State of Iowa v. Shawn Michael Elder Jr. , 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 338 ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1822
Filed April 22, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SHAWN MICHAEL ELDER JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, John G. Linn,
Judge.
Shawn Michael Elder Jr. appeals his conviction for manufacture of more
than five grams of methamphetamine. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Curtis Dial of Law Office of Curtis Dial, Keokuk, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Katie Fiala, Assistant Attorney
General, and Michael P. Short, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., Bower, J., and Miller, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
2
MILLER, S.J.
Shawn Michael Elder Jr. appeals his conviction for manufacture of more
than five grams of methamphetamine. He contends the trial court erred in
granting the State’s motion to continue trial beyond one year after arraignment
and denying his related motion to dismiss. We reverse Elder’s conviction and
remand for dismissal of the charge.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Resolution of the issue before us requires a detailed recitation of the
procedural history of this case. Proceedings were initiated when the State
charged Elder with various drug-related crimes on October 16, 2012. Elder filed
a written arraignment on November 5, 2012, and entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial was set for Tuesday, January 8, 2013.
A pretrial conference was held on December 17, 2012. The court entered
an order the same day, confirming the January 8, 2013 trial date and stating
Elder demanded his right to a speedy trial.
On December 18, 2012, the State filed additional minutes of evidence
naming five additional witnesses for trial. The next day Elder waived his right to
a speedy trial and moved for his first continuance, citing his need to depose the
newly-named witnesses and defense counsel’s absence from the country from
December 22, 2012 to January 4, 2013. Trial was continued to Tuesday, March
19, 2013.
3
The State moved to consolidate Elder’s case with that of Tiffany Rae
Mitchell. The motion was heard on January 22, 2013. That same day the court
consolidated the cases.
Elder sought his second continuance at a pretrial conference held on
February 25, 2013. The State did not resist the motion, and trial was
rescheduled for Tuesday, April 23, 2013.
Trial was not reached as scheduled on April 23 because a “higher priority”
case was scheduled for trial the same day. On May 9, 2013, the court entered
an order setting trial for Friday, June 14, 2013. On June 7, 2013, the court,
which had been notified by the State of a purported error in the trial date in the
May 9 order, changed the trial date to Tuesday, June 11, 2013.
On June 10, 2013, Elder filed a third request for continuance. His motion
noted the apparent error in the trial date set in the May 9 order, stated no
subpoenas had been issued, and informed the court that defense counsel was
scheduled to be in other hearings on June 12, 13, and 14, 2013, “all of which
were scheduled before May 9, 2013.”1 Trial was continued to Tuesday, July 23,
2013.
Elder filed a fourth request for continuance on June 24, 2013, stating his
attorney would be out of the country on the scheduled July trial date. He also
noted that his June 11, 2013 motion to reopen the record and reconsider the
court’s December 13, 2012 ruling on his motion to suppress had not yet been
1
No explanation appears in the record as to why, if before May 9 defense counsel had a
hearing or hearings in another case or cases scheduled for June 14, the conflict with the
June 14 trial date in this case was not raised before the June 10 motion.
4
ruled upon. Although the State filed an objection to the motion to continue, it
thereafter withdrew its objection and the court continued the trial to Tuesday,
August 20, 2013.
Following a pretrial conference held on August 5, 2013, the court
confirmed the August 20, 2013 trial date. On August 12, 2013, the court denied
Elder’s renewed motion to suppress.
On August 16, 2013, Elder filed his fifth motion to continue, noting that his
attorney was scheduled to be in trial on a different matter from August 20 to
August 30, 2013. Trial was then continued again, until Tuesday, September 24,
2013.
A pretrial hearing was held on September 16, 2013, at which time the
court expressed its concern about counsel concurrently representing Elder and
his co-defendant, Mitchell. The court continued trial to Tuesday, October 22,
2013, to allow for an October 14, 2013 hearing on the potential conflict of interest
in joint representation. The court provided that if trial was not reached on
October 22, the trial would be held on November 13, 2013.
