In the Interest of J.T. ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0984
Filed June 3, 2020
IN THE INTEREST OF J.T.,
J.T., Minor Child,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Montgomery County, Amy
Zacharias, Judge.
A juvenile appeals his delinquency adjudication. AFFIRMED.
Justin R. Wyatt of Woods, Wyatt, & Tucker, PLLC, Glenwood, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
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MAY, Judge.
D.S. reported J.T. raped her. The juvenile court adjudicated J.T. delinquent
for committing an act constituting third-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa
Code section 709.4(1)(a) (2019). On appeal, J.T. asserts (1) the court should not
have excluded J.T. and the public when D.S. testified, and (2) there was insufficient
evidence to support the finding of delinquency. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
At the delinquency hearing, D.S. testified to the following facts. In January
2019, D.S. was a wrestling cheerleader. On the evening of January 11, D.S. was
at school to prepare for a wrestling meet. D.S., J.T., and another individual went
for a walk around the school. J.T. asked the other individual to leave. D.S. and
J.T. made their way toward an auditorium. They began kissing. Then J.T. pushed
D.S. into the auditorium, forced her into a corner, and began to take off D.S.’s
pants. She told him to stop. He put a coat over her mouth to quiet her. He then
“brought [D.S.] to the floor and then he started to put his penis in [her].” She
testified he held her down. When D.S. was finally free, she redressed and left.
J.T. told her not to tell anyone or she “would regret it.” She headed to the bathroom
to wash her face “so it didn’t look like [she] was crying.” A few days later, D.S. told
her mother what happened. Her mother reported the incident to the police. D.S.
also went to the hospital for an examination.
The State petitioned to adjudicate J.T. as delinquent for committing an act
constituting sexual abuse in the third degree. The juvenile court held an
adjudicatory hearing. With the agreement of J.T. and his counsel, only the
attorneys, court reporter, and judge were present when D.S. testified. The juvenile
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court ultimately found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that J.T.
committed the delinquent act alleged. J.T. appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“Delinquency proceedings are special proceedings that serve as an
alternative to the criminal prosecution of a child.” In re A.K., 825 N.W.2d 46, 49
(Iowa 2013). “The objective of the proceedings is the best interests of the child.”
Id.
We apply different standards to different issues. We review questions of
statutory interpretation for errors at law. In re M.L.B., No. 00-1911, 2001 WL
1659105, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001). “We review constitutional
challenges de novo.” In re T.H., 913 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Iowa 2018). And “[w]e
consider the sufficiency of the evidence in juvenile delinquency adjudications de
novo.”1 Id. “Although we give weight to the factual findings of the juvenile court,
especially regarding the credibility of witnesses, we are not bound by them.” A.K.,
825 N.W.2d at 49. “We presume the child is innocent of the charges, and the State
has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the [child] committed
the delinquent acts.” Id.
III. D.S.’s Testimony
J.T. alleges the juvenile “court committed reversible error by excluding the
public and defendant from the courtroom during the testimony of the alleged
1 Unlike in a criminal case, we do not view the evidence in the light “most favorable
to the State” to determine whether “any reasonable fact finder could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the [accused] committed the delinquent acts.”
A.K., 825 N.W.2d at 49.
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victim.” He contends the court was obligated to conduct a colloquy beyond “asking
if everyone was in agreement.” And the court’s failure to do so resulted in the
violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution, article I section 10 of the Iowa Constitution, and Iowa Code
section 602.1601.
We begin with error preservation. “As a rule, a defendant must preserve
error by making an objection at the earliest opportunity after the grounds for the
objection become apparent.” State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Iowa
1995). “This rule applies equally to constitutional issues.”2 Id. But J.T. made no
objection when the State proposed closing the hearing so that D.S. could testify
with only the judge, the court reporter, and the lawyers present. In fact, both J.T.
and his counsel told the court they agreed with the proposal. So we find error was
not preserved on J.T.’s claim.
Even if we were to overlook the error-preservation issue, J.T. waived any
contrary rights he may have had when he and his lawyer agreed to the State’s
proposal. See Martineau v. Perrin, 601 F.2d 1196, 1199 (1st Cir. 1979) (noting it
is well “established that a criminal defendant can ‘waive his [or her] constitutional
right to a public trial’” (citations omitted)). We note J.T. relies on Iowa Code section
602.1601. It provides that “[a]ll judicial proceedings shall be public, unless
otherwise specially provided by statute or agreed to by the parties.” Iowa Code
2 As the State points out, though, “J.T. does not cite any case law in Iowa
answering the question whether a juvenile has a constitutional right to a public
trial.”
