Monue Forkpayea Geimah v. State of Iowa ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0988
Filed June 3, 2020
MONUE FORKPAYEA GEIMAH,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County, Crystal S. Cronk,
Judge.
Monue Forkpayea Geimah appeals the denial of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
C. Aron Vaughn of Kaplan & Frese, LLP, Marshalltown, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Doyle and Schumacher, JJ.
2
BOWER, Chief Judge.
Monue Forkpayea Geimah appeals the denial of his application for
postconviction relief (PCR). He maintains plea counsel was ineffective in failing to
advise him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to theft in 2017. On
our de novo review, we conclude plea counsel did not inform Geimah “of all the
adverse immigration consequences that competent counsel would uncover,”1 but
Geimah failed to prove he would not have pleaded guilty had he been adequately
advised. We therefore affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On February 29, 2016, Geimah was charged with one count of theft in the
third degree for “depositing checks with insufficient funds and receiving $841.00.”
On December 8, 2016, Geimah filed a written guilty plea to one count of theft in
the fourth degree. This written guilty plea contained the following warning:
Immigration Consequences. If you are not a citizen of the United
States, a conviction may have immigration consequences.
Immigration law is a specialized field of law. [Plea counsel] is not an
immigration lawyer and you should seek the consultation of an
immigration specialist if you want advice regarding the immigration
consequences of your plea.
Geimah waived his right to be present at sentencing. On January 5, 2017, the
district court entered judgment and Geimah was sentenced to one year in the
Poweshiek County Jail, which was suspended. He was placed on probation for
one year and ordered to pay a fine, surcharges, and costs.
1Morales Diaz v. State, 896 N.W.2d 723, 732 (Iowa 2017) (applying standard of
practice enunciated in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)).
3
On January 28, 2019, Geimah filed a PCR application, asserting his plea
counsel provided ineffective assistance by not adequately explaining the
immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
Trial was held on May 15. Geimah, his wife, Melissa, and plea counsel
testified at the trial. Geimah testified that he was born in, and is a citizen of, Liberia,
West Africa. He legally immigrated to the United States in 2010. Geimah testified
his father and his four half-siblings live in the United States, he is married to a
United States citizen with whom he has two children. He stated he knows no one
in Liberia. Geimah also testified that in March 2018 he turned himself in to
authorities in Minnesota for an outstanding warrant for a driving while intoxicated
charge. He testified he had completed the requirements of that case, and the
charge was dropped. However, as he was being released, he was seized by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and was placed in detention.
Geimah testified he contacted his plea counsel asking that she seek
modification to the Poweshiek County judgment entry, and counsel filed a motion
to set aside and re-sentence on April 17, 2018. The district court set aside the
sentence, vacated any prison time, and sentenced Geimah to pay a fine, statutory
surcharges, court costs, and victim restitution. Geimah believed he would be
released from immigration detention if this amendment were made to the judgment
entry. However, he remained in immigration detention and was subsequently
ordered removed and ineligible to return.2
2 On June 28, 2018, a federal immigration court ordered Geimah be removed from
the United States to Liberia. The immigration court based this removal on two
separate sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). First, the
immigration court found that Geimah was removable because he violated INA
4
Geimah testified his plea counsel never asked about his immigration status,
never asked about his criminal history, and never discussed the potential
immigration consequences of pleading guilty. Geimah testified that had he known
he would be deported and would not be eligible to return to the United States, he
would never have pleaded guilty because he would be separated from his children.
Melissa testified all of Geimah’s family with whom he has any relationship
are in the United States, she and Geimah have two children together, including
one who has a heart condition, and Geimah has always been involved with the
children’s care. She was asked whether Geimah would have pleaded guilty in the
theft case had he known about the immigration consequences that were going to
result from it and she replied, “I do not believe so. . . . Because we—we want—
we want to remain as a family here in the United States.”