On October 8, 2013, the State moved to continue trial beyond one year,
asserting this case had been scheduled for trial on seven occasions, noting Elder
had requested and received five continuances, and stating that two times the
case had not been reached for trial “because a case of higher priority was
scheduled for trial.”2 The court granted the motion on October 9, 2013. In doing
2
The State’s motion asserted that another case had been scheduled for trial on
September 24, 2013, but it had “scheduled that morning of trial” after the State had
5
so the court stated its belief that it need not determine “who or where to attribute
the delay to in this case” but instead needed to determine “why is it we’re in the
position we are now.” It found “the State has demonstrated good cause to
extend this case beyond the one-year limitation set forth in Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.23(2)(c).” In doing so it relied on “the case history”; “the pressing
demands presented the County Attorney”; “the docket that this county uniquely
presents”; “the pressing demands of defense counsel, based on some of the
scheduling conflicts because of other cases defense counsel was required to
attend to”; and “the pretrial preparation, the motions filed by the defendant.”
On October 9, 2013, Elder moved to sever his trial from Mitchell’s. The
court granted that motion on October 21, 2013. No trial was held on October 22,
2013, as scheduled, apparently because of a conflict with another trial scheduled
for that same day.
On November 12, 2013, Elder moved to dismiss for violation of the one-
year speedy-trial rule. The court denied the motion on November 13, 2013,
noting that it had granted an extension of the one-year deadline in its October 9
order and stating its continued belief that “good cause” existed to continue trial
beyond the one-year deadline. The court added to its earlier ruling a conclusion
that the number of continuances that had been sought by the defense resulted in
“any delay beyond one year [being] attributable to the defendant.”
On November 13, 2013, Elder waived his right to a jury trial and a bench
trial was held. The court found Elder guilty of manufacture of more than five
“called off its witnesses” in this case. We presume the State intended to say that the
other case had “settled that morning of trial.”
6
grams of methamphetamine. On that same date the court sentenced Elder to a
term of imprisonment and to pay a fine. Elder appeals.
II. The Issue(s) on Appeal.
Elder asserts:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO
CONTINUE BEYOND ONE YEAR AND IN FAILING TO GRANT
THE MOTION TO DISMISS.
Elder argues that although he did request continuances, including continuances
of the July and August 2013 trial dates, the trial could have been held in
September or October. He argues that the State has not met its burden to prove
an exception to the one-year speedy trial requirement.
The State asserts:
The District Court Properly Found Good Cause Existed To Extend
Defendant’s Trial Beyond The One-Year Deadline.[3]
III. Scope and Standards of Review.
Our scope of review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P.
6.907; State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001); State v. Finn, 469
N.W.2d 692, 693 (Iowa 1991). We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard. State
v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Iowa 2005); State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598,
601 (Iowa 1999). When speedy-trial rights are at issue, the district court’s
discretion narrows. Winters, 690 N.W.2d at 907. “The trial court’s discretion to
avoid dismissal under [Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33] is circumscribed by
3
The State does not appear to resist Elder’s argument that the district court erred in
concluding that any delay beyond one year was attributable to Elder. Although we
therefore arguably need not address that question, in the event we have misread the
State’s brief we choose to address it. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude
the record does not support the court’s conclusion on this point.
7
the limited exceptions to the rule’s mandate. So, the question ultimately is
whether the trial court properly exercised—or abused—its limited discretion
under the rule.” Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 204 (citations omitted).
IV. Merits.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(c) provides: “All criminal cases
must be brought to trial within one year after the defendant’s initial arraignment
pursuant to rule 2.8 unless an extension is granted by the court, upon a showing
of good cause.” This rule establishes an “outer limit” for trial, comparable to a
statute of limitations. State v. Mary, 401 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986).
“In determining whether there is good cause for a delay, we focus only on one
factor, the reason for the delay. The attending circumstances bear on that
inquiry only to the extent they relate to the sufficiency of the reason itself.” State
v. Campbell, 714 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Iowa 2006) (citations omitted).
Delay attributable to the defendant may constitute good cause preventing
the State from carrying out its obligation to bring the defendant to trial in a timely
manner. State v. Keys, 535 N.W.2d 783, 787 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). A defendant
“may not actively, or passively, participate in the events [that] delay his trial and
then later take advantage of that delay to terminate the prosecution.” Finn, 469
N.W.2d at 694. A defendant who actively participates in events which delay his
retrial cannot take advantage of the delay to terminate prosecution. State v.
