In the Interest of D.A., D.A., and D.F., Minor Children ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0566
Filed June 17, 2020
IN THE INTEREST OF D.A., D.A., and D.F.,
Minor Children,
T.F., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Karen Kaufman Salic,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the juvenile court decision terminating her parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Elizabeth M. Wayne of Papenheim Law Office, Parkersburg, for appellant
mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Meredith L. Lamberti, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Cynthia Schuknecht of Noah, Smith, Schuknecht & Sloter, P.L.C., Charles
City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Doyle and Schumacher, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.
A mother appeals the juvenile court decision terminating her parental rights.
We conclude there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to show the
children could not be safely returned to the mother’s care and her parental rights
were properly terminated. We find the services provided to the mother were
reasonable under the facts of the case. We determine termination of the mother’s
parental rights is in the children’s best interests and none of the exceptions to
termination should be applied. We affirm the juvenile court.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
T.F. is the mother of Da.A., born in 2003; De.A., born in 2005; and D.F.,
born in 2008.1 The children were removed from the mother’s care on
December 19, 2018, due to the mother’s substance-abuse issues, mental-health
issues, and general lack of stability. There were also concerns about the mother’s
supervision of the children. After the removal, the mother moved out of Iowa. She
did not have any contact with the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) for
approximately six weeks.
The children were adjudicated to be in need of assistance (CINA), pursuant
to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2018). The mother then moved back to Iowa.
She had a psychological evaluation and was diagnosed with borderline personality
disorder. The psychologist expressed concern that the mother “may not prioritize
the needs of her children before her own needs.”
1 The father of Da.A. and De.A is deceased. The father of D.F. has not appealed
the termination of his parental rights.
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The mother exhibited a pattern of dishonesty with social workers throughout
the case. She stated she was employed but submitted only handwritten invoices
that appeared to be in her handwriting to support her claim. The company she
named as her employer had no knowledge of her. The mother stated she had to
move because there was a fire at her duplex, but social workers discovered she
had been evicted for nonpayment of utilities and rent. At one point the mother paid
the landlord with counterfeit bills. She attempted to use fraudulent checks.
Furthermore, while the mother tested negative for scheduled drug tests, she did
not appear for any random drug tests.
The mother requested additional visitation, and DHS attempted to
accommodate her by adding a second visitation each week on Wednesdays. The
mother did not appear for these additional visits, stating she was working, although
as noted above, there was no evidence she actually had a job. DHS stopped
offering the Wednesday visits because the mother was not attending them.
The children had psychological evaluations. It was recommended that
Da.A. remain in his current placement with a family friend. Da.A. stated he did not
feel he would be successful if returned to his mother’s care. De.A. was diagnosed
with conduct disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Due to his
behavior, he was placed in a group shelter home. He suffers from extreme anger
and needs intense, ongoing therapy. His behaviors are aggravated by his mother,
who is manipulative and dishonest with him. D.F. was diagnosed with depression,
post-traumatic stress disorder, and an anxiety disorder. The psychologist’s report
states D.F. “is in need of a stable, nurturing, and protective environment.” The
children participate in individual therapy.
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On December 18, 2019, the State filed a petition seeking termination of the
mother’s parental rights. The mother filed a motion for reasonable efforts on
January 8, 2020, claiming DHS should do more to reschedule visits missed for any
reason, encourage the children to attend visits, and reinstate the Wednesday
visits.
The termination hearing was held on March 12, by which time the mother
was back living in the duplex. She had two visits each week, and all previous
missed visits had been made up. The mother’s visitation was described by a DHS
social worker as “sporadic and very chaotic throughout the life of the case.” The
mother testified she was attending an intensive outpatient treatment program.
De.A. appeared for the hearing by telephone and stated he wanted to return to his
mother’s care.
The juvenile court entered an order on March 20 terminating the mother’s
parental rights under section 232.116(1)(f) and (l) (2019). The court found
termination of the mother’s rights was in the children’s best interests, stating,
“Mother is not going to now or in the foreseeable future be in a position to
consistently meet their needs. She has shown a preoccupation with her needs
over those of the children and there is no reason to believe that will change.” The
court also found none of the exceptions in section 232.116(3) should be applied.
