State of Iowa v. Jerod Kurt Miller ( 2020 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 18-1839
    Filed March 18, 2020
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    JEROD KURT MILLER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wright County, DeDra L. Schroeder
    (mistrial and dismissal motions) and James M. Drew (trial), Judges.
    Defendant appeals his convictions for willful injury causing serious injury
    and domestic abuse assault (strangulation) causing bodily injury. AFFIRMED.
    Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ashley Stewart, Assistant
    Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    Heard by Tabor, P.J., and Mullins and Schumacher, JJ.
    2
    SCHUMACHER, Judge.
    Jerod Miller appeals his convictions for willful injury causing serious injury
    and domestic abuse assault (strangulation) causing bodily injury. We conclude
    the retrial of Miller did not violate his right against double jeopardy because he
    requested a mistrial in his first trial. We determine Miller has not shown he received
    ineffective assistance on the ground defense counsel did not object to a video.
    Finally, we find Miller was not denied his right to a speedy trial. We affirm Miller’s
    convictions.
    I.      Background Facts & Proceedings
    Miller and his girlfriend, H.S., resided together in 2018.        Beginning on
    February 23, 2018, and continuing into February 24, Miller assaulted H.S. several
    times. At one point, Miller bent H.S. backward over the kitchen sink and pressed
    his thumbs into her eye sockets, causing H.S. to lose consciousness. H.S.’s
    mother took H.S. to the hospital, where H.S. received treatment for her injuries,
    including swelling of the brain and an annular tear to her lower lumbar region. She
    had bruising all over her body, including her face. H.S. also had injuries along her
    neck indicative of strangulation. Dr. Subhash Sahai testified the injuries to H.S.
    created a substantial risk of death.
    Miller was charged with willful injury causing serious injury, in violation of
    Iowa Code section 708.4(1) (2018), and domestic abuse assault (strangulation)
    causing bodily injury, in violation of section 708.2A(5). Miller gave notice of the
    defenses of diminished responsibility, self-defense, and excited/agitated delirium.
    Miller was prescribed Depakote for anxiety, which was to be taken twice a
    day. The Wright County jail had difficulty refilling Miller’s prescription. Lynn Morris,
    3
    the assistant jail administrator, emailed Integrated Telehealth Partners (ITP), the
    jail’s medical provider, seeking a refill before Miller ran out of his medication. At
    4:45 p.m. on July 9, Janet Raines of ITP tried to fax the prescription to the
    pharmacy, but the fax did not go through.
    Miller’s jury trial began on July 10.      Miller had his morning dose of
    medication that day, but the jail did not have sufficient medication on hand for his
    evening dose. At 4:02 p.m., Raines informed the jail she successfully faxed the
    prescription to the pharmacy and also called it in to the pharmacy. The jail staff
    was busy with other issues, including booking in a new inmate, and did not see the
    fax from Raines until 5:30 p.m., when the pharmacy was closed. The jail staff
    talked to medical professionals and received information that Miller should be fine
    although he missed his evening dose of Depakote.
    On the second day of the trial, July 11, defense counsel informed the court
    Miller had not received his medication the night before.         Miller received his
    medication at 9:37 a.m. on July 11, so he missed one dose. Defense counsel
    stated he was not alleging bad faith by the jail but there was concern because
    Miller had not taken a medication usually prescribed for thought and mood
    disorders. The court sent the jury home, stating the trial would resume the next
    day.
    On July 12, the third day of the trial, the State presented a letter by Dr.
    Kovilparambil Anthony to the court, which stated, “If someone who is stable on
    Depakote misses just one dose, it can potentially reduce the therapeutic level but
    whether it will have any significant effect depends on the person. Most likely it will
    4
    not cause any major clinical issues as long as the person resumed Depakote
    immediately.”
    On the same day, defense counsel stated Miller was not able to proceed
    with the trial because he was unable to think clearly and focus. Counsel stated he
    did not know “whether it’s going to be three days or two weeks before Mr. Miller is
    prepared to proceed.”      Defense counsel requested a mistrial with prejudice,
    stating, “I think we’ve shown a lot of our defense already. And I believe that Mr.
    Miller would be prejudiced by having to retry this case again.” The State did not
    resist the motion for a mistrial but asked that it be without prejudice so Miller could
    be retried. The district court granted a mistrial without prejudice.
    On July 24, Miller filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the actions of the jail
    staff should be considered State action. Miller asserted a second trial would violate
    his right against double jeopardy. He also stated a second trial would violate his
    right to a speedy trial, as his original speedy trial deadline had passed.
