State of Iowa v. Mary Jane Jackson Thomas ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0795
Filed October 19, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARY JANE JACKSON THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Ian K. Thornhill, Judge.
A defendant appeals from the denial of her motions to dismiss, for judgment
of acquittal, and for a new trial. AFFIRMED.
Webb L. Wassmer of Wassmer Law Office, PLC, Marion, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Heard by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Badding, JJ. Chicchelly, J., takes no
part.
2
GREER, Judge.
In addition to other convictions, a jury found Mary Jane Jackson Thomas
guilty of both first- and second-degree kidnapping of her stepdaughter, K.T.—
Jackson Thomas challenges only these kidnapping convictions. Throughout the
trial, Jackson Thomas moved to dismiss the kidnapping charges under Iowa Rule
of Criminal Procedure 2.11(6)(a), for a judgment of acquittal, and for a new trial
because the State provided inadequate evidence to establish that she confined
K.T., an essential element of both kidnapping charges. The district court denied
all of these motions. On our review, because Jackson Thomas has not pointed to
reversible errors or an abuse of discretion committed by the district court, we affirm
her convictions.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
K.T. was twelve years old when she moved to Minnesota to live with her
father and stepmother, Jackson Thomas. While in Minnesota, Jackson Thomas
began using an electrical cord to hit K.T. The family moved to Cedar Rapids, and
K.T.’s younger brother joined them. While in Cedar Rapids, the abuse continued
and escalated. Jackson Thomas would use her hands, her teeth, a hammer, a
screwdriver, a television remote, and electrical cords to beat K.T. almost every
other day.
There were three instances, however, that stood out to K.T. because they
occurred in the home’s bathrooms.1 The first occasion, Jackson Thomas told K.T.
to go into the first-floor bathroom. Jackson Thomas followed her inside with a
1 K.T. testified she was beat inside a bathroom three or four times, but she
elaborated on only three instances.
3
hammer and electrical cords. She told K.T. to remove her clothing and then placed
the clothing outside the bathroom door. Jackson Thomas then locked the
bathroom door, which locked from the inside, and told K.T. to stand in the bathtub.
Jackson Thomas yelled and cursed at K.T. and hit her, first with the electrical cord
and then with the hammer. K.T. testified that it was bright outside when she went
into the bathroom and dark when she left.
The second instance, Jackson Thomas again told K.T. to go into the
bathroom. Jackson Thomas brought in a knife she used for chewing tobacco, an
electrical cord, and a hammer. She again told K.T. to remove her clothes and put
them outside the bathroom door. Jackson Thomas locked the door and told K.T.
to get in the bathtub. At some point after Jackson Thomas began beating K.T.,
K.T. grabbed the knife and threatened to end her own life if Jackson Thomas did
not stop. Jackson Thomas calmed K.T. down and promised to stop beating her.
But, once K.T. turned over the knife, the beating resumed with the electrical cord
and hammer. K.T. testified the beating continued for hours, again explaining the
sky was bright when she went into the bathroom and dark when she came out.
When Jackson Thomas next kept K.T. in a bathroom, it was on the home’s
second floor. Jackson Thomas brought a hammer and electrical cord into the
bathroom; there was already a screwdriver inside the room. She again instructed
K.T. to take off her clothing, which was left on the floor inside the bathroom this
time, and locked the door. During this incident, Jackson Thomas first struck K.T.
with a hammer on her shoulders and hands. Then, using the electrical cord, she
hit K.T.’s back and hands. Jackson Thomas picked up the screwdriver to stab
K.T., who lifted her arm up to block the attack—the screwdriver went through K.T.’s
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forearm, leaving both an entry and exit wound. Jackson Thomas continued to beat
K.T. for what K.T. described at trial as “an eternity.”
More than once, when Jackson Thomas was beating K.T. in an area of the
home other than the bathroom, K.T. would run away and hide in the bushes
outside. But when the three beatings occurred in the bathrooms, K.T. testified that
even when Jackson Thomas would leave the bathroom momentarily, she could
not leave the bathroom because she could not get her clothes on fast enough to
escape.2 K.T.’s younger sibling was also in the home during at least one of the
bathroom instances; Jackson Thomas called for the younger child to bring her a
hammer and cracked the door just enough to grab it before shutting the door again.
K.T. testified that the beatings in the bathroom were worse than the beatings
elsewhere in the home.
On October 11, 2019, K.T. asked Jackson Thomas how she wanted the
child to cook that night’s dinner; Jackson Thomas became angry and beat K.T.
