated that she stared at the ceiling
and “was just waiting for it to end.” Fangman eventually stopped and left the
bathroom. G.M. vomited again and went to sleep in J.H.’s room.
J.H. testified that the next morning G.M. was giggling and informed her, “I
fucked your dad.” G.M. denied having informed J.H., instead telling a different
friend. Two trial witnesses, J.H. and a deputy sheriff who investigated the case,
reported that G.M. told many peers at school about what had happened. J.H.
stated that G.M. appeared to be boasting about the event and would tell anyone
who would listen. When J.H. would attempt to play it off as a joke, G.M. would
clarify she was not joking. Another of G.M.’s friends was informed about the event
by both G.M. and J.H. He explained that G.M. informed him that she had initiated
the intercourse. J.H. eventually sent her step-father, Fangman, a text message
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that read: “you fucked my friend in the bathroom.” Fangman did not respond to
the text.
G.M. informed her mother of Fangman’s actions in March 2021. A deputy
sheriff interviewed Fangman in April. Fangman largely denied knowing G.M. He
also denied any knowledge of the events that took place in November, although
he did express some memory of J.H. and a friend drinking together one night.
The State charged Fangman with multiple counts related to the sexual
abuse and providing alcohol to minors. He was also charged with two counts of
child endangerment, but those charges were severed before trial. The jury found
Fangman guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree, in violation of Iowa Code
section 709.4(1)(b)(3)(d) (2020); and sexual abuse in the third degree,
incapacitation, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4(1)(d).2 Fangman appeals.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Fangman contends his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to identify prior
inconsistent statements by G.M. and failing to properly prepare a witness.
However, we cannot consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.7; State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 152 (Iowa
2021) (describing how section 814.7 “diverts all claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel to postconviction-relief proceedings and requires they be resolved there
in the first instance”). As such, Fangman must pursue his claims in postconviction-
relief proceedings. We do not consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claims
in this opinion.
2 The convictions were merged for sentencing purposes.
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III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In the sole remaining issue, Fangman claims there is insufficient evidence
to support his convictions. In particular, he emphasizes the inconsistent
statements G.M. provided to various people prior to disclosing the abuse to her
mother. He also highlights inconsistencies between G.M.’s testimony and
testimony provided by other witnesses, particularly J.H. He claims G.M.’s
testimony was so confused and contradicted that it should be considered a nullity.
See State v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993).
We review sufficiency of the evidence claims for the correction of errors at
law. State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012). We will uphold the
verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. “Evidence is considered
substantial if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it can convince
a rational jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.Substantial evidence supports Fangman’s convictions. G.M. testified that
Fangman performed oral sex and penetrated her vagina with his penis. That
testimony is sufficient to establish substantial evidence that Fangman committed
a sex act against G.M. See State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2022).
Fangman contends G.M.’s testimony was so contradicted as to be a nullity. See
Smith, 508 N.W.2d at 103. But,
Smith is an outlier case. It has been criticized in the commentary,
and it has not been followed in any sexual abuse case in Iowa since.
The primary flaw in Smith is that it is inconsistent with the standard
of appellate review of jury verdicts, which requires that the evidence
be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict and which
requires deference to the jury’s resolution of disputed factual issues.
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Mathis, 971 N.W.2d at 518. Therefore, as is consistent with our standard of review,
“it was for the jury to resolve the conflicts between” the witnesses’ testimony. Id.
And, “[i]nconsistencies and lack of detail are common in sexual abuse cases and
do not compel a jury to conclude that the victim is not credible or that there is
insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict.” State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d 1,
11 (Iowa 2021).
In any event, G.M.’s testimony was corroborated. J.H. and G.M. largely
agreed about the events leading up to the assault, including what they were doing
and the type of alcohol they consumed. In his interview with the police, Fangman
vaguely remembered an evening when J.H. and a friend may have been drinking
in the fall. He remembered playing video games with J.H.’s younger sibling, which
corroborated the girls’ testimony about the course of the evening. And when J.H.
accused Fangman of having sex with her friend in the bathroom, Fangman did not
respond. See State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 569-70 (Iowa 2009) (explaining
that, in some circumstances, silence in the face of an accusation can be deemed
an admission). While there was no physical evidence, such evidence is
unnecessary to sustain a conviction. See Donahue, 957 N.W.2d at 11 (explaining
that a victim’s testimony need not be corroborated by other evidence).
We also note that the inconsistencies between G.M.’s testimony and other
witnesses’ testimony largely related to whom G.M informed about the assault and
her demeanor when doing so were put in context by other testimony. Katie Burrell,
a forensic interviewer at the Child Protection Center, testified that children
frequently inform friends of an assault first and may delay reporting to adults.
Moreover, due to a combination of fear of being blamed, not being believed, and
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potential repercussions, embarrassment over the assault, and other social
pressures, assault victims may try to minimize the event. Sometimes that
minimization can come from being flippant, bragging, or joking about the event.
And G.M. testified that when she did inform people about the assault, it was
because, “I just wanted to let people know, and people would tell a grownup about
it.” The jury could have interpreted her behavior as consistent with child sexual
assault victims. And if the jury believed J.H. and other witnesses’ testimony about
G.M.’s conduct after the assault., that conduct was not fatal to her testimony
implicating Fangman. If anything, it indicated she immediately and repeatedly told
her peers about the event and clarified that she was not joking when challenged
about the events.
Further, the different reactions attributed to G.M. were irrelevant to the
elements of the offenses of which Fangman was charged. Whether G.M. was
bragging or claimed to welcome the assault is not relevant to the offense itself—a
minor cannot consent to sexual acts with an adult, nor can an intoxicated
individual. See Iowa Code § 709.4. The jury was well within its rights to disregard
the differences in testimony and focus on the elements of the offense. See Mathis,
971 N.W.2d 514, 518 (finding contradictions in child victims’ testimony was not
dispositive in a sufficiency of the evidence challenge because the inconsistencies
“[had] no bearing on the children’s testimony regarding [the defendant’s] abuse”).
AFFIRMED.