The court found, “Any sadness the child[ren] may experience because of
termination does not overcome the likely long-term hardship and neglect the
child[ren] will suffer if in the care of [the mother]. The Court simply cannot find that
the parent-child relationship is so strong that it outweighs the need for termination.”
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights.
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II. Standard of Review
Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d
764, 773 (Iowa 2012). The State must prove its allegations for termination by clear
and convincing evidence. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). “‘Clear
and convincing evidence’ means there are no serious or substantial doubts as to
the correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” Id. Our primary
concern is the best interests of the child. In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Iowa
2014).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The mother claims there is not clear and convincing evidence in the record
to support termination of her parental rights. She states the children could be
returned to her care and there is insufficient evidence to show she had a severe
substance-abuse related disorder. “When the juvenile court orders termination of
parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to
terminate on one of the sections to affirm.” In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 435 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2015). We focus on section 232.116(1)(f).
The mother only disputes the fourth element of section 232.116(1)(f), which
requires a showing of “clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the
child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section
232.102.” We consider whether the child can be safely returned to the parent’s
care. See In re I.L., No. 14-0672, 2014 WL 4631555, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 17,
2014). The phrase “at the present time” means at the time of the termination
hearing. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014).
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The children were removed from the mother’s care due to the mother’s
substance-abuse issues, mental-health issues, and general lack of stability, as well
as concerns about the mother’s supervision of the children. Those concerns
remained at the time of the termination hearing. The mother did not successfully
complete a substance-abuse treatment program. She attended therapy for her
mental health for a period of time but quit in December 2019. Furthermore, the
mother continued to exhibit instability in her housing and employment and by
engaging in criminal conduct. We conclude there is clear and convincing evidence
in the record to show the children could not be safely returned to the mother’s care.
We determine her parental rights were properly terminated under section
232.116(1)(f).
IV. Reasonable Efforts
The mother asserts the State did not engage in reasonable efforts to reunite
her with the children. She states that she should have received more visitation
with the children.
While the State had the obligation to make reasonable efforts, it is the
parent’s responsibility, prior to the termination hearing, to demand services that
they are not offered. In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
“The reasonable efforts concept would broadly include a visitation arrangement
designed to facilitate reunification while protecting the child from the harm
responsible for the removal.” In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App.
1996).
The mother requested additional visitation with the children, and DHS
attempted to comply with her request. The mother did not attend the extra
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visitation time offered to her, so DHS discontinued offering the additional time. By
the time of the termination hearing, the mother was having two visits each week.
Her attendance at visitation was described as sporadic and chaotic. We find the
services provided to the mother were reasonable under the facts of the case, as
she did not take full advantage of all of the visitation offered to her. See In re S.J.,
620 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he department must assess the
nature of its reasonable efforts obligation based on the circumstances of each
case.”).
V. Best Interests
The mother contends termination of her parental rights is not in the best
interests of the children. “When we consider whether parental rights should be
terminated, we ‘shall give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the
best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren],
and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].’”
In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)).
“It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State
has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday
a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the
child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010).
The mother has had a negative impact on the children. The juvenile court
noted the children did not always want to attend visits, or when they attended, they
wanted to leave early. The mother engaged them in inappropriate conversations
about the juvenile court proceedings and blamed others for her situation. The court
found the mother committed theft during one visit by leaving a bowling alley without
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paying while accompanied by the children. We agree with the juvenile court’s
conclusion the “[m]other is not going to now or in the foreseeable future be in a
position to consistently meet their needs.” We determine termination of the
mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.
As part of her best-interests argument, the mother claims the juvenile court
should have decided not to terminate her parental rights based on the closeness
of the parent-child relationship and because the children objected to the
termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(b), (c). The provisions in section
232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory. A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113.
Although the mother presented evidence to show the children opposed
termination, the court found they had been pressured by the mother to take this
position. The court also found the evidence did not show termination of the
mother’s rights would be detrimental to them. The court concluded termination
was in the children’s best interests and declined to apply any of the exceptions
found in section 232.116(3). On our careful review of the record, we agree with
the court’s determination.
We affirm the juvenile court’s decision terminating the mother’s parental
rights.
AFFIRMED.