Isaac Lesley Neal, Jr. v. State of Iowa ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1441
Filed January 11, 2023
ISAAC LESLEY NEAL, Jr.,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Nancy S. Tabor,
Judge.
Isaac Neal appeals the district court’s summary disposition of his fifth
postconviction-relief application. AFFIRMED.
Kaitlyn C. DiMaria of DiMaria Law, PLLC, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Doyle, S.J.* Tabor, J.,
takes no part.
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2023).
2
VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
Isaac Neal appeals the district court’s summary disposition of his fifth
postconviction-relief application, filed thirty-one years after the supreme court
resolved his direct appeal from a conviction for first-degree kidnapping. See
State v. Neal, 353 N.W.2d 83 (Iowa 1984); see also Neal v. Acevedo, 114
F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 1997); Neal v. State, No. 12-1725, 2014 WL 69529, at *1
(Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2014); Neal v. State, No. 04-1983, 2006 WL 1229921, at *1
(Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2006). Neal concedes postconviction-relief actions “must
be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the
event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.” Iowa Code
§ 822.3 (2015). But he contends two of his claims fall into an exception for “a
ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time
period.” Id.The first claim is based on the confinement element of first-degree
kidnapping. See State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 1981). Neal asserts “the
distinction between the ‘confinement’ necessary for kidnapping as opposed to the
inherent confinement necessary for the crime of sexual abuse was further clarified
and enhanced” in State v. Robinson, 859 N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 2015), and he should
get the benefit of that opinion.
Neal’s characterization of the law as a “clarification” is dispositive. A
clarification of law can be raised within the applicable time period. See Perez v.
State, 816 N.W.2d 354, 361 (Iowa 2012) (“What [the defendant] does not explain
is how [a Supreme Court opinion] can be both a clarification of the law and a
ground he could not have raised within the three-year time bar.”); cf. Thongvanh v.
3
State, 938 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Iowa 2020) (distinguishing Perez on the ground that the
supreme court had espoused disagreement about the applicable law, whereas no
such disagreement was voiced with respect to the law raised by the defendant).
Robinson simply clarified the long-established confinement analysis set forth in
Rich. The court of appeals has repeatedly said as much. See Ripperger v. State,
No. 19-0524, 2021 WL 3661118, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2021) (stating “[t]he
Iowa Court of Appeals has determined several times that Robinson clarified
existing law and did not announce a new rule of law”); see, e.g., Lang v. State,
No. 17-1279, 2019 WL 2523551, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 19, 2019) (finding
Robinson did not announce a new rule of law); Johnson v. State,
No. 17-0436, 2018 WL 1633520, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018) (“[W]e reject
the claim that Robinson set forth new law.”); Jackson v. State, No. 17-0153, 2018
WL 739277, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2018) (noting “Robinson did not announce
a new rule; it merely clarified an existing rule”); Brandes v. State,
No. 17-0128, 2017 WL 6517176, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2017) (stating
“Robinson did not announce a new rule”); Grayson v. State, No. 15-1382, 2016
WL 6652357, at *2 (“[T]he supreme court did not announce a new rule in Robinson
but rather only clarified existing law.”); Hampton v. State, No. 15-1802, 2016
WL 2743451, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2016) (same). Because Neal could
have raised the issue within the three-year period prescribed by Iowa Code section
822.3, the district court did not err in concluding the “confinement” claim was time-
barred.
Neal next contends his trial attorney “was ineffective for failing to challenge”
the district court’s denial “of his constitutional right to public trial.” Specifically, he
4
challenges the fact that the jury “deliberated into the hours after the courthouse
had closed and the courthouse remained closed and locked during those
deliberations as well as when the verdict was returned in [c]ourt.” In his view, the
claim raises “a new ground of fact discovered through depositions.”
The after-hours courthouse closure was a fact that could have been raised
within the limitations period. See Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 143 (Iowa 2018)
(“[T]he applicant must meet the ‘obvious requirement’ that he or she could not have
raised the ground of fact within the limitations period.” (citation omitted)). Indeed,
during argument on the State’s motion to dismiss the application on statute-of-
limitations grounds, Neal’s attorney stated, “I understand that’s probably a fact that
could have been realized before now.” Because the courthouse closure could
have been raised within the limitations period, the district court did not err in
concluding the claim was time-barred.
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Neal’s fifth postconviction-relief
application.
AFFIRMED.