Triston Randall Estate v. Quentin Ray Ary Estate ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-2077
Filed April 1, 2020
TROY RANDALL, Individually and as administrator of the ESTATE OF
TRISTON RANDALL and THE ESTATE OF TRISTON RANDALL,
Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
vs.
DENNIS ARY and SANDRA ARY, Co-Administrators of the ESTATE OF
QUENTIN RAY ARY; and THE ESTATE OF QUENTIN RAY ARY,
Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
and
JACK YOUDE and VAN-HOF TRUCKING, INC.,
Defendants.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Benton County, Lars G. Anderson,
Judge.
Parties to a wrongful death lawsuit appeal the order granting a new trial on
damages. AFFIRMED.
Joel T.S. Greer of Cartwright Druker & Ryden, Marshalltown, for appellants.
Vernon P. Squires and Jeremiah D. Junker of Bradley & Riley PC, Cedar
Rapids, for appellees.
Kimberly S. Bartosh (until withdrawal), Stephen E. Doohen, and Zachary J.
Hermsen of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for Jack Youde and Van-Hof
Trucking, Inc.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Ahlers, JJ. Greer, J.,
takes no part.
2
DOYLE, Judge.
Parties to a wrongful death lawsuit appeal the order granting a new trial on
damages after the trial court found the jurors considered documents that were
outside the record in determining damages. The defendants contend the court
abused its discretion in granting a new trial on damages because the damage
award was supported by the evidence rather than influenced by the extrinsic
documents. On cross-appeal, the plaintiffs contend the court erred by denying
their request for additur.
Seventeen-year-old Triston Randall was a passenger in a truck driven by
Quentin Ary. The truck was struck by a tractor-trailer when Ary tried to cross
Highway 150 without stopping at a posted stop sign. All five people in the truck
were killed in the collision.
Triston’s father, Troy, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Ary’s estate,
both individually and as administrator of Triston’s estate.1 At trial, the parties
presented expert witness evidence on the amount of the plaintiffs’ damages. The
plaintiffs called a forensic economist who calculated Triston’s lost accumulation
damages between $1,197,277 and $1,458,492. The defendants’ expert witness,
a retired professor of economics, calculated Triston’s lost accumulation damages
between $51,971 and $155,853. The jury found Ary at fault for Triston’s death,
and it awarded $59,205 in damages to Triston’s estate for loss of accumulation but
no damages to Troy for loss of consortium.
1 The lawsuit also named the driver of the tractor-trailer and his employer as
defendants. Because the jury found no fault on their part and they do not
participate in this appeal, we refer only to Ary’s estate and its administrators as the
defendants.
3
After the jury returned its verdict, the court attendant found documents in
the jury room that were not part of the record. The district court described the
documents:
There were two documents found. One is a type written
document consisting of two pages that appears to have been
prepared by one of the jurors. In general terms, it contains various
calculations of future valuations of present sums of money using
different assumptions. The second document consists of one page
and appears to be a photocopy from a book with a chart containing
rates of return for different asset types for various holding periods.
The plaintiffs moved for new trial, arguing the jury committed misconduct by
viewing and considering extrinsic evidence during their deliberations. The plaintiffs
asked the court to condition a new trial upon a damages additur, suggesting an
additur of $311,706 for lost accumulation and $300,000 for lost consortium. The
defendants resisted, arguing the plaintiffs could not show the misconduct likely
impacted the jury’s decision. The trial court granted a new trial on damages and,
on that basis, stated it “need not address” the request for additur.
We review a grant of new trial based on jury misconduct for an abuse of
discretion. See Ten Hagen v. DeNooy, 563 N.W.2d 4, 10 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s actions were clearly unreasonable
under the circumstances. See id. To impeach a verdict based on jury misconduct,
“it must appear the misconduct was calculated to, and with reasonable probability
did influence the verdict.” Id. (quoting State v. Arnold, 543 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Iowa
1996)).
The trial court determined that the documents found in the jury room appear
to be have been intended to help the jury calculate the plaintiffs’ damages. It noted
that the jury’s award did not correspond neatly to any of the numbers provided by
4
the experts.2 On this basis, the court determined that “the jury performed their own
calculations” of damages and that there was “a reasonable probability that these
calculations were influenced by the documents.”
