State of Iowa v. Miranda Marie Simpson ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-0666
Filed August 19, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MIRANDA MARIE SIMPSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Annie Reynolds,
Magistrate, and Gregory D. Brandt, District Associate Judge.
Miranda Simpson appeals following her conviction of the simple
misdemeanor crime of third-degree harassment. AFFIRMED.
Joel E. Fenton of Law Offices of Joel E. Fenton, PLC, West Des Moines,
for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mullins and Ahlers, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
The State charged Miranda Simpson with the simple misdemeanor crime of
third-degree harassment. See Iowa Code § 708.7(4) (2017). The State claimed
Simpson made “posts on [F]acebook” that were likely to annoy or harm a massage
therapist and the therapist’s employer. A magistrate found Simpson guilty, a
finding that was affirmed on appeal to the district court.
Simpson filed an application for discretionary review, which the supreme
court granted. The case was transferred to this court for disposition.
Simpson contends (1) the State failed to lay an adequate foundation for the
admission of the Facebook posts and (2) the magistrate’s finding of guilt lacked
sufficient evidentiary support.1
I. Foundation for Admission of Facebook Posts
The foundational issue arose as follows. The owner of an Ankeny massage
salon located a one-star review on the salon’s Facebook page. The owner
identified the author of the review as Simpson. Simpson’s public post stated that
one of the massage therapists could provide a “happy ending” and her “bosses
kn[e]w” or did not “care.” The owner took a screenshot of the post, which together
with four other screenshots of a stream of comments following the initial post, was
identified as Exhibit 1.
The State offered Exhibit 1 through the owner. Simpson objected on the
ground that no foundation was laid “in terms of who took these pictures, where the
1 No issue was raised as to whether the Facebook post satisfied the requirement
that the person “communicates with another . . . in a manner likely to cause the
other person annoyance or harm.” See Iowa Code §708.7(1)(a)(1). We express
no opinion on that issue.
3
pictures are from, [and] if this is the Miranda Simpson who’s sitting in the courtroom
today.” The magistrate admitted the exhibit, reasoning, “[T]he testimony has been
that [the owner] took the screenshot and . . . that’s a fair and accurate depiction of
what she observed on the screen.” In a dispositional order, the magistrate
determined the owner “was a credible witness with a reliable memory and provided
proper foundation for the [e]xhibit.”
On appeal, the district court affirmed the admission of Exhibit 1, reasoning
as follows:
The evidence presented supports that the Facebook account in
question belongs to Ms. Simpson and that she was the individual
who posted the items in question[] here. [The salon owner] testified
that she personally observed the posts on the Facebook account of
Miranda Simpson and that she took screenshots of those posts. The
trial court found the testimony of [the owner] credible. There is no
reason for this Court to put aside those findings. The testimony of
[the owner] is sufficient to establish the proper foundation for
admission of the exhibit.
In this appeal, Simpson insists the owner’s testimony was insufficient to
establish a foundation for admission of Exhibit 1. She argues “[n]o reliable data or
information from Facebook, the custodian of the computer information and
postings being depicted in the screenshot, was provided to further authenticate or
link [her] to the act of posting.” “We review questions of admissibility of evidence
for an abuse of district court discretion, meaning that we accord wide latitude to
the district court on the question of sufficiency of foundation.” State v. Buller, 517
N.W.2d 711, 712 (Iowa 1994) (citation omitted). “Established rules of evidence
however cannot be ignored under the guise of trial court discretion.” Id.
The established rule of evidence relevant to this case states: “To satisfy the
requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent
4
must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.901(a). Evidence that an electronic writing
is what the proponent claims it is requires “evidence sufficient to show that the
purported author of the communication, whether it be an email, a Facebook
posting, or a text message, actually authored or published the content.” Lauri
Kratky Dore, 7 Iowa Practice: Evidence § 5.901:11, “Authentication of
electronically stored evidence: E-mails and social media evidence.”
“Authenticating circumstances can include the context of an e-mail.” Id.
The salon owner identified the first page of Exhibit 1, named the author of
the review, examined the contents of the post on Simpson’s public Facebook page,
identified the therapist partially named in the review, and took the screenshot of
the post. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding her
testimony sufficient to establish that the post was what she claimed it to be. See
State v. Goodwin, No. 18-1822, 2020 WL 1551149, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 1,
2020) (concluding “[t]here was enough circumstantial evidence linking Goodwin to
the texts sent by Edwin to let the jury decide whether it believed he was the
sender”); State v. Akok, No. 17-0655, 2018 WL 4362065, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept.
12, 2018) (finding “a sufficient prima facie case of authenticity made” based in part
on the fact that Facebook messages “were sent from the account of a person
identifying himself to be Akuk Akok”); cf. In re ADW, No. 12-1060, 2012 WL
3200891, at * 6 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2012) (concluding “[t]he State did not offer
any evidence in this case to identify [Facebook] photographs in time or place”).
In reaching that conclusion, we have considered the owner’s inability to
identify the last four pages of the five-page exhibit. In our view, her lack of
5
knowledge went to the weight rather than the admissibility of Exhibit 1. See State
v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 196–97 (Iowa 2002) (“When the district court has
determined that the State has established a sufficient foundation for the admission
of the physical evidence, any speculation to the contrary affects the weight and not
the admissibility of the evidence.”); State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1985) (noting that questions of whether a witness can “without question
identify” an exhibit as belonging to a person “go the weight and credibility of the
evidence as opposed to its admissibility”).
The court could have assigned greater weight to the entirety of Exhibit 1 in
light of an Ankeny police officer’s testimony that he took the screenshots of
Simpson’s public postings appearing on the last four pages of the exhibit.
Additionally, the massage therapist mentioned in the post testified she “looked up
[Simpson’s] name” and “saw [Simpson’s] public comment referencing her.” The
therapist opined that Simpson posted the disparaging review “to try to get [her]
fired or get [her] license revoked.” She based her opinion on public postings of
photographs showing Simpson with the therapist’s ex-boyfriend. We affirm the
admission of Exhibit 1 and the weight assigned to it.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
At trial, the Ankeny police officer who investigated the case testified that he
asked Simpson about the Facebook post and “she claimed that she was sticking
up for her friend.” The magistrate cited this testimony in finding harassment.
Simpson argues “the trial court misunderstood or misrelated statements made by
[the officer] involving a purported confession or partial confession by” her. The
State characterizes the argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
6
supporting the district court’s findings of guilt. We agree. Our review of the
magistrate’s fact findings is for substantial evidence. See State v. Hearn, 797
N.W.2d 577, 579–80 (Iowa 2011).
At trial, the officer acknowledged Simpson did not explicitly state “she was
the one that made the post on Facebook.” At the same time, it is clear he took
Simpson’s statement that she was “sticking up for a friend” as a tacit admission
that she posted the comments. The magistrate similarly inferred Simpson was the
person who made the posting. The inference is supported by substantial evidence.
We affirm the finding of guilt for third-degree harassment.
AFFIRMED.