Plea counsel testified she knew Geimah was not a United States citizen:
I recall him—You know, my general thing is the second that I found
out that he is not—first not—You could tell that English was not his
first language, you know. We had a brief conversation. That’s when
I found out he was from Liberia, and he had—he did ask about
section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)] because he was “enjoined
under a protection order and has been determined to have engaged in conduct in
violation of that order that involves protection against credible threats of violence,
repeated harassment, or bodily injury to that person or persons for whom the
protection order was issued[.]” Specifically, the immigration court found that
Geimah’s wife, Melissa, asked for and received an order of protection against
Geimah based on “physical abuse, sexual abuse, and threats, as well as fear for
physical safety[,]” and that Geimah violated this order of protection when he went
to Melissa’s home. This violation subjected Geimah to removal from the United
States.
The immigration court also found Geimah was independently removable
under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)] because he was
convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude: the January 5, 2017 Poweshiek County
conviction for theft in the fourth degree (challenged here) and a February 14, 2017
Black Hawk County conviction for theft in the fifth degree (entered after a bench
trial).
5
immigration. I had indicated I don’t know a lot about immigration.
Generally, anything can get you deported and that immigration takes
into consideration different factors, and clearly if he was in this
country illegally that he would most certainly be deported. I—I recall
him saying that he had a green card at that conversation, and I had
again told him I am not an immigration attorney. He should speak
with an immigration attorney for more specifics. He indicated he had
a case going on somewhere else and that he would talk to that
attorney.
Q. Do you remember where that other pending case was?
A. No, he didn’t tell me. I don’t believe he told me at that point where
the other county case was or anything like that.
Q And— A. He was with his wife that day as well.
Q. —And a similar question. Did he ever mention who the
attorney in that other case was? A. No.
Q. And as part of your representation of Mr. Geimah, did you
ever ask him what his criminal history in the United States was?
A. He told me he had that case. I think that he ended up picking up
another charge while my case was pending because he was jailed,
and his wife attended that pretrial conference. I think the only other
specific that I knew about was the offense that he was jailed for. I
believe that one was out of Black Hawk County during the pendency
of my representation with him, and I almost thought that was like a
domestic abuse charge or something like that. But other than me
getting his presence excused because he was currently in jail, that
was the extent of my communication regarding that charge, and that
information came to me through his wife.
Q. And you were aware that Mr. Geimah was from Liberia? I
don’t recall if you said whether you knew what his immigration in the
United States was, so did you ever find out what his immigration
status in the United States was during your representation? A. I
believe he had told me that he had a green card and that he was
currently married to his wife, who is a U.S. citizen. That—That’s
pretty much what I remember, and that was from that very first
conversation that, you know, I tried to make clear I’m not an
immigration attorney. I don’t know exactly what consequences you
could ultimately be facing, you know. Those could be up—Those
could be deportation. I mean, literally, that’s my spiel.
....
Q. Did you personally ever consult with any immigration
attorneys as part of your representation of Mr. Geimah prior to the
guilty plea and sentencing? A. At the time that his case was going
on, that was not the current standard so, you know, I did not.
....
Q. And prior to Mr. Geimah being issued his original sentence
in the case, did you and he ever discuss the possibility that the
Poweshiek County case would result in him never being able to
6
legally reenter the United States if he did get deported? A. No. It
was literally deportation is the only word I said and speak to an
immigration attorney.
On cross examination, trial counsel testified further:
Q. [Counsel], when you spoke to Mr. Geimah about potential adverse
immigration consequences and informed him that he needed to
speak to an immigration attorney, was it your understanding that he
had an immigration attorney at that time? A. The way that he said
he had another attorney and basically would ask them made me feel
like he would get his questions answered, and since he didn’t bring
it up anymore, I thought he got his questions answered. He never
specifically—To be a hundred percent fair and honest, he never
specifically told me that that was an immigration attorney, but the
context was he would answer or ask the other attorney, and then he
never brought it up.