K.T.’s father came downstairs and saw what was going on and told Jackson
Thomas to stop. The beating halted momentarily, but it continued again after
K.T.’s father went to work until Jackson Thomas left the home to go to the store.
Although K.T. finished cooking dinner, she packed a bag and left the home;
eventually she arrived on foot at the Cedar Rapids Police Department (CRPD).
2 During cross-examination at trial, when Jackson Thomas asked K.T. if she
contemplated grabbing a towel or her clothes and running, K.T. answered:
I was naked, and I know better not to run out there naked. . . .
[T]here’s so much time for her to walk in the dining room and grab
[the electrical cord] and for me to, like, go at that time, ‘cause the
dining room is right there . . . [a]nd I can’t run out—she can block me.
5
After K.T. described the months of abuse to CRPD officers, Jackson
Thomas was interviewed by CRPD investigators.3 She admitted to hitting K.T. in
the bathroom and said she would confront K.T. in the bathroom so K.T. would not
run away. She also admitted to brandishing the screwdriver to scare K.T. out of
running.
Jackson Thomas was initially charged with two counts each of willful injury
causing serious injury, willful injury causing bodily injury, and going armed with
intent in November 2019. But the State amended the trial information in December
to include a charge of kidnapping in the first degree. The amended trial information
alleged Jackson Thomas did “confine or remove K.T. from one place to another,
without having the authority nor the consent of K.T. to do so, while having the intent
to inflict serious injury upon K.T. As a result, K.T. suffered serious injury and/or
was intentionally subject to torture.” The original minutes of testimony informed
Jackson Thomas that K.T. would testify “that while being whipped with the
electrical cord she is generally forced to stand in the bathtub, naked, while she is
beaten and if she tries to block the strikes or defend herself she is beaten worse.”
Jackson Thomas took depositions, including K.T.’s, in August 2020. She
then moved to dismiss the kidnapping charge, alleging there was insufficient
evidence in the minutes of testimony to support the confinement requirement for
kidnapping. A hearing was held, and the court denied the motion, stating:
The reference to allegedly holding the child in the bathtub and
the, I guess, unrobing of the child are facts that could fit into one of
these—one or more of these prongs, but it’s ultimately a question for
the jury to decide. The Defendant is on sufficient notice as to what
3 Video and audio from this interview was recorded and played for the jury during
trial.
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those allegations are. And now, apparently with some depositions
having taken place, the alleged victim has expanded on what those
circumstances were. But for purposes of charging the offense [of
first-degree kidnapping], I find that’s sufficient.
The State later moved to amend the trial information once more, adding a
charge of second-degree kidnapping; Jackson Thomas consented to the
amendment.
Trial began in March 2021. After the State rested, Jackson Thomas moved
for judgment of acquittal, arguing again the State had not proved the confinement
necessary for either of the kidnapping charges. The court, “giving the State the
benefit of all reasonable inferences and looking at the evidence in the light most
favorable to them,” denied Jackson Thomas’s motion. The jury found Jackson
Thomas guilty on all counts.
Finally, Jackson Thomas moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury’s
verdict on first- and second-degree kidnapping went against the weight of the
evidence. Once again, the court denied Jackson Thomas’s motions.
II. Analysis.
On appeal, Jackson Thomas maintains the district court incorrectly denied
her motions for dismissal, judgment of acquittal, and new trial.
Before delving into the specific motions, however, it helps to give an
overview of kidnapping jurisprudence. Generally, “[a] person commits kidnapping
when the person either confines a person or removes a person from one place to
another, knowing that the person who confines or removes the other person has
neither the authority nor the consent of the other to do so.” Iowa Code
§ 710.1 (2019). The act must be accompanied by one of the following: “[t]he intent
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to hold such person for ransom,” “[t]he intent to use such person as a shield or
hostage,” “[t]he intent to inflict serious injury upon such person, or to subject the
person to a sexual abuse,” “[t]he intent to secretly confine such person,” or “[t]he
intent to interfere with the performance of any government function.” Id. First-
degree kidnapping occurs “when the person kidnapped, as a consequence of the
kidnapping, suffers serious injury, or is intentionally subjected to torture or sexual
abuse.” Id. § 710.2(1). Relevant here, second-degree kidnapping occurs “where
the kidnapper is armed with a dangerous weapon, or where the victim is under
eighteen years of age other than a kidnapping by a parent or legal guardian whose
sole purpose of the kidnapping is to assume custody of a victim under eighteen
years of age.” Id. § 710.3(1)
Because many crimes involve some sort of confinement or removal of the
victim, our case law has established that to satisfy the confinement or removal
requirements of section 710.1, there must be “more than the confinement or
removal that is an inherent incident of commission of the crime.” State v. Rich, 305
N.W.2d 739, 742, 745 (Iowa 1981); accord State v. Mead, 318 N.W.2d 440, 442,
445 (Iowa 1982) (applying the Rich test to crimes other than sexual abuse). There
is “no minimum period of confinement or distance of removal . . . required for
conviction of kidnapping” as long as the removal or confinement “definitely
exceed[s] that normally incidental to the commission of [the crime].” Rich, 305
N.W.2d at 745; accord State v. Mesenbrink, No. 15-0054, 2015 WL 7075826, at
*3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2015) (“In applying the test, we consider not only
whether the defendant confined someone longer than the duration of the
underlying crime but also whether the quality or extent of the confinement was
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much greater than necessary to accomplish the underlying crime.”). “Such
confinement or removal may exist because it substantially increases the risk of
harm to the victim, significantly lessens the risk of detection, or significantly
facilitates escape following the consummation of the offense.” Rich, 305 N.W.2d
at 745.
