State of Iowa v. Christopher Eric Curley ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0449
Filed January 11, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER ERIC CURLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Jason Besler, Judge.
A defendant appeals his sentence following a guilty plea. AFFIRMED.
Webb L. Wassmer of Wassmer Law Office, PLC, Marion, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Badding, JJ.
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GREER, Judge.
Christopher Curley pled guilty to second-degree burglary and assault
causing bodily injury. The plea agreement laid out that the State would not
recommend a specific sentence and Curley was free to argue for whatever
sentence he chose. He asked the court for a suspended sentence. But, in part
because of Curley’s prior convictions for willful injury causing bodily injury,
domestic abuse assault, and assault causing bodily injury, the district court
sentenced him to ten years on the burglary charge and imposed a fine for the
assault charge. Curley now appeals, arguing the district court abused its discretion
in its sentencing choice.
Because Curley pled guilty to crimes that are not class “A” felonies, under
Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2022) he needs good cause to appeal; as he is
only challenging his sentence, he has good cause. See State v. Damme, 944
N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020) (“We hold that good cause exists to appeal from a
conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges his or her
sentence rather than the guilty plea.”). We review a criminal sentence within the
statutory limits for an abuse of discretion. State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 385
(Iowa 2020). That sentence is “cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor,”
which a defendant can only overcome by “affirmatively demonstrating the court
relied on an improper factor.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105–06 (citation omitted).
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Curley argues the sentencing court gave too much weight to his prior
criminal history and the vengeful nature of the crime1 and too little weight on the
context surrounding the crime; he asserts the court should have imposed a
suspended sentence. But, when determining the appropriate sentence, district
courts are expected “to consider the host of factors that weigh in on the often
arduous task of sentencing a criminal offender, including the nature of the offense,
the attending circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender,
and the chances of reform.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002).
And, before suspending a sentence—as Curley asked the district court to—it is
also required to take into account “the defendant’s prior record of convictions or
deferred judgments, employment status, family circumstances, and any other
relevant factors, as well as which of the sentencing options would satisfy the
societal goals of sentencing.” Id.; see also Iowa Code § 907.5(1). Here, the district
court recognized the “understandable anger” Curley would have felt leading up to
the incident, but also noted this was not inconsistent with his past convictions.2
The district court was free to weigh the factors within its discretion to craft the
appropriate sentence. Because the district court did not rely on improper factors
1 Curley explained to the court that the incident at hand was a bout of “vigilante
justice” that occurred after his wife was sexually assaulted, purportedly by the man
Curley assaulted.
2 Curley also argues the district court had insufficient information about his prior
convictions. But he cannot point us to a case, nor do we find one on our own
review, that dictates how much information the district court needed about these
incidents. And Curley was free to, and did, explain the distinctions between the
instant crime and his previous convictions at sentencing.
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and acted within its discretion in determining Curley’s sentence, we will not disturb
it.
AFFIRMED.