On redirect, Geimah’s counsel asked:
Q. [Counsel], regarding the other attorney that Mr. Geimah
mentioned to you about immigration advice, did you ever attempt to
follow up with that other attorney to see if Mr. Geimah’s questions
had been answered? A. No. He didn’t tell me what the attorney was
even for. I didn’t—At that time I didn’t know he had criminal charges
pending someplace else. I still am not certain that he did, but I—he
didn’t tell me who it was or what it was for, and I really didn’t,
necessarily, think that it was, you know, my business.
Q. Would it be accurate to also say, then, that you didn’t ask
him for any more details about who the attorney was or what the
other attorney’s purpose was? A. That would be fair.
The district court entered its ruling on May 16, 2019, finding plea counsel
breached no duty because she
discussed the case with Applicant and negotiated a plea agreement
whereby Applicant was not placed into custody, which was his
desired result. [Counsel] also put him on notice of the possible
consequences, including deportation, and advised him to seek
advice from immigration counsel. [Counsel] confirmed this
notification in the written guilty plea sent to Applicant.
The court found plea counsel’s “testimony regarding her advisement to [Geimah]
regarding possible deportation is credible.”
7
The court found Geimah’s testimony that he had no awareness of the
possible immigration consequences was not credible because “[t]his case was not
his first involvement with the U.S. court system; he had prior charges in Minnesota,
as well as in Black Hawk County, Iowa,” and he was “represented by counsel in all
of the criminal cases.”
Geimah appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review PCR proceedings for correction of legal error unless they raise
constitutional issues, in which case our review is de novo. Perez v. State, 816
N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 2012). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raises
constitutional issue and thus our review is de novo. Morales Diaz, 896 N.W.2d at
727.
III. Discussion.
“Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel-claims require a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence both that counsel failed an essential duty and that
the failure resulted in prejudice.” Id. (citation omitted). An attorney’s performance
is constitutionally deficient when the attorney fails to advise the defendant on the
immigration consequences of pleading guilty. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368–69;
Morales Diaz, 896 N.W.2d at 729. The applicant must show counsel’s
performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Morales Diaz,
896 N.W.2d at 728 (citation omitted). In defining this standard, “[w]e look to the
practice and expectations of the legal community.” Id. (citation omitted).
If an applicant satisfies the first prong, the next step is proving prejudice. In
this context, an applicant proves prejudice by showing he or she would not have
8
pleaded guilty and instead would have insisted on going to trial. Id. Importantly,
“[t]his does not mean the defendant must show he or she would have prevailed at
trial.” Id. at 729. “Rather, the defendant must only show the ‘decision to reject the
plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372).
A. Breach of duty. We note the PCR court did not cite Padilla or Morales
Diaz, but did conclude plea counsel “put [Geimah] on notice of the possible
consequences, including deportation.” On our de novo review of the record, we
cannot come to the same conclusion. Moreover, the State concedes that
Geimah’s defense attorney failed to comply with the standards expected of
attorneys:
[C]ounsel after Padilla is held to the same standard counsel was
before Padilla: to provide objectively reasonable assistance as
measured by prevailing professional norms. See Commonwealth v.
Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 38 N.E.3d 278, 290 (2015) (“[T]he failure
of a criminal defense attorney to make a reasonable inquiry of the
client regarding his or her citizenship and immigration status is
sufficient to satisfy the deficient performance prong of the ineffective
assistance analysis.”); State v. Favela, 343 P.3d 178, 182 (N.M.
2015) (“A defense attorney’s failure to advise a client of the ‘specific
immigration consequences of pleading guilty, including whether
deportation would be virtually certain’ renders that attorney’s
performance deficient, which satisfies the first prong of the Strickland
test.” (quoting State v. Paredez, 136 N.M. 533, 101 P.3d 799, 805
(2004))); see also Lindsay C. Nash, Considering the Scope of
Advisal Duties Under Padilla, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 549, 576 (2011)
(“[D]efense attorneys must investigate and research the law using
available resources and then advise noncitizen defendants about
immigration consequences at the level of specificity that research
permits.”). Counsel’s duty as interpreted in Padilla does not depend
on an assessment of the clarity of the consequences or on
categorizing them as strictly related to deportation. Instead,
consistent with the approach we have always taken, counsel’s duty
depends on society’s expectations of its attorneys.