Zaehringer, 306 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Iowa 1981)
Although waiver is not expressly mentioned in rule 2.33(2)(c), because the
right to a speedy trial is personal to a defendant a defendant may waive the right
8
to trial within one year. State v. Rodriguez, 511 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Iowa 1994);
State v. Magnuson, 308 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa 1981).
Exceptions to the one-year deadline thus include (1) waiver by the
defendant, (2) delay attributable to the defendant, and (3) other “good cause” for
the delay. Cf. Winters, 690 N.W.2d at 908 (holding that such exceptions exist for
the ninety-day deadline of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b)). The
burden of showing an exception to a speedy-trial deadline “rests squarely on the
State.” Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 204 (stating such is the burden in a rule 2.33(2)(b)
ninety-day speedy-trial case). The State’s burden is a heavy one. Mary, 401
N.W.2d at 241.
Elder was not tried until eight days beyond the one year after his
arraignment. He did not waive his right to be tried within one year. The district
court was therefore required to dismiss the charge against Elder unless the State
proved (1) the delay of trial beyond one year was attributable to Elder, or (2)
other good cause existed for the delay beyond one year. See Miller, 637 N.W.2d
at 204.
“Delay attributable to the defendant may include whatever passage of time
is reasonably necessary to act upon the defendant’s motion.” State v. Hart, 703
N.W.2d 768, 772 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Elder did file a motion on June 11, 2013. That motion was disposed of on August
12, 2013, almost three months before the end of the one-year trial deadline and
cannot constitute delay beyond one year attributable to Elder or to other good
cause.
9
In January 2013 the State, not Elder, sought and secured consolidation of
Elder’s case with that of Mitchell. On September 16, 2013, the court expressed
its concern about a possible conflict of interest if defense counsel represented
both. On October 9, 2013, Elder filed a motion to sever trials. No resistance by
the State appears in the record. The motion was not submitted and granted until
October 21, 2013, apparently as an uncontested, routine matter.4 This
uncontested motion, filed four weeks before the one-year deadline, and the
court’s ruling on the motion, filed two weeks before the deadline, do not
constitute delay beyond one year that is attributable to Elder or to other good
cause. See, e.g., Nelson, 600 N.W.2d at 601 (stating that although a defendant
“must accept the time reasonably necessary for careful deliberation and ruling on
dispositive motions,” this “is not to say a defendant who files a timely motion
thereby forfeits the right to be tried without lengthy and unexplained delay”); see
also Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 206 (reversing conviction and remanding for dismissal
where the trial court’s ruling on a motion “came down with a week to spare”
before expiration of a ninety-day speedy-trial deadline).
Additional grounds cited by the trial court as “good cause” in sustaining
the State’s motion to continue trial beyond one year are equally unconvincing. 5
These reasons included the pressing demands of the county attorney and
4
Nothing in the record, other than perhaps the fact the State had already sought and
secured an order continuing trial beyond one year, indicates why in the absence of any
resistance by the State the motion could not have been sustained as a consent matter at
a substantially earlier date than October 21.
5
That motion and the ruling sustaining it came four weeks before the expiration of the
one-year period. In its ruling the court relied entirely upon matters it cited as constituting
“good cause” and made no mention of delay attributable to Elder other than “motions
filed by the defendant,” a ground which we have rejected.
10
defense counsel and the scheduling conflicts of defense counsel. However,
nothing in the record shows that either the prosecuting attorney or defense
counsel was unavailable for trial after September 24, 2013 (or, for that matter,
after defense counsel’s late-August trial) and before the one year expired.