A. Motion to Dismiss.
We review the denial of a motion to dismiss made under Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.11(6) for correction of errors at law. State v. Wells, 629
N.W.2d 346, 351 (Iowa 2001). We accept all the facts alleged by the State in the
trial information and minutes of testimony as true. State v. Finders, 743 N.W.2d
546, 548 (Iowa 2008). We will find error if these facts “do not constitute a crime as
a matter of law.” Id.Because Jackson Thomas had not yet been charged with second-degree
kidnapping at the time of the motion to dismiss, we need only consider the first-
degree-kidnapping charge that her motion to dismiss addressed. Jackson Thomas
argues on appeal, as she did in her initial motion, that the trial information and
minutes of testimony make no mention of confinement or the Rich intensifiers
necessary for confinement, and so do not establish that necessary element of first-
degree kidnapping. Yet, in her motion, Jackson Thomas made no argument of
any prejudice to her substantial rights.4 See State v. Brisco, 816 N.W.2d 415, 420
4 Under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.5(5), “The term ‘indictment’ embraces
the trial information.” As for the contents of an indictment (or trial information), our
rules provide:
An indictment is a plain, concise, and definite statement of the
offense charged. The indictment shall be signed by the foreman or
forewoman of the grand jury. The names of all witnesses on whose
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(Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (noting that on appeal the defendant did not argue the trial
information prejudiced his substantial rights). But Jackson Thomas’s argument
misconstrues the purpose of the trial information and minutes of testimony, which
“is to afford the person charged with an opportunity to prepare a defense” and
generally alert the defendant “to the source and nature of the evidence against
[them].” Id.; accord State v. Dalton, 674 N.W.2d 111, 120 (Iowa 2004); State v.
Kirby, 391 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1986) (noting the purpose underlying the
requirements of trial information is to “protect[] a defendant from being misled by
the charging instrument”).5 This is a case-by-case determination. Dalton, 674
N.W.2d at 120.
evidence the indictment is found must be endorsed thereon. The
indictment shall substantially comply with the form that accompanies
these rules. The indictment shall include the following:
a. The name of the accused, if known, and if not known,
designation of the accused by any name by which the accused may
be identified.
b. The name and if provided by law the degree of the offense,
identifying by number the statutory provision or provisions alleged to
have been violated.
c. Where the time or place is a material ingredient of the
offense a brief statement of the time or place of the offense if known.
d. Where the means by which the offense is committed are
necessary to charge an offense, a brief statement of the acts or
omissions by which the offense is alleged to have been committed.
No indictment is invalid or insufficient, nor can the trial,
judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any
defect or imperfection in a matter of form which does not prejudice a
substantial right of the defendant.
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.4(7) (emphasis added).
5 Jackson Thomas also objects to the district court’s use of the term “notice
pleading,” a concept found in civil case law, during the motion hearing. See Rees
v. City of Shenandoah, 682 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 2004). But even if the district
court used the wrong turn of phrase, it pulled the standard it used straight from
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.5. As such, we find no reversible error.
