In the Interest of C.W., I.W., K.W., and M.W., Minor Children ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1874
Filed June 3, 2020
IN THE INTEREST OF C.W., I.W., K.W., and M.W.,
Minor Children,
M.W., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Susan Cox, District
Associate Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to four of her
children. AFFIRMED.
Jamie F. Deremiah of Flanagan Law Group, PLLC, Des Moines, for
appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Magdalena Reese of Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and Greer, JJ.
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GREER, Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to four of her
children, born between 2010 and 2015.1 The court terminated the mother’s rights
to all four children pursuant to paragraphs (d) and (i) of Iowa Code section
232.116(1) (2019) and also terminated the mother’s rights to the oldest three
children pursuant to paragraph (f). The mother challenges the statutory grounds
for termination, maintains the State failed to make reasonable efforts at
reunification, and argues termination of her rights is not in the children’s best
interests.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764,
773 (Iowa 2012). “When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than
one statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we
find supported by the record.” Id. at 774. Here, we consider whether termination
was appropriate under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), which allows the court to
terminate parental rights when:
(1) The court has previously adjudicated the child to be a child
in need of assistance after finding the child to have been physically
or sexually abused or neglected as the result of the acts or omissions
of one or both parents, or the court has previously adjudicated a child
who is a member of the same family to be a child in need of
assistance after such a finding.
(2) Subsequent to the child in need of assistance adjudication,
the parents were offered or received services to correct the
circumstance which led to the adjudication, and the circumstance
continues to exist despite the offer or receipt of services.
1The parental rights of the children’s fathers were also terminated. No father
appeals.
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The mother challenges only the second element, arguing she has corrected the
circumstances that led to the children’s adjudication in October 2017.
The Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) has been involved with this
family off and on since 2008, and the mother’s rights to another child were
terminated in 2009. DHS became involved this time after police were called to the
mother’s neighborhood to deal with a naked man who was attempting to break into
a home. When they arrived, the police learned the man—the father of the youngest
child—was under the influence of PCP and had been left in charge of caring for
the mother’s children, in spite of the fact the mother had a no-contact order against
the man for a recent incident of domestic violence he perpetrated against her. The
home itself was unsanitary, with trash, rotten food, and a bug infestation inside the
home. The children were immediately removed from the mother’s care, and she
was charged with four counts of child endangerment.
On top of leaving the children with an inappropriate caretaker, DHS had
additional concerns regarding the children’s safety after they met with the children.
The children reported to DHS workers that the mother smokes “weed,” uses
“pokies” and “shots” in her feet, and takes pills she keeps in her closet. At testing
done shortly after the children’s removal, one of the children tested positive for
cocaine, and the mother tested positive for cocaine and opiates of hydrocodone
and oxycodone. Additionally, two of the four children were observed by a doctor
to have belt-mark bruises on their bodies. Those children alleged that the
youngest child’s father had hit them with a belt and that that their mother was aware
of it but did nothing to stop it.
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The mother maintains that she now has a safe and stable home in which to
parent the children and claims she no longer has mental-health, substance-abuse,
or relationship issues. Additionally, she argues DHS failed to make reasonable
efforts at reunifying her with the children because no one from the department
came to view her home after she moved in November 2018 and she was not
allowed to have visits in the home after they were ended in October 2018. See In
re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000) (“[T]he reasonable efforts requirement
is not viewed as a strict substantive requirement of termination. Instead, the scope
of the efforts by the DHS to reunify parent and child after removal impacts the
burden of proving those elements of termination which require reunification efforts.
The State must show reasonable efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child
cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.” (citation omitted)).
First, the record does not support the mother’s claim that she has resolved
the issues that led to the children’s adjudication as children in need of assistance.
The mother missed some drug tests that DHS requested of her and she refused
to put on a sweat patch, claiming it caused a negative reaction on her skin. Still,
the mother had multiple drug tests that were positive. When she tested around the
time of the children’s removal, she tested positive for cocaine and opiates. In the
drug tests she took in September 2018 and May 2019—less than two weeks before
the first day of the termination proceeding—she tested positive for opiates. At the
termination hearing, the mother testified she had a prescription for opiate drugs
due to ongoing issues she has with pain. The mother provided evidence of March
and November 2018 prescriptions for hydrocodone, but she failed to provide any
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updated documentation surrounding her positive tests to explain the presence of
opiates.
Additionally, while the mother testified she is not in a relationship and has
not been in a relationship during this case, her testimony is not credible. Insofar
as the mother’s therapist backed up the mother’s statements and opined that the
mother had new insights into recognizing and choosing healthy relationships, we
find the therapist’s testimony less than persuasive since it is clear her knowledge
is based on what the mother reports and the mother was less than candid with her.
The better evidence established the mother was dating—at least at one point in
late 2018—a man with a criminal history involving the use and distribution of
methamphetamine. And the mother introduced this man to one of the children, in
violation of DHS’s orders, as the child reported to the foster parents that she had
a secret about meeting her new “dad.” The mother claims there is no truth to this—
either the relationship or that she introduced the kids to a man—but her Facebook
account showed several posts about a specific man during that time and the man’s
business information (also available on Facebook) corroborate other comments
and descriptions given by the young child. The mother claimed her account was
hacked and someone else must have put up the posts about the man, but this
strains credulity.
We cannot say whether the mother’s new home is better maintained and
more safe for the children because DHS did not visit the new home. But we
understand DHS’s rationale, and we do not find a failure to make reasonable
efforts based on this issue. DHS’s concern about the state of the mother’s housing
was limited to whether it was safe for the children. As the children’s therapist
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suggested the children should not have visits in the mother’s home until the mother
made more progress in other aspects of the case, a suggestion DHS agreed with,
there was no reason to view the house before that time. Especially since the
mother has shown she can clean up her home for a short time; the question is
whether she can maintain the home long-term. Moreover, it was not DHS’s failure
to view the home that prevented visits from taking place there. The mother’s lack
of progress in other areas of the case plan plus her inability to handle the behaviors
of the children prevented visits from taking place there.
Because the circumstances that led to the children’s adjudication still
existed at the time of the termination hearing, we agree with the juvenile court that
the State proved the ground for termination of the mother’s parental rights pursuant
to section 232.116(1)(d). And we have the benefit of a detailed and extensive
termination order listing the circumstances supporting termination.
Next, the mother maintains termination of her parental rights is not in the
children’s best interests. In considering the best interests of the children we “give
primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering
the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental,
and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). As
our case law provides, the defining elements in a child’s best interests are the
child’s safety and need for a permanent home. See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793,
801 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially). The need for permanency was
especially manifest here, as the children seemed to fatigue of the process—
sometimes refusing to go to visits out of apparent frustration with the mother’s lack
of progress and expressing a desire for the proceedings to be finished. The four
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children have been in the same foster care placement since January 2018, and
the foster parents are interested in adopting them. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2)(b)(1). This family can provide the stability and safety for the children
that the mother is yet unable to do. Termination of her parental rights is in the
children’s best interests.
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to these four
children.
AFFIRMED.