    The district court ruled as follows:
    The Court finds that the jail made reasonable efforts to maintain a
    prescription for the Defendant and that it was not intentional that
    there was a brief lapse between use of one prescription and the
    renewal of the next.
    The Court does not make a finding of any prosecutorial
    misconduct on the part of the Wright County Jail that could be
    imputed on the State of Iowa or rises to the level that necessitates
    dismissal of this matter.
    Double jeopardy does not apply in this case. The State had
    completed a portion of the State’s case in chief when this matter
    came to the attention of the Court. The Motion for Mistrial was
    granted at the request of counsel.
    The court denied Miller’s motion to dismiss.
    5
    A new criminal trial commenced on August 7. The jury found Miller guilty of
    willful injury causing serious injury and domestic abuse assault (strangulation)
    causing bodily injury. Miller filed post-trial motions, which again raised the issue
    of the mistrial in the earlier trial. The court declined to revisit that issue. Miller was
    sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years on the willful injury
    charge and five years on the domestic abuse assault charge, to be served
    consecutively. Miller appeals.
    II.    Double Jeopardy
    Miller claims he was subjected to double jeopardy when he was tried a
    second time after the declaration of a mistrial in his first trial. He states that under
    the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, he is protected from
    repeated prosecution for the same offense.
    “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution ‘is
    applicable to state criminal trials through the Fourteenth Amendment due process
    provision.’” State v. Kramer, 
    760 N.W.2d 190
    , 194 (Iowa 2009) (citation omitted).
    Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the State cannot make multiple attempts to
    convict a defendant for the same offense. 
    Id. On constitutional
    claims, such as
    those of double jeopardy, our review is de novo. 
    Id. “The protections
    of the Double Jeopardy Clause are implicated only when
    the accused is actually placed in jeopardy.” 
    Id. “This state
    of jeopardy attaches
    when a jury is empaneled and sworn, or, in a bench trial, when the judge begins
    to receive evidence.” 
    Id. Miller was
    placed in jeopardy when the jury was sworn
    in at his first trial. See State v. Lasley, 
    705 N.W.2d 481
    , 493 (Iowa 2005) (“In a
    trial by jury, jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn.”).
    6
    “The general rule [is] that the guarantee against double jeopardy does not
    bar retrial of a defendant when the prior trial was terminated or reversed on the
    behest of the defendant.” State v. Chase, 
    335 N.W.2d 630
    , 633 (Iowa 1983); see
    also State v. Swartz, 
    541 N.W.2d 533
    , 537 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he Double
    Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial of a defendant after a mistrial declared at the
    defendant’s request.”). “Where the defendant, by requesting a mistrial, exercised
    his choice in favor of terminating the trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause generally
    would not stand in the way of reprosecution.” State v. Hurd, 
    496 N.W.2d 274
    , 276–
    77 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).
    An exception to the general rule arises if there is prosecutorial misconduct
    “intended to goad” a motion for mistrial by the defendant. 
    Swartz, 541 N.W.2d at 537
    . A defendant who has made a motion for a mistrial may successfully invoke
    double jeopardy only where “the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a
    mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” 
    Hurd, 496 N.W.2d at 277
    (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 
    456 U.S. 667
    , 679 (1982)).
    In addition to consent, double jeopardy does not bar the retrial of a
    defendant if a mistrial was granted based on “manifest necessity to terminate the
    first trial.” State v. Harrison, 
    578 N.W.2d 234
    , 238 (Iowa 1998). The term “manifest
    necessity[ ] does not mean absolute necessity,” but it does require a “high degree”
    of necessity. 
    Id. “Under the
    doctrine of manifest necessity, a court has a duty to
    declare a mistrial when the ends of public justice demand it.” 
    Id. The State
    has
    the burden to establish manifest necessity. 
    Id. Although Miller
    requested a mistrial, he states that because he asked for a
    mistrial with prejudice and the court granted a mistrial without prejudice, he did not
    7
    consent to the declaration of a mistrial. Miller contends a retrial in this situation is
    prohibited unless the mistrial was based on manifest necessity, and the State did
    not establish manifest necessity for the mistrial. Miller asserts the retrial violated
    his right against double jeopardy.
    The record shows defense counsel raised the issue of a mistrial and asked
    for a mistrial with prejudice. In the alternative, defense counsel requested that if a
    mistrial with prejudice was not granted, “we just continue this with the same jury
    panel.” Defense counsel noted the logistical problems with the second alternative,
    as it was unknown when Miller might be prepared to proceed with the trial. The
    State did not resist the request but asked that if a mistrial was granted, it would be
    a mistrial with prejudice. Defense counsel then requested that if a mistrial was
    granted, Miller would have the opportunity to address the issues of prejudice or
    dismissal of the case later.