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At the time of the motion, the trial information alleged Jackson Thomas did
“confine or remove K.T. from one place to another, without having the authority nor
the consent of K.T. to do so, while having the intent to inflict serious injury upon
K.T. As a result, K.T. suffered serious injury and/or was intentionally subject to
torture.” The minutes of testimony further attested that K.T. was “forced to stand
in the bathtub, naked, while she is beaten.” And we are to consider both the trial
information and the minutes of testimony when determining whether an accused
has been adequately apprised of the crime charged. State v. Grice, 515 N.W.2d
20, 23 (Iowa 1994). Taking these assertions in the filings as true, Jackson Thomas
was given ample warning of the charges levied at her—no additional mode of
confinement or removal was later tacked on, nor were there additional witnesses
to the kidnapping who were sprung on her at trial. And, at the motion hearing,
Jackson Thomas made no argument of surprise. As a practical matter, at the time
the motion was filed, the parties had engaged in discovery and several depositions,
including that of K.T., where the kidnapping elements were explored. And while
Jackson Thomas could question the sufficiency of the evidence later in the trial,
this is not an appropriate basis for a motion to dismiss. See State v. Doss, 355
N.W.2d 874, 880 (Iowa 1984) (“A motion that merely challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting an indictment is not a ground for setting aside an
indictment.”). We agree with the district court that Jackson Thomas had sufficient
notice of the criminal conduct alleged and the witnesses supporting the allegations.
Overall, we find no reversible error in the court’s denial of Jackson Thomas’s
motion to dismiss the first-degree kidnapping charge.
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B. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.
Jackson Thomas’s next motion came at the close of the State’s evidence,
when she moved for a judgment of acquittal. Among other issues, Jackson
Thomas argued there was insufficient evidence of confinement as required for both
the first- and second-degree kidnapping charges. “In reviewing the trial court’s
ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal, this court reviews the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State, and all legitimate inferences that may
reasonably be deducted therefrom are accepted.” State v. Schertz, 328
N.W.2d 320, 321 (Iowa 1982) (internal citations omitted). We will uphold the
district court’s denial of the motion “if there is any substantial evidence in the record
tending to support the charge.” Id. Substantial evidence is that “which would
convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.Because the beatings occurred only in K.T.’s residence, Jackson Thomas
contends the alleged confinement within the home was only incidental to the
abuse. See State v. Robinson, 859 N.W.2d 464, 481–82 (Iowa 2015) (“Phrased
somewhat differently, did the evidence of the tossing of the cell phone, the locking
of the doors, the covering of the victim’s mouth, and any additional confinement
associated with movement of the victim from the hallway to the bedroom, all
occurring within the enclosed apartment, provide a sufficient basis to allow the jury
to regard the case as presenting more than sexual abuse but instead involving the
much more serious crime of kidnapping with its substantially harsher penalties?
We conclude that it does not.”). Pointing to Robinson and Rich for guidance,
Jackson Thomas contends the district court was wrong to deny her motion for
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judgment of acquittal. To prove more than incidental confinement, the three
prongs of the test require a showing of confinement or removal that
(1) “substantially increases the risk of harm to the victim,” (2) “significantly lessens
the risk of detection,” or (3) “significantly facilitates escape of the perpetrator.”
Rich, 305 N.W.2d at 745–46. Yet, as noted in Robinson, courts have shown
some reluctance to find the independent crime of kidnapping when
the additional confinement or removal occurs within an enclosed
structure. Such additional confinement or movement within an
enclosed structure may not be a sufficiently significant change in the
risk environment to substantially increase the risk of harm,
significantly lessen detection, or significantly aid escape.
859 N.W.2d at 480–81 (analyzing kidnapping confinement rules under other
various jurisdictions); cf. Harper v. State, No. 17-0435, 2018 WL 4360892, at *6–
7 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2018) (finding confinement occurred when the
kidnappee was taken to the basement, allowing the defendant to “take his time”
and “flee the area”). Robinson, then, does not foreclose the possibility that
someone can be kidnapped when being confined or removed to a room in the
same enclosed structure already occupied. It directs us only to look at the specific
facts of the case and determine if the additional confinement satisfies the Rich test.
And in the past, our supreme court has upheld a kidnapping conviction in a child-
abuse case where there was confinement in the child’s home. See State v.
Siemer, 454 N.W.2d 857, 864–65 (Iowa 1990). In Siemer, a child handcuffed to a
bed in the basement suffered horrific abuse. 454 N.W.2d at 864. Finding the
confinement made the child an easy target for torture, the court held that evidence
supported a finding of confinement that exceeded confinement normally incidental
to the underlying crime of child abuse. Id. at 864–65. Further, the court concluded
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“Siemer’s confinement of [the child] substantially increased the risk of harm to the
child and significantly lessened the risk that Siemer’s infliction of chronic abuse
would be detected.” Id. From this record, there is evidence that could convince
the jury Jackson Thomas confined K.T. on any one of the three instances where
she was forced into the bathroom. She was told to disrobe, a state that stopped
her from running. See State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Iowa 1997) (“So, by
ordering [the kidnappee] to take off her clothes prior to the sexual assault, [the
defendant] was able to keep her confined to the motel room prior to the assault,
lowering his chances of detection and increasing the risk of harm to [the
kidnappee].”). Further, Jackson Thomas admitted herself that the purpose of
acting in the bathroom was to keep K.T. from fleeing.
