State of Iowa v. Steven Corey Palmateer ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0516
Filed February 17, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
STEVEN COREY PALMATEER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hardin County, Andrea Miller (search
warrant), Magistrate, and Steven J. Oeth (motion to suppress), Judge.
Steven Palmateer appeals his criminal conviction, challenging the denial of
his motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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MULLINS, Judge.
Steven Palmateer appeals his drug conviction. He argues the district court
erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to a search
warrant that allegedly “fail[ed] to state the place to be searched with particularity
and fail[ed] to provide information supporting the reliability of the confidential
informant.”
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In October 2019, Officer Calen Holman of the Ackley Police Department
prepared an application for a search warrant. The application identified the places
to be searched as follows: “Addresses 519 4th avenue Ackley, IA and 704 7th
avenue Ackley, IA” and a storage unit at a specific location. In support of the
application, Holman explained he was approached by a confidential informant
within the last forty-eight hours. The informant advised Palmateer was distributing
illegal drugs; named eight of Palmateer’s accomplices; and specified where
implements of the distribution operation were stored, including “704 7th ave in
Ackley,” a storage unit, and “519 4th ave in Ackley.” The informant also advised
of Palmateer’s trafficking structure and how he typically conducts business.
Holman explained he “corroborated many pieces of the [informant’s] information
by reviewing several electronic communications between Steve Palmateer [and
his accomplices] found on [a specific accomplice’s] cell phone as a result of a
recent search warrant.” Holman detailed why the communications were indicative
of drug trafficking. In conclusion, the application “request[ed] a search warrant for
403 4th avenue Ackley, IA and 704 7th avenue Ackley, IA,” as well as the storage
unit and certain motor vehicles. Included with the application were property
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records from the county assessor’s office relative to 519 4th Avenue and 704 7th
Avenue. The search warrant ultimately signed by a magistrate authorized a search
of “Addresses 403 4th avenue Ackley, IA and 704 7th avenue Ackley, IA,” in
addition to the storage unit and vehicles.
Prior to the execution of the search warrant, Holman noticed the search
warrant bore an incorrect address, 403 4th Avenue, which was supposed to be
519 4th Avenue. Holman contacted the magistrate by phone, who advised him to
cross the incorrect address out and replace it with the correct address. The
magistrate testified at the suppression hearing she questioned Holman whether
the warrant application and materials showed that the correct address was the one
officers intended to search, Holman responded in the affirmative, and the
magistrate directed: “Okay if it’s one spot and it’s a matter of one number, go ahead
and strike it. Write on there ‘per magistrate.’”1 Holman crossed out “403” and
handwrote “519 Per Magistrate.”
Following execution of the search warrant, Palmateer was criminally
charged in relation to items found at 519 4th Avenue. Palmateer filed a motion to
suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant, in which he
argued the warrant was not supported by probable cause because it was
improperly amended to identify a different address and the allegations of a
confidential informant were not sufficiently corroborated. Following hearing, the
court denied the motion. As to the confidential informant, the court noted the
“informant provided multiple names of people involved in the drug trafficking
1 The direction and writing also specified the magistrate by name.
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operation and also provided specific locations where the drugs were being kept,”
and Holman “corroborated the informant’s information by viewing cell phone
contents” that “confirmed the drug trafficking activity.” The court concluded
amending the warrant did not render it invalid because the “application listed
incriminating information relative to 519 4th in multiple spots,” the information
provided probable cause to search that location, and the magistrate authorized
Holman to make the amendment.
Following a bench trial on the minutes of evidence, Palmateer was found
guilty of possession of more than five grams of methamphetamine with intent to
manufacture or deliver. Palmateer appealed following the imposition of sentence.
II. Standard of Review
We review a challenge to a search warrant for an alleged lack of probable
cause de novo, based on the totality of the circumstances. See State v. McNeal,
867 N.W.2d 91, 99 (Iowa 2015). “[W]e do not make an independent determination
of probable cause,” we merely decide “whether the issuing judge had a substantial
basis for concluding probable cause existed.” Id. (quoting State v. Gogg, 561
N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 1997)). “[W]e draw all reasonable inferences to support
the judge’s finding of probable cause and give great deference to the judge’s
finding”—“[c]lose cases are decided in favor of upholding the validity of the
warrant.” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 364).
III. Analysis
The United States and Iowa Constitutions protect against unreasonable
searches and direct that no warrants shall issue without probable cause. U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8; see McNeal, 867 N.W.2d at 99. The test
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to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a search warrant is as
follows:
[W]hether a person of reasonable prudence would believe a crime
was committed on the premises to be searched or evidence of a
crime could be located there. Probable cause to search requires a
probability determination that (1) the items sought are connected to
criminal activity and (2) the items sought will be found in the place to
be searched.
