Murl Edward McMullin v. State of Iowa ( 2022 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 21-0889
    Filed September 21, 2022
    MURL EDWARD McMULLIN,
    Applicant-Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Mitchell E. Turner,
    Judge.
    An applicant appeals the denial of a postconviction-relief application.
    AFFIRMED.
    Thomas Hurd of the Law Office of Thomas Hurd, PLC, Des Moines, for
    appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
    2
    SCHUMACHER, Judge.
    Murl McMullin was charged and convicted of first-degree murder in the
    strangulation death of his girlfriend. At trial, the jury was presented with evidence
    that McMullin had admitted to a friend that he killed his girlfriend and placed her
    body in a freezer because she was “messing around.” McMullin’s conviction was
    affirmed on direct appeal on April 13, 1988. See State v. McMullin, 
    421 N.W.2d 517
    , 520 (Iowa 1988).
    More than twenty-five years later, McMullin filed this postconviction-relief
    (PCR) application, his first, in which he alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to request an independent expert opinion on his competency to stand trial.
    The district court denied his petition in its entirety, finding (1) McMullin’s application
    was time-barred by Iowa Code section 822.3 (2014) because he filed it more than
    three years after his conviction was final, (2) McMullin failed to show his application
    was based on newly discovered evidence, and (3) trial counsel was not ineffective.
    McMullin appeals, challenging the district court’s determinations on the issues of
    the statute of limitations and newly discovered evidence. However, he does not
    challenge the district court’s determination on the merits of his appeal—that is, that
    counsel was not ineffective. Such omission constitutes waiver of the issue. See
    Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3).
    Generally, we review decisions regarding applications for
    postconviction relief for errors at law. Ledezma v. State, 
    626 N.W.2d 134
    , 141 (Iowa 2001). This standard applies when we review a
    statute-of-limitations defense to postconviction actions. Harrington
    v. State, 
    659 N.W.2d 509
    , 519-20 (Iowa 2003). “However, when the
    applicant asserts claims of a constitutional nature, our review is de
    novo.” Ledezma, 
    626 N.W.2d at 141
    .
    3
    Debates v. State, No. 15-1491, 
    2016 WL 7403715
    , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21,
    2016).
    We address McMullin’s first argument concerning the statute of limitations.
    McMullin argues that the absence of the procedendo date in the file prohibits a
    statute-of-limitations defense.1 First, as noted by the State, McMullin did not make
    this argument to the district court. As such, the claim is not preserved for our
    review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 
    641 N.W.2d 532
    , 539 (Iowa 2002). However,
    even if we were to consider this argument, absent any evidence to the contrary,
    the district court is entitled to presume that procedendo issued in 1988. See State
    v. Proulx, 
    252 N.W.2d 426
    , 431 (Iowa 1977) (holding that since nothing in the
    record established otherwise, government officials were presumed to have
    complied with the requirements of the code); 
    Iowa Code § 814.24
     (requiring
    procedendo to be issued after an appellate decision is filed with the clerk).
    We turn to McMullin’s argument that newly discovered evidence establishes
    that McMullin was not competent to stand trial in 1986. McMullin relies on the part
    of Iowa Code section 822.3 that provides the three-year statute of limitations “does
    not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the
    applicable time period.” McMullin focuses on his mental health as the newly
    discovered evidence. McMullin’s PCR counsel argued that new evidence existed
    because McMullin is
    now able to understand just how bad of a psychological situation he
    was in back in 1986, but was not able to communicate that back then.
    1Presumably, all or part of the underlying criminal file was destroyed as a result of
    a flood. “In 2008, the Cedar River overflowed its banks and inundated the City of
    Cedar Rapids.” Salem United Methodist Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., No. 13-
    2086, 
    2015 WL 1546431
    , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2015).
    4
    So the new evidence, as I say, would–his new state of mind based
    on his treatment, his ongoing medication, sort of resulted in a
    revelation that now he understands better his situation than in 1986.
    We reject this argument. McMullin was found competent to stand trial more than
    twenty-five years ago. McMullin, 
    421 N.W.2d at 518
    . And his mental-health issues
    were known at least by the time McMullin filed a habeas corpus action in federal
    court in 1989. McMullin v. Nix, 
    909 F.2d 314
    , 314 (8th Cir. 1990). And in this PCR
    action, McMullin did not testify as to the date he asserts he learned of any newly
    discovered evidence. McMullin failed to meet his burden that the existence of new
    evidence entitled him to relief.
    We affirm the district court’s denial of McMullin’s PCR application.
    AFFIRMED.