In the Interest of H.W., S.J., J.J., and M.J., Minor Children ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1396
Filed February 17, 2021
IN THE INTEREST OF H.W., S.J., J.J., and M.J.,
Minor Children,
D.W., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Romonda Belcher,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the child-in-need-of-assistance adjudication of her
children. AFFIRMED.
Bryan J. Tingle, Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Paul White of Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney and guardian
ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and May and Schumacher, JJ.
2
MAY, Judge.
A mother appeals the adjudication of her children as children in need of
assistance (CINA).1 All four children—H.W., S.J., J.J., and M.J.—were
adjudicated CINA pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) and (n) (2020).
Two of the children—H.W. and S.J.—were additionally adjudicated CINA pursuant
to section 232.2(6)(d). The mother appeals adjudication under paragraphs (d) and
(n). We affirm.
I. Background Facts
The mother and her children came to the attention of the Iowa Department
of Human Services (DHS) in May 2019 because of a domestic-violence incident.
M.J.’s father, Michael,2 handcuffed and beat the mother while the children were
present. Michael was convicted of domestic abuse assault and child
endangerment. Afterwards, the mother and all four children went to live with the
children’s maternal grandmother.
The mother told DHS that her prior relationships also involved incidents of
domestic violence, including her relationships with H.W.’s father and with David,
S.J. and J.J.’s father. The mother also told DHS that she was depressed and has
been told she may have bipolar disorder.
In July, the mother moved into a two-bedroom apartment with seven other
people: the four children, Michael, David, and an unrelated adult named Frank.
1 Only the mother appeals the CINA adjudication. She appeals following the entry
of a dispositional order. See In re Long, 313 N.W.2d 473, 475 (Iowa 1981) (holding
an order for adjudication is not final for appeal purposes until disposition).
2 During the CINA investigation, it was revealed that M.J.’s father is not her
biological father. But he is listed on her birth certificate. So we still refer to him as
M.J.’s father.
3
The record suggests Frank may have a mild intellectual disability. David and the
mother told DHS that David was Frank’s caretaker.
In October, DHS received information that the mother was exhibiting
symptoms of substance abuse. In November, the mother tested positive for
methamphetamine. She completed a substance-abuse evaluation. There was no
recommendation for treatment. But concerns about the mother’s
methamphetamine use continued.
In April 2020, DHS received a report that S.J. was sexually assaulted by
Frank. The alleged sexual assault occurred around 6:00 p.m. Law enforcement
was not involved until Frank called the police around 5:00 a.m. the next morning.
He called alleging “he was being kicked out of his apartment due to people
accusing him of sexually assaulting their daughter.” DHS asked David and the
mother why they did not call the police themselves. They said they did not want
Frank to get in trouble.
S.J. underwent a forensic interview. She stated that Frank repeatedly
sexually abused her, her mother was aware of the abuse, and her mother had
previously witnessed the abuse on several occasions. Before the interview could
be completed, David left with S.J. The interview was never completed, and its
transcript is not a part of our record. But the DHS worker present at the interview
testified about its contents.
The children were all removed to the maternal grandmother’s care, where
they continue to reside. A no-contact order was issued between the mother and
children. The mother and David were both arrested and charged with sexual
abuse and neglect in connection with Frank’s sexual abuse of S.J.
4
In July, the children were adjudicated CINA. In August, the children were
confirmed CINA.
In September, the mother filed a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.904(2). She asked the court to clarify what paragraphs of
section 232.2(6) apply to each child. The court granted the motion. The court
clarified that all four children were adjudicated CINA pursuant to
section 232.2(6)(c)(2) and (n). In addition, H.W. and S.J. were adjudicated CINA
pursuant to section 232.2(6)(d).
The mother now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
CINA proceedings are reviewed de novo. In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 40
(Iowa 2014). “[W]e are not bound by the juvenile court’s fact findings; however,
we do give them weight. Our primary concern is the children’s best interests.” Id.(citation omitted). “In determining the best interests of the child[ren], ‘we look to
the parent[’s] past performance because it may indicate the quality of care the
parent is capable of providing in the future.’” In re L.H., 904 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Iowa
2017) (second alteration in original) (quoting In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa
2006)). “CINA determinations must be based upon clear and convincing
evidence.” J.S., 846 N.W.2d at 41. We ask whether there are “serious or
substantial doubts as to the correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn from the
evidence.” L.H., 904 N.W.2d at 149 (alteration in original) (quoting In re D.W., 791
N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010)).
5
III. Analysis
CINA proceedings are governed by chapter 232. We find the meaning of
chapter 232 in its words. In re C.S., No. 19-1444, 2020 WL 1550675, at *1 (Iowa
Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2020); see Doe v. State, 943 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Iowa 2020) (noting
“in questions of statutory interpretation, ‘[w]e do not inquire what the legislature
meant; we ask only what the statute means’” and “[t]his is necessarily a textual
inquiry as only the text of a piece of legislation is enacted into law” (first alteration
in original) (citation omitted)).
In section 232.2, the legislature defined the term “child in need of
assistance” or CINA. For a child to be adjudicated CINA, the child must be affected
by one or more of the situations described in paragraphs 232.2(6)(a) through (q).3
Here, the mother appeals her children’s CINA adjudications under paragraphs (d)
and (n).
We begin by addressing the mother’s claim that H.W. and S.J. should not
have been adjudicated CINA under paragraph (d). It applies to a child “[w]ho has
been, or is imminently likely to be, sexually abused by the child’s parent, guardian,
custodian, or other member of the household in which the child resides.” Iowa
Code § 232.2(6)(d) (emphasis added). Here, the sexual abuser was Frank. The
mother claims that because Frank is not related to herself, S.J., or David, Frank
cannot be a “member of the household” for purposes of paragraph (d). In support,
the mother cites section 236.2(4). It provides, in relevant part: “For purposes of
this chapter, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context: . . . .
3 The child must also be “unmarried.” Iowa Code § 232.2. It appears undisputed
that all children involved are unmarried.
6
‘Family or household members’ means spouses, persons cohabiting, parents, or
other persons related by consanguinity or affinity.” Iowa Code § 236.2(4)(a)
(emphasis added).
By its own terms, though, section 236.2 only applies to chapter 236 (“this
chapter”), which governs domestic abuse cases. Id. We cannot rewrite
section 236.2(4) so it will also apply in CINA cases, which are governed by
chapter 232. See Fishel v. Redenbaugh, 939 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa Ct. App.
2019). So we cannot rely on section 236.2(4) to decide whether Frank was a
“member of the household.”
Instead, we must focus on chapter 232. The parties do not cite, and we
have not found, any definition within chapter 232 for the term “member of the
household in which the child resides.”4 When the legislature does not define words
4 While it seems unlikely that the question before us has not arisen in a prior case,
the parties do not cite—and we did not find—any opinions that directly address the
issue before us.
We have not overlooked the supreme court’s discussion of the term
“member of the household in which the child resides” in In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495(Iowa 2014). There, the question before the court was whether an established
father was a “parent” for purposes of chapter 232. J.C., 857 N.W.2d at 497. As
part of its analysis, the court noted that, in addition to precisely-defined categories
such as “parent,” chapter 232 also refers to more “capacious or undefined”
categories—including the category of “other member[s] of the household in which
the child resides.” Id. at 503–04 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2)). The
court explained:
[I]n various provisions in chapter 232, the legislature coupled
carefully defined, discrete terms, such as parent, guardian, or