In Padilla, the U.S. Supreme Court looked to “norms of
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the
9
like” to measure counsel’s performance. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Consulting the current version
of the American Bar Association guidelines now, we find they
recommend the following:
(a) Defense counsel should determine a client’s
citizenship and immigration status, assuring the client
that such information is important for effective legal
representation and that it should be protected by the
attorney–client privilege. Counsel should avoid any
actions that might alert the government to information
that could adversely affect the client.
(b) If defense counsel determines that a client
may not be a United States citizen, counsel should
investigate and identify particular immigration
consequences that might follow possible criminal
dispositions. Consultation or association with an
immigration law expert or knowledgeable advocate is
advisable in these circumstances. Public and
appointed defenders should develop, or seek funding
for, such immigration expertise within their offices.
(c) After determining the client’s immigration
status and potential adverse consequences from the
criminal proceedings, including removal, exclusion,
bars to relief from removal, immigration detention,
denial of citizenship, and adverse consequences to the
client’s immediate family, counsel should advise the
client of all such potential consequences and
determine with the client the best course of action for
the client’s interests and how to pursue it.
(d) If a client is convicted of a removable
offense, defense counsel should advise the client of
the serious consequences if the client illegally returns
to the United States.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Def.
Function 4-5.5 (4th ed. 2015). We recognize these
recommendations are demanding, but we do not find them too
onerous a burden to place on the professional advisers employed to
represent their clients’ best interests.
Morales Diaz, 896 N.W.2d at 730–31 (emphasis added). “Whether or not
deportation consequences are certain or possible under a criminal charge, the
specific statutory consequences need to be explained with reasonable clarity so a
full and measured decision to plead guilty can be made.” Id. at 732.
 10
Here, defense counsel repeatedly stated she informed Geimah deportation
was possible and advised him to speak with an immigration attorney. This does
not comport to the standard expected and, thus, plea counsel breached a duty
when she did not adequately inform Geimah regarding the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea.
B. Prejudice. Yet, Geimah must also show counsel’s breach of duty
resulted in prejudice. Geimah testified that had his counsel informed him of the
immigration consequences of his plea, he never would have entered it. “We must
decide whether this would have been a rational choice.” Id. at 732–33.
On appeal, Geimah maintains that had he “been aware of the immigration
consequences of a conviction (deportation, cancellation of removal, inability to
legally reenter the United States following deportation, inability to naturalize etc.),”
rejecting the plea and going to trial “would have been entirely reasonable under
the circumstances.” We must consider the circumstances Geimah was in at the
time he was deciding whether to take the plea. See Lee v. United States, 582 U.S.
___,137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017) (“Courts should not upset a plea solely because
of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for
his attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should instead look to contemporaneous
evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences.”). We
acknowledge “[t]he decision whether to plead guilty also involves assessing the
respective consequences of a conviction after trial and by plea. When those
consequences are, from the defendant’s perspective, similarly dire, even the
smallest chance of success at trial may look attractive.” Id. at 1966 (citation
omitted).
11
On July 17, 2015, Geimah pleaded guilty in Black Hawk County to violating
a no-contact order. Therefore, at the time Geimah was considering whether to
plead guilty in Poweshiek County, he was already deportable.3
In early 2017, Geimah also had two pending charges of theft, which are
considered “crimes of moral turpitude.” Being convicted of one crime involving
moral turpitude committed within five years after the date of admission and “for
which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed” renders a noncitizen
deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Being convicted of two
or more crimes involving moral turpitude “at any time after admission” renders a
noncitizen deportable. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
In Poweshiek County, Geimah was charged with theft in the third degree,
for which a term of two years may be imposed. See Iowa Code §§ 714.2(3),
903.1(2) (2016). Geimah pleaded guilty to theft in the fourth degree—an offense
for which a sentence of one year may be imposed. See id. §§ 714.2(4), 903.1(1).