The district court also cited “the case history” and “the docket that this
county uniquely presents.” However, at the time of the court’s ruling on the
motion to continue beyond one year, nothing in the “case history” prevented trial
in the four weeks remaining before the one-year deadline. “Prior cases teach
that the general press of court business is insufficient to avoid dismissal under a
speedy-trial rule, even for a busy judge sitting in a high-volume court.” Miller,
637 N.W.2d at 205 (citing and quoting Nelson, 600 N.W.2d at 602). “When the
State contends ‘court congestion’ is the reason for delay, the trial court must
distinguish between chronic court congestion and specific circumstances arising
out of unique, non-recurring events which create a particular scheduling
problem.” State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983). The record
contains no evidence of such unique, non-recurring events, and strongly
suggests nothing more than chronic court congestion. Nor does the record
contain any explanation of why other matters should have taken precedence over
Elder’s case in the week of October 28, 2013, still within one year of Elder’s
arraignment. See State v. Leonard, 240 N.W.2d 690, 692-93 (Iowa 1976)
(noting, in reversing a conviction and remanding for dismissal on speedy-trial
grounds the absence of an explanation as to why other matters took precedence
11
over Leonard’s trial). Under the record presented, the county’s docket cannot
justify the denial of Elder’s right to a timely trial.
As noted above, in its November 13, 2013 ruling denying Elder’s motion to
dismiss, the court added to its earlier ruling a conclusion that the number of
continuances sought by the defense resulted in delay beyond one year being
attributable to Elder. However, the last continuance sought by Elder continued
trial to September 24, 2013, with six weeks remaining available thereafter in
which to bring the case to trial. Further, in considering whether a delay beyond a
speedy-trial deadline warrants dismissal of the prosecution, it is not appropriate
to identify the amounts of time related to events that are believed to have
impeded progress of the case, attribute those events to the defendant, and then
extend the deadline by a like number of days. Campbell, 714 N.W.2d at 628.
Instead,
[t]he decisive inquiry in these matters should be whether events
that impeded the progress of the case and were attributable to the
defendant . . . serve as a matter of practical necessity to move the
trial date beyond the initial . . . period required by the rule.
Id. The record discloses no events attributable to Elder that “serve as a matter of
practical necessity” to move the trial date in this case beyond the one-year
deadline.
Two final points deserve brief mention. First, the pattern of continuances
in this case—always for four, five, or six weeks, and always into a subsequent
month—strongly suggests a “regular” trial schedule for cases such as this, a
schedule which was adhered to even at the cost of Elder’s right to a trial within
12
one year.6 Such scheduling has been rejected as a reason for denying a right to
speedy trial. See generally Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 204-06.
Second, “[w]e have emphasized the obligation of the district court to give
priority to the use of judicial resources in disposing of criminal cases because of
the speedy trial requirement of [the statutory predecessor of our present criminal
procedure speedy trial rules].” Iowa Civil Liberties Union v. Critelli, 244 N.W.2d
564, 570 (Iowa 1976). When a speedy-trial deadline approaches, extra ordinary
measures may be required. Criminal cases must be disposed of promptly
throughout a district, “even at the cost of deferring civil cases throughout the
district if necessary.” State v. Wright, 234 N.W.2d 99, 104 (Iowa 1975). Further,
in the case of docket congestion or unusual workloads an additional judge or
judges may be assigned in order to accommodate speedy-trial cases. See, e.g.,
Leonard, 240 N.W.2d at 693 (recognizing, in reversing a conviction and
remanding for dismissal on speedy trial grounds, that the chief judge has the
authority to assign judges of the district to accommodate unusual workloads, and
noting the lack of a showing that the chief judge was requested to do so). Here,
as in Leonard, the record contains no indication of any such action.
V. Conclusion and Disposition.
Elder did not waive his right to be tried within one year of his arraignment.
The history in this case reveals that after numerous delays were sought and
secured by Elder’s requests for continuance, delays after October 9, 2013, were
6
The district court’s pretrial ruling of September 16, 2013, provided that if trial was not
reached on October 22 (within the one year and with two weeks remaining before
expiration of the one-year deadline), trial would be held November 13, 2013 (eight days
after expiration of the one year since arraignment).
13
attributable to the court and the State. The State has not met its “heavy burden”
to show that delay attributable to Elder or other “good cause” required continuing
trial beyond one year. We conclude the district court abused its discretion in
ordering trial continued beyond one year from Elder’s arraignment and
subsequently denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to trial within
one year. We therefore reverse Elder’s conviction and remand to the district
court for dismissal of the trial information.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.