McNeal, 867 N.W.2d at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gogg, 561
N.W.2d at 363). We interpret warrant applications “in a common sense, rather
than a hypertechnical manner.” See id. at 100 (quoting State v. Shanahan, 712
N.W.2d 121, 132 (Iowa 2006)).
First, Palmateer argues the search-warrant application materials were
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause because “[t]he ‘place to be
searched’ as described in the warrant was not described with particularity . . . and
the alteration of the warrant exacerbates this defect.” Palmateer hones in on the
application’s conclusory request for a search warrant for 403 4th Avenue and the
pre-alteration authorization of a search at the same address in the search warrant,
as opposed to a request and authorization for a search at the location where the
illegal contraband was located, 519 4th Avenue. Iowa Code section 808.3(1)
(2019) provides a person may submit an application for a search warrant
which includes facts, information, and circumstances tending to
establish sufficient grounds for granting the application, and probable
cause for believing that the grounds exist. The application shall
proscribe the person, place, or thing to be searched and the property
to be seized with sufficient specificity to enable an independent
reasonable person with reasonable effort to ascertain and identify
the person, place, or thing.
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In support of his position, Palmateer cites United States v. Clement as the
applicable test, where the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals questioned, “whether the
place to be searched is described with sufficient particularity as to enable the
executing officer to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and
whether there is any reasonable probability that another premise[s] might
mistakenly be searched.” 747 F.2d 460, 461 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States
v. Gitcho, 601 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979)).
Clement involved a search warrant authorizing a search of apartment number four
at a specific address, but officers searched apartment number three at the same
address. Id. Because the executing officers knew the apartment to be searched
was number three, as opposed to apartment four as stated in the warrant, the court
found “no probability of a mistaken search” and concluded the inaccurate address
in the warrant did not invalidate the search. Id. While Clement is somewhat
distinguishable, the same holds true here. All of the supporting documentation
disclosed the officers intended to search 519 4th Avenue, and said documentation
provided probable cause to search that location. While the conclusory request of
the application requested authorization to search 403 4th Avenue and the ensuing
pre-altered search warrant authorized a search at that address, given Holman’s
familiarity with the investigation and the places he intended to search, we find “no
probability of a mistaken search.” See id. In fact, Holman caught the error before
execution, and the magistrate authorized Holman to alter the warrant to allow a
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search of 519 4th Avenue, as was originally intended.2 At the end of the day, the
application described the place to be searched with sufficient specificity to enable
ascertainment of the place to be searched, 519 4th Avenue, and the ultimate
warrant that was executed authorized a search of that location. See Steele v.
United States, 267 U.S. 498, 403 (1925) (“It is enough if the description is such
that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort ascertain and
identify the place intended.”). We affirm the district court’s denial of Palmateer’s
motion to suppress on this point.
Next, Palmateer argues “[t]he warrant did not contain sufficient indicia of
reliability regarding the confidential informant, nor was sufficient corroboration
provided to support the informant’s allegations.” Generally, Palmateer argues
Holman was required to disclose every conceivable detail supporting the
informant’s reliability and attach every piece of evidence supporting the same and
the information provided. “[I]f the grounds for issuance are supplied by an
informant” then “[t]he application or sworn testimony supplied in support of the
application must establish the credibility of the informant or the credibility of the
information given by the informant.” Iowa Code § 808.3(2). Here, the informant
reported a drug trafficking operation among Palmateer and eight of his
accomplices, all of whom were identified by name. The informant also provided
locations where the operation was being conducted and where contraband relative
thereto was located, including 519 4th Avenue, as well as how the group
2 Palmateer makes no claim that the amendment to the warrant was illegal or
otherwise inappropriate. We deem any such argument waived. See Iowa R. App.
P. 6.903(2)(g)(3).
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conducted business. Holman verified his training and experience in narcotics
investigation and enforcement. And Holman reviewed electronic communications
between Palmateer and several of his accomplices that were found on one of the
accomplice’s cell phones, which was obtained as a result of a recent search
warrant. Those communications were indicative of an ongoing drug trafficking ring
and matched information provided by the informant. Holman applied for a search
warrant within forty-eight hours of receiving the information. Upon our de novo
review, we find the warrant application and attachments sufficiently demonstrated
the reliability of the confidential informant and the reliability of the information
provided was sufficiently corroborated. We affirm the district court on this point as
well.
Finding no cause for reversal on the issues presented for our review, we
affirm Palmateer’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.