Adam John Pitman v. State of Iowa ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-0709
Filed January 9, 2020
ADAM JOHN PITMAN,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, Mary Ann
Brown, Judge.
The applicant appeals the district court decision denying his request for
postconviction relief from his conviction for first-degree murder. AFFIRMED.
Thomas Hurd of Greenberg & Hurd, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Doyle, J., and Danilson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2020).
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DANILSON, Senior Judge.
Adam Pitman appeals the district court decision denying his request for
postconviction relief from his conviction of first-degree murder. Pitman claims he
received ineffective assistance because defense counsel did not present a
defense of diminished responsibility. Defense counsel considered the defense and
rejected it due to a lack of expert witness support. We conclude Pitman has failed
to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the district court’s
decision denying his request for postconviction relief.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
On August 30, 2011, an officer stopped a vehicle driven by Pitman due to
non-functioning taillights. The officer observed Pitman “dumping what appeared
to be prescription pills into his mouth.” The officer got Pitman to spit out at least
some of the pills. Pitman told the officer he had just killed his mother. When
officers checked Pitman’s home, they found the body of Pitman’s mother. Her
death was by strangulation.
Pitman was taken to a hospital for treatment of a potential overdose. Pitman
stated he was bipolar and had schizophrenia. He also stated he was a
methamphetamine addict. He told hospital staff he recently consumed synthetic
marijuana and snorted bath salts. Additionally, he took prescribed medications for
anxiety and depression.
Pitman was charged with murder in the first degree, in violation of Iowa
Code section 707.2 (2011). Defense counsel filed notice of the defenses of
intoxication, diminished capacity, and insanity. Pitman had an evaluation with
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Dr. Frank Gersh on November 19, 2011. According to defense counsel,1 Dr. Gersh
submitted a report stating there was no tenable basis for the defenses of
diminished capacity or insanity, so defense counsel relied upon the defense of
intoxication.
During the criminal trial, Dr. Paul Perry, a pharmacist, testified Pitman
voluntarily snorted bath salts but he became involuntarily intoxicated because he
usually used Circle V bath salts, but these were unavailable, so he used Night
Lights bath salts, which gave him a much greater affect than he anticipated.
Dr. Perry also stated Pitman may have been exposed to a higher dosage of bath
salts than he was used to on the day of the murder. Dr. Perry gave the opinion
Pitman was unable to form the specific intent to commit the offense based on his
use of synthetic marijuana and bath salts.
Dr. Michael Flaum, a psychiatrist, saw Pitman when he was brought into the
hospital on the day of the incident. Dr. Flaum testified Pitman had a history of
mental-health problems and substance abuse. Dr. Flaum found Pitman was
intoxicated but appeared to understand reality and did not show any signs of
delusions or hallucinations. Dr. Flaum was “struck by how freely [Pitman] was
admitting those actions. It seemed like someone who was not thinking clearly
about the consequences of making those kinds of comments.”
The jury did not accept Pitman’s intoxication defense and found him guilty
of first-degree murder. He was sentenced to prison for the rest of his life. Pitman’s
conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Pitman, No. 12-1743, 2014 WL
1 An affidavit was submitted from one of Pitman’s two defense attorneys.
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251899, at *12 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2014). We determined there was sufficient
evidence in the record to show Pitman had the specific intent to kill his mother. Id.
at *8.
Pitman filed an application for postconviction relief. He claimed he received
ineffective assistance because defense counsel did not present a defense of
diminished responsibility. Dr. James Gallagher, a psychiatrist, reviewed Pitman’s
medical records. Dr. Gallagher found Pitman was prone to impulsive behavior,
which was “consistent with borderline personality disorder combined with
substance abuse.” Dr. Gallagher stated:
All that can be said is that if Mr. Pitman was under the influence of
the drugs as he said he was, his tendency toward impulsivity could
have been accentuated especially in conjunction with his basic
unstable personality functioning. There is insufficient evidence to
say that he was psychotic or delusional at the time. If he was using
benzodiazepines, such medications could function to disinhibit an
individual, resulting in more impulsive behavior.