Forcing K.T. into the bathroom also allowed Jackson Thomas to beat K.T.
for hours at a time—from daylight to dark, longer than necessary for Jackson
Thomas’s other crimes. See State v. Albright, 925 N.W.2d 144, 155 (Iowa 2019)
(affirming finding of guilt for kidnapping where a person was confined “for over
thirteen hours” and stating “[t]his was not a ‘minimal degree of confinement’”
(citation omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Crawford, 972
N.W.2d 189, 198 (Iowa 2022); Rich, 305 N.W.2d at 745 (dictating the confinement
must “exceed that normally incidental to the commission of” the underlying crime);
State v. Poland, No. 17-0189, 2018 WL 3302201, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 5,
2018) (finding confinement under the kidnapping statute with evidence of locking
the bedroom door and extending the assault for a longer time than necessary to
commit the underlying offense); Mesenbrink, 2015 WL 7075826, at *4 (“Although
[covering the kidnappee’s mouth] alone is insufficient to constitute kidnapping, the
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duration was about thirty minutes, which we opine is longer than necessary to
commit willful injury causing serious injury.”). Supporting the serious injury prong,
K.T. testified that the beatings in the bathroom were worse than when she was
elsewhere in the home. And, requiring K.T. to stand in the bathtub allowed
Jackson Thomas to bludgeon the child more severely while making for an easier
and more discrete cleanup of the blood. All of these details support that Jackson
Thomas confined K.T. because her placement in the bathroom both significantly
lessened the chances of detection and substantially increased the risk of harm to
K.T. See Albright, 925 N.W.2d at 155 (“Our kidnapping cases have generally held
that the increased-risk-of-harm prong of the Rich test is satisfied when the duration
of confinement substantially exceeded the underlying crime.”).
Thus, we find no error in the district court’s denial of Jackson Thomas’s
motion for judgment of acquittal.
C. Motion for a New Trial.
Lastly, Jackson Thomas appeals the denial of her motion for a new trial
because the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. “A district court
should grant a motion for a new trial only in exceptional circumstances,” and we
review the denial of such a motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ary, 877
N.W.2d 686, 705–06 (Iowa 2016). When considering the weight of the evidence,
a court determines “whether more ‘credible evidence’ supports the verdict
rendered than supports the alternative verdict.” Id. at 706 (citation omitted). Here
we find ample evidence supporting the conviction for kidnapping.
Jackson Thomas argues there was no evidence showing “that placement
of K.T. in the bathroom, even with the door locked and for several hours, created
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any risk that was substantially or significantly different.” But when considering the
weight of the evidence, “[t]he question for the court is not whether there was
sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict rendered or an alternative
verdict, but whether ‘a greater amount of credible evidence’ suggests the verdict
rendered was a miscarriage of justice.” Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706 (citation omitted).
In this case, other than using cross-examination to attack K.T.’s credibility over
other statements, Jackson Thomas put on no evidence to combat K.T.’s assertions
that the beatings in the bathroom were worse than those elsewhere in the house
and that she was stripped of her clothing and placed in the bathroom to prevent
her from running away, a reality not present elsewhere in the house. And Jackson
Thomas’s own words from the interview videos played during trial bolstered the
State’s case that locking the bathroom door would keep K.T. from running away.
As noted above, there was credible evidence the confinement substantially
increased the risk of harm and significantly decreased the risk of detection
because K.T. could not leave the home. See State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185,
193 (Iowa 2008) (holding a district court may grant a new trial on the ground the
verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence only in an extraordinary case in
which “the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict” rendered).
Finding no miscarriage of justice given the credible evidence supporting the
kidnapping convictions, we do not find the court abused its discretion by denying
Jackson Thomas’s motion for a new trial.
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III. Conclusion.
Because we find no reversible error in the district court’s denial of Jackson
Thomas’s motions to dismiss under rule 2.11(6) or for judgment of acquittal, and
we find no abuse of discretion in its denial of her motion for a new trial, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.