    Miller raised an alternative argument, asking for a continuance, but noted
    the logistical problems with this scenario, as he did not know how long it would be
    before he could continue with the trial. Miller asserted he was unable to continue
    with the trial on July 12. Additionally, after the district court stated it was inclined
    to grant the motion for mistrial without prejudice, Miller could have withdrawn his
    motion for mistrial but did not do so. See 
    Hurd, 496 N.W.2d at 277
    .
    In ruling on Miller’s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, the
    district court stated, “The Motion for Mistrial was granted at the request of counsel.”
    Although Miller did not receive exactly the type of mistrial he requested, we find
    the first trial “was terminated or reversed on the behest of the defendant.” See
    
    Chase, 335 N.W.2d at 633
    .
    8
    In this appeal, Miller does not claim he requested a mistrial due to
    provocation by the prosecution. On this basis, we determine the case does not
    come within the exception to the general rule that arises if there is prosecutorial
    misconduct “intended to goad” a motion for mistrial by the defendant. See 
    Swartz, 541 N.W.2d at 537
    .
    We have already determined Miller requested the declaration of a mistrial.
    Therefore, we are not required to consider his arguments concerning whether the
    mistrial was based on manifest necessity.1 See 
    Harrison, 578 N.W.2d at 238
    (finding manifest necessity should be considered when a defendant has not
    consented to a mistrial).
    As noted, “[w]here the defendant, by requesting a mistrial, exercised his
    choice in favor of terminating the trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause generally would
    not stand in the way of reprosecution.” 
    Hurd, 496 N.W.2d at 276
    –77. We conclude
    the retrial of Miller did not violate his right against double jeopardy because he
    consented to the declaration of a mistrial in this first trial. See 
    Chase, 335 N.W.2d at 633
    .
    III.   Ineffective Assistance
    Miller claims he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel
    did not object to the State’s presentation of a video evidencing Miller arguing with
    1Even   if we were to consider the doctrine of manifest necessity, we would find the
    declaration of a mistrial was demanded by the ends of public justice. See 
    Harrison, 578 N.W.2d at 238
    . Defense counsel stated, “[Miller’s] in no position to proceed
    today,” and the State did not disagree. Defense counsel also noted the difficulty
    with continuing the case, stating it could be “three days or two weeks before Mr.
    Miller is prepared to proceed.”
    9
    H.S. about a week prior to the incidents giving rise to the criminal charges.2 Miller
    asserts the video was inadmissible under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b), as
    evidence of prior bad acts. He states the evidence was unduly prejudicial because
    it reflected adversely on his character.
    We conduct a de novo review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
    State v. Maxwell, 
    743 N.W.2d 185
    , 195 (Iowa 2008). To establish a claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove: (1) counsel failed to
    perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied the
    defendant a fair trial. 
    Id. A defendant’s
    failure to prove either element by a
    preponderance of the evidence is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance. See
    State v. Polly, 
    657 N.W.2d 462
    , 465 (Iowa 2003).
    Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b)(1) provides, “Evidence of a crime, wrong,
    or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that
    on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” The
    evidence may be admissible, however, to show “motive, opportunity, intent,
    preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”
    Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b)(2).
    In determining whether evidence is admissible under rule 5.404(b), we
    consider the following three-step analysis:
    (1) “the evidence must be relevant and material to a legitimate issue
    in the case other than a general propensity to commit wrongful acts”;
    2  The State contends that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may no
    longer be considered in a direct appeal, based on amended section 814.7 (2020).
    The Iowa Supreme Court has determined this statutory provision became effective
    on July 1, 2019, and does not apply retroactively. State v. Macke, 
    933 N.W.2d 226
    , 231 (Iowa 2019). The recent changes to section 814.7 do not apply in this
    appeal. Supreme Court precedent binds us.
    10
    (2) “there must be clear proof the individual against whom the
    evidence is offered committed the bad act or crime”; and (3) if the
    first two prongs are satisfied, “the court must then decide if [the
    evidence’s] probative value is substantially outweighed by the
    danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.”
    State v. Richards, 
    879 N.W.2d 140
    , 145 (Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Sullivan,
    
    679 N.W.2d 19
    , 25 (Iowa 2004)).
