Christopher Roby v. State of Iowa ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 20-0312
    Filed January 21, 2021
    CHRISTOPHER ROBY,
    Applicant-Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Linda M.
    Fangman, Judge.
    Christopher Roby appeals the denial of his application for postconviction
    relief. AFFIRMED.
    Steven E. Goodlow of Goodlow Law Firm, Albia, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee State.
    Considered by Mullins, P.J., and May and Schumacher, JJ.
    2
    MULLINS, Presiding Judge.
    In December 2014, Christopher Roby entered Alford1 pleas to numerous
    charges in two criminal cases stemming from separate events—conspiracy to
    commit intimidation with a dangerous weapon and felon in possession of a firearm
    in one case, and two counts of first-degree burglary and one count of domestic
    abuse assault by strangulation causing bodily injury in the other. The minutes of
    evidence and attachments in the second case disclosed Roby went to the
    residence of a woman and a child he shares with the woman, “broke into her
    apartment, and strangled and bit her.” The female showed police officers “where
    Roby had pried open the screen to the front window, breaking it,” and “Roby came
    through the front window [and] pushed/threw her down and strangled her by
    straddling her and placing both hands around her neck.” The female grabbed the
    child and made it to her vehicle outside. She was followed shortly by Roby, who
    opened the vehicle door and punched and bit her. At the time of the foregoing,
    there was a valid no-contact order in place between Roby and the child, which
    prohibited Roby’s physical presence in the home. The female exhibited injuries
    consistent with her report of Roby’s acts to law enforcement.
    In December 2015, Roby filed an application for postconviction relief, in
    which he referenced and attached a “[d]ocument from the victim explaining the
    crime wasn’t committed.” The document, dated November 18, 2014, prior to
    1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
    , 37 (1970) (“An individual accused of
    a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition
    of a prison sentence even if he [or she] is unwilling or unable to admit his [or her]
    participation in the acts constituting the crime.”).
    3
    Roby’s entry of his pleas and previously received by the prosecutor and defense
    counsel, provided:
    I just wanted to inform you that I do not want to appear at any court
    arrangements. [Roby] did have a key that he came through the
    apartment with. We had an argument that turned into a physical fight
    inside and outside the apartment as well as in the car . . . . We
    argued back and forth for a long time until my neighbors called the
    police. I never wanted the police over to my place or to have any
    charges against [Roby].
    In his amended application, Roby claimed, among other things, his attorney in the
    criminal proceeding was ineffective in failing to properly investigate the case and
    depose the victim.
    At the postconviction-relief trial, Roby’s criminal counsel testified to his
    recollection of the letter from the victim and Roby’s knowledge of the same prior to
    entering his plea. He testified the letter, noting Roby had a key to the residence,
    was inconsequential due to the existence of a no-contact order prohibiting his
    presence in the residence at the time. Counsel confirmed his recollection of
    speaking with Roby about the letter and elements and circumstances of the crimes,
    but Roby “made the decision that he wanted to cooperate” with the State, “and he
    wanted to plead guilty and take the agreement.” Counsel added, based on trial
    strategy, he would not have deposed the victim because the letter was different
    from the victim’s initial report to law enforcement and “that would have raised
    issues with her credibility. And . . . it kind of flew in the face of some of the physical
    evidence.” In his testimony, Roby acknowledged he knew a no-contact order was
    in place and he had no right, license, or privilege to be at the victim’s residence.
    Following trial, the court denied Roby’s application for postconviction relief.
    Roby appeals. Appellate review of postconviction-relief proceedings is typically
    4
    for correction of errors at law, but where claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
    are forwarded, our review is de novo. See Diaz v. State, 
    896 N.W.2d 723
    , 727
    (Iowa 2017). Because Roby’s claim concerns the effectiveness of trial counsel, he
    must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) his counsel failed to
    perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington,
    
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984); State v. Lopez, 
    907 N.W.2d 112
    , 116 (Iowa 2018). We
    “may consider either the prejudice prong or breach of duty first, and failure to find
    either one will preclude relief.” State v. McNeal, 
    897 N.W.2d 697
    , 703 (Iowa 2017)
    (quoting State v. Lopez, 
    872 N.W.2d 159
    , 169 (Iowa 2015)).
    Roby claims his counsel was ineffective in allowing him to plead guilty
    following the victim’s purported recantation of her allegations. He highlights the
    victim’s statement that he had a key to the apartment, which he believes raises
    questions about “whether a factual basis could be made . . . regarding his right,
    license or privilege” to be present, and counsel was under a duty to investigate
    further and depose the victim.      Upon our de novo review, we are unable to
    conclude counsel failed to perform an essential duty or Roby suffered prejudice.
    As to counsel’s performance of duties, “we will not reverse where counsel has
    made a reasonable decision concerning trial tactics and strategy.”           State v.
    Ondayog, 
    722 N.W.2d 778
    , 786 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted). And counsel
    strategically declined to investigate the victim’s supposed recantation given its
    stark inconsistency with the victim’s initial report and the physical evidence,
    predicting credibility issues. We find this reasonable. On the issue of prejudice,
    there is no reasonable probability Roby would have insisted on going to trial had
    counsel deposed the victim. See State v. Straw, 
    709 N.W.2d 128
    , 136 (Iowa
    5
    2006). Roby knew about the potentially exculpatory nature of the letter and still
    chose to accept the State’s plea agreement to significantly reduce his sentencing
    exposure and the potential filing of federal gun charges.
    We conclude counsel was not ineffective as alleged and affirm the denial of
    Roby’s application for postconviction relief.
    AFFIRMED.