Thus, either theft in the third or fourth degree would have rendered Geimah
deportable—but Geimah was already deportable due to the earlier conviction for
violation of the protective order.
3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) (“Any alien who at any time after admission is
enjoined under a protection order issued by a court and whom the court determines
has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that involves
protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily
injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued is
deportable. For purposes of this clause, the term ‘protection order’ means any
injunction issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of
domestic violence, including temporary or final orders issued by civil or criminal
courts (other than support or child custody orders or provisions) whether obtained
by filing an independent action or as a pendente lite order in another proceeding.”).
12
Still, Geimah’s plea allowed him to avoid being convicted of an “aggravated
felony” and avoid a term of imprisonment.4 “[A] noncitizen convicted of [an
aggravated felony] is subject to mandatory deportation.” Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963
(emphasis added). An alien convicted of an aggravated felony also faces
expedited removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(3)(A). Geimah’s guilty plea
allowed him to avoid mandatory and expedited removal proceedings.
Deportation or removal is not the sole immigration consequence of import,
however. An alien may qualify for cancellation of removal. For a lawful permanent
resident to be eligible for cancellation of removal, he must (1) lawfully be admitted
as a permanent resident for at least five years (which Geimah was), (2) have
resided continuously in the U.S. for at least seven years after legally being
admitted into the U.S., and (3) not be convicted of an aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a)(1)–(3). The immigration court noted the Poweshiek County conviction
did not result in a term of imprisonment, and thus rejected finding Geimah had
been convicted of an aggravated felony.
Nonetheless, the immigration court determined Geimah was not eligible for
cancellation of removal:
[R]espondent [Geimah] is not eligible statutorily for cancellation of
removal for permanent residents under INA section 240A(a) [8
U.S.C. § 1229b]. That is due to the court’s ruling that the
respondent’s theft convictions constitute crimes involving moral
turpitude, and they were both committed within seven years of the
respondent’s only admission into the United States in 2010.
Essentially, respondent was admitted on June 1, 2010[,] and he was
convicted in January and February of 2017 for theft offenses
4 “A theft offense . . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year” is
an aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). Theft in the third degree,
punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years, qualifies as an aggravated
felony. See Iowa Code §§ 714.2(3), 903.1(2).
13
committed prior to that date. As such, they were within seven years
of his admission. As such, the respondent’s continuous residence
clock was cut off after the commission of the second offense [of
moral turpitude].
(Emphasis added.) See 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1) (“For purposes of this section
[related to cancellation of removal], any period of continuous residence or
continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end . . .
(B) when the alien has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of
this title that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States under section
1182(a)(2) of this title or removable from the United States under section
1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title, whichever is earliest.”); cf. Barton v. Barr, ___
S. Ct. ___, 2020 WL 1941965, at *5 (2020) (interpreting this ‘stop-time rule’ and
concluding “cancellation of removal is precluded if a noncitizen committed a
§ 1182(a)(2) offense (as in Barton’s case) the conviction occurred after the seven
years elapsed”). The “stop-time rule” was triggered upon Geimah’s commission
of two crimes of moral turpitude within the seven-year period after admission.
The State notes that by pleading guilty in Poweshiek County Geimah
avoided going to prison. Geimah did testify he “was happy” because he would not
go to jail and would be placed on unsupervised probation. On our de novo review,
and considering all the circumstances, we conclude a decision to reject the plea
bargain at the time would not have been rational. Consequently, Geimah has
failed to establish the requisite prejudice, and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim fails.
AFFIRMED.