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§ 602.1601 (emphasis added). And at the adjudicatory hearing, the following
record was made:
[STATE:] At this point I would move the court to allow the
alleged victim to testify in essentially an empty courtroom, absent of
course the judge, the court reporter, and the two attorneys. I believe
that it is going to be traumatic enough for her to give her testimony
without other individuals in the room.
THE COURT: And is that an issue that has been discussed
with you, [defense counsel]?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And is that something you also discussed with
your client?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And what is your position and I can also ask
him in a moment too. But what is your position on that?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we are in agreement
with allowing the alleged victim to testify without any family members
or without the defendant in the courtroom.
THE COURT: And, [J.T.], have you—you had a chance to talk
to [defense counsel] about this issue?
[J.T.]: Yes.
THE COURT: And you are in agreement with—you’re okay
with not being in the courtroom?
[J.T.]: Yes.
THE COURT: And you have had a chance to talk to [defense
counsel] about this case?
[J.T.]: Yes.
THE COURT: And specifically you had a chance to—there
were depositions taken in this case, and I don’t want to know
specifically what you talked about, but you had a chance to talk with
him about that testimony and about how to proceed with this
hearing?
[J.T.]: Yes.
THE COURT: And you don’t have any issues with testimony
proceeding that way today?
[J.T.]: No.
THE COURT: All right. I will allow the victim to testify with a
record being made by the court reporter and just having [the two
attorneys] in the courtroom. Certainly if there are any concerns about
the testimony or that they are inconsistent with what was previously
provided by way of deposition testimony, I would allow you, [defense
counsel], time to talk with your client and to address those concerns
on cross-examination.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Your Honor.
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As this dialogue shows, J.T. and his counsel both agreed to the State’s
proposal for D.S.’s testimony. And they both confirmed J.T. had received legal
advice on the issue. So we find J.T. waived any rights he had to a different
procedure.3 See Martineau, 601 F.2d at 1199.
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence
J.T. also contends there is insufficient evidence to support his adjudication.
He points to D.S.’s “faulty, and ever-shifting, testimony,” D.S.’s failure to report for
three days, and the lack of any lab results.
Iowa Code section 709.4(1)(a) provides “[a] person commits sexual abuse
in the third degree when the person performs a sex act” that “is done by force or
against the will of the other person.” A sex act is defined to include “[p]enetration
of the penis into the vagina or anus.” Iowa Code § 702.17(1).
D.S. provided specific details of her assault to an examining nurse, to the
police, and in her testimony. She testified J.T. held her down and penetrated both
her vagina and anus with his penis. And that it was painful. And that she found
blood in her underwear afterwards.
Other evidence corroborated D.S.’s account. For example, the examining
nurse indicated—both by testimony and in a report—that D.S. had multiple bruises
on her inner thighs, including a handprint-shaped bruise. And D.S. told the police
3 We note J.T. takes issue with the adequacy of the juvenile court’s colloquy as
well as the court’s failure to make certain findings. He insists a four-part test had
to be satisfied before closing the hearing. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48
(1984); accord State v. Schultzen, 522 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Iowa 1994). However,
that test applies when closures are “over the objections of the accused.” Waller,
467 U.S. at 47. Here, there was no objection.
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where the assault happened. When they investigated, they found dried blood on
the auditorium floor where D.S. had said the assault happened.
We note also the juvenile court expressly rejected suggestions that D.S.’s
testimony was “unbelievable” or made up “in an attempt to cover up a consensual
sexual encounter.” We view these comments as findings that D.S.’s testimony
was credible. And “we leave determinations of credibility for the trier of fact, who
was in a better position to evaluate” witnesses. In re K.H., No. 19-0199, 2020 WL
109585, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020); accord In re A.D.E., No. 09-0687, 2009
WL 4842797, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2009) (noting we give weight to the
juvenile court’s credibility finding due to “the favorable vantage point of that court”).
Based on our de novo review of the record, we defer to the juvenile court’s
assessment of witness credibility and conclude there is sufficient evidence to
support the adjudication.
V. Conclusion
J.T. failed to preserve error concerning the procedures used for D.S’s
testimony. And even if we bypass the preservation issue, J.T. waived any
objections when he expressly agreed to those procedures. Finally, we find there
is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s delinquency adjudication.
AFFIRMED.