The district court denied Pitman’s request for postconviction relief. The
court stated:
As to Pitman’s mental condition, the record discloses that trial
counsel performed their duty by having Pitman evaluated early on in
the case to determine whether he had any competency or diminished
responsibility issues. That examiner’s report did not give them any
information to support such a defense. Just because Pitman has
now found a different expert that may provide a basis for a
diminished responsibility defense does not mean that trial counsel
failed to perform an essential duty by choosing to follow the
recommendation of the expert they retained at the time of the original
case. As a result, the court finds no basis in the argument that trial
counsel used an erroneous trial strategy.
The court found Pitman failed to show defense counsel failed to perform an
essential duty or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. The court
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concluded Pitman did not establish that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Pitman now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We conduct a de novo review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008). To establish a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, an applicant must prove: (1) counsel failed to
perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied the
applicant a fair trial. Id. An applicant’s failure to prove either element by a
preponderance of the evidence is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance. See
State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 2003).
III. Ineffective Assistance
Pitman claims he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel
did not present a defense of diminished responsibility. “[D]iminished responsibility
may be offered as a defense where an accused, because of a limited capacity to
think, is unable to form a necessary criminal intent.” State v. Collins, 305 N.W.2d
434, 436 (Iowa 1981). Diminished responsibility may provide a defense to the
element of specific intent in an offense. State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2014). The specific intent to kill is an element of first-degree murder.
State v. Serrato, 787 N.W.2d 462, 469 (Iowa 2010). Pitman asserts that if a
diminished-responsibility defense had been presented, the jury likely would have
found he did not have the requisite specific intent and would have found him guilty
of second-degree murder, rather than first-degree murder.
“Crafting a trial strategy is inherently difficult, so we ‘must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
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professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered sound
trial strategy.”’” State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 206 (Iowa 2018) (citations
omitted). “In accordance with this presumption, counsel fails his or her essential
duty by ‘perform[ing] below the standard demanded of a reasonably competent
attorney.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “Miscalculated trial
strategies and mere mistakes in judgment normally do not rise to the level of
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 143 (Iowa
2001).
Defense counsel considered the defense of diminished responsibility and
filed notice of the defense. Defense counsel arranged for Pitman to have a mental
evaluation with Dr. Gersh prior to the trial. Dr. Gersh reported “there was no
tenable basis for the continued advancement of the defenses of insanity or
diminished capacity.” After Dr. Gersh’s evaluation, defense counsel did not have
the support of an expert to testify in support of a defense of diminished
responsibility. Defense counsel proceeded with the defense of intoxication.
We find Pitman has not shown the conduct of defense counsel was outside
the range of normal competency. See Pettes v. State, 418 N.W.2d 53, 56–57
(Iowa 1988) (“In view of the equivocal nature of the doctor’s reports supporting the
defense of diminished capacity, . . . we do not believe [the decision declining to
raise that defense] was beyond the range of normal competency.”); see also
Gordon v. State, No. 09-1067, 2010 WL 1377040, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 8,
2010) (finding defendant did not receive ineffective assistance where the
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defendant was evaluated by a psychiatrist and based on the report, defense
counsel determined a diminished responsibility defense was not feasible).
We agree with the district court’s findings:
Trial counsel reasonably investigated whether Pitman would be able
to offer some type of mental health defense. The opinion rendered
by their expert indicated such a defense was not available. As a
result, counsel then pursued another option of intoxication as a
defense. This was reasonable and appropriate given the facts in this
case. There is nothing in the record to indicate that counsel failed to
perform an essential duty. As a result, the court concludes that the
Applicant has failed to establish grounds to support his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
We are also not convinced trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty in
arguing the intoxication defense without relating it back to Pitman’s underlying
mental conditions. Pitman’s underlying mental issues were in the record, and the
jury had the ability to consider all of Pitman’s circumstances in reaching their
ultimate conclusion.
We conclude Pitman has failed to show he received ineffective assistance
of counsel. We affirm the district court’s decision denying his request for
postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.