    The video was relevant to the issues of motive and intent because it showed
    Miller was angry with H.S. Miller was in a custody dispute with his ex-wife and she
    wanted to use evidence of his relationship with H.S. against him, which caused
    Miller to get angry with H.S. Miller claimed he was acting in self-defense and H.S.
    was the aggressor. The video was relevant to show Miller attacked H.S. because
    he was angry with her, not because he was acting in self-defense. Miller did not
    dispute he was in the video.3
    We find the first two elements were met and turn to the issue of whether the
    probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
    See 
    id. “Unfair prejudice
    arises when the evidence ‘appeals to the jury’s
    sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or . . . may
    cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established
    propositions in the case.’” State v. Wilson, 
    878 N.W.2d 203
    , 216 (Iowa 2016)
    (citation omitted). One factor we may consider in determining whether evidence is
    unfairly prejudicial is to compare the “enormity of the charged and uncharged
    crimes.” State v. Larsen, 
    512 N.W.2d 803
    , 808 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). In the video,
    Miller yelled and swore at H.S., which we find was not unduly prejudicial in
    3This exhibit is referred to as a video throughout the record. The exhibit contains
    only audio of the defendant’s voice.
    11
    comparison to the crime alleged in this case. The State presented evidence to
    show H.S. was severely beaten and had potentially life-threatening injuries.
    We find no breach in failing to object to the admission of video.            The
    probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair
    prejudice. See State v. Duncan, 
    710 N.W.2d 34
    , 40 (Iowa 2006). Defense counsel
    does not breach an essential duty by failing to file a meritless motion. See State
    v. Ross, 
    845 N.W.2d 692
    , 701 (Iowa 2014).
    Furthermore, even if defense counsel had breached an essential duty, the
    evidence does not show Miller was prejudiced by counsel’s performance.
    “[P]rejudice exists when ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
    unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”
    Ledezma v. State, 
    626 N.W.2d 134
    , 145 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). Miller beat
    H.S. several times, causing her injuries severe enough to create a substantial risk
    of death. It is not reasonably probable that the exclusion of the video would have
    led to a different result in the criminal trial. We find Miller has not shown he
    received ineffective assistance of counsel.
    IV.    Pro Se Brief
    On May 17, 2019, Miller filed a pro se supplemental brief. The State filed a
    motion to strike the pro se brief, claiming it did not comply with the rules of appellate
    procedure and could not be considered under a recent amendment to section
    814.6A(1). The Iowa Supreme Court determined the motion to strike should be
    submitted with the appeal.
    Section 814.6A(1) was amended effective July 1, 2019. See Iowa Code
    § 3.7(1); State v. Draine, 
    936 N.W.2d 205
    , 206 (Iowa 2019). We have determined
    12
    a defendant’s pro se brief that is filed before the effective date of the legislation
    may be considered. See State v. Smith, No. 18-2052, 
    2020 WL 376554
    , at *4 n.1
    (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2020); State v. Syperda, No. 18-1471, 
    2019 WL 6893791
    ,
    at *12 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2019). Miller’s pro se brief was filed before July 1,
    2019, and therefore consideration of the brief is not barred by section 814.6A(1).
    Although Miller’s pro se supplemental brief does not follow all of the rules
    of appellate procedure for briefing found in Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure
    6.901, we will consider the merits of the issues he raises. See In re Estate of
    DeTar, 
    572 N.W.2d 178
    , 181 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (noting that “as a matter of
    grace” we may consider a pro se brief that does not fully comply with the appellate
    rules if “we can do so without assuming a partisan rule and undertaking [a party’s]
    research and advocacy”).
    Miller claims his right to a speedy trial was violated.4 His claim, however, is
    based on the assertion the district court improperly granted a mistrial in this case.
    He contends the court erred by granting a mistrial and because of this his speedy
    trial rights continued to run. He states the speedy trial deadline expired before the
    retrial.
    We have already determined the district court properly granted a mistrial in
    his case. The speedy trial deadline resets at the time a mistrial is declared, giving
    the State ninety days to try a defendant after the mistrial declaration. State v.
    Zaehringer, 
    306 N.W.2d 792
    , 794–95 (Iowa 1981); see also State v. Fisher, 351
    4 Miller also claims the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. We
    have considered the mistrial and double jeopardy issues and do not discuss them
    further.
    
    13 N.W.2d 798
    , 802 (Iowa 1984) (noting the ninety-day period for trying a case would
    begin with an order for mistrial). The court declared a mistrial on July 12 and the
    second trial began on August 7, well within the ninety-day period. We find Miller
    was not denied his right to a speedy trial.
    We affirm Miller’s convictions for willful injury causing serious injury and
    domestic abuse assault (strangulation) causing bodily injury.
    AFFIRMED.