The defendants argue the plaintiffs fail to show a reasonable probability that
the extrajudicial documents influenced the verdict. They note that the jury’s
damage award “is within the range” provided by their expert witness. But the
question is not whether the jury’s verdict aligns with the evidence presented, but
whether outside evidence influenced its decision.
In reaching its conclusion, the court cited State v. Whited, No. 00-1333,
2002 WL 180362, at *1-2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2002), in which a jury verdict in a
criminal prosecution for sexual abuse was questioned when the court learned that
the jurors had consulted evidence outside the record.3 The defendant moved for
new trial based on jury misconduct, which the district court denied after
determining the extrajudicial evidence was not prejudicial because it was
“consistent with the other information available and provided during the course of
2 The defendants’ expert calculated three different projections for lost accumulation
based on average earnings: one based on Triston only graduating high school,
one based on completion of an associate degree, and one based on completion of
a bachelor degree. Although the jury’s award of $59,205 falls between the lowest
and highest figures the defendants’ expert gave, it does not fit within any of the
three individual ranges calculated by the expert. The closest range is based on
high school graduation, with the expert calculating lost accumulation to be between
$51,971 and $54,838.
3 In Whited, the jury consulted both dictionary and medical dictionary definitions of
“trichomonas,” which the complaining witness had been diagnosed with. 2002 WL
180362, at *2. Both definitions described trichomonas as a “sexually transmitted
disease.” Id. During trial, the complaining witness’s doctor testified that
trichomonas is sexually transmitted and, “if there’s a positive, that means there has
been some sexual contact.” Id. But on cross-examination, the doctor admitted
trichomonas can also be transmitted from contact with inanimate objects, like toilet
seats. Id.5
the trial.” Whited, 2002 WL 180362, at *2-3. On appeal, this court acknowledged
that the extrajudicial evidence “was consistent” with the evidence presented at trial
and did not contradict it. Id. at *3. But we concluded the jury’s misconduct
warranted reversal because the outside evidence “did not present a full description
of the information elicited at trial.” Id. Instead, it “reinforced” the opinion of a
medical expert who testified at trial on whether the sexual abuse occurred and
likely influenced the jury’s verdict. Id.
For the same reasons, we find the trial court acted within its discretion in
granting a new trial on damages. The jury was confronted with two expert
witnesses who provided vastly different calculations of lost accumulation
damages. The jury went outside the record in consulting documents to help it
decide damages. Those documents appear to have provided a calculation that fell
within the range of damages provided by one expert but conflicted with the
damages calculated by the other expert. Although the jury could have reached the
same verdict without consulting outside evidence, there is a reasonable probability
that the documents influenced its verdict. See King v. Barrett, 185 N.W.2d 210,
213 (Iowa 1971) (holding that where a juror went to the scene of an automobile
collision and made observations that varied from those of witnesses, “the collecting
of the data and the reporting of it during deliberations constituted such jury
misconduct as to vitiate the verdict”); Harden v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 112 N.W.2d
324, 326 (Iowa 1961) (holding that new trial was warranted based on jury’s
examination of chart not in evidence that showed the average stopping distance
for a vehicle on dry surfaces and “showed a different distance at a certain speed,
than that testified to by witnesses”).
6
The plaintiffs ask us to remand to the district court for entry of an additur
instead of a new trial on damages. See Pexa v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 686 N.W.2d
150, 162 (Iowa 2004) (“If the damages are inadequate, the trial court must either
grant a new trial or, if appropriate, grant an additur.”). But the court granted a new
trial based on juror misconduct, not inadequate damages. As noted, the jury’s
damage award was within the range of the evidence. Although juror misconduct
may have influenced the jury’s damage award, there is no basis for finding the
award itself was inadequate. See Triplett v. McCourt Mfg. Corp., 742 N.W.2d 600,
602 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (noting the court must not set aside a verdict merely
because it would have reached a different conclusion; to set aside the verdict, the
award must be “(1) flagrantly excessive or inadequate; (2) so out of reason as to
shock the conscience; (3) a result of passion, prejudice, or other ulterior motive; or
(4) lacking in evidentiary support”).
We affirm the order granting a new trial on the damages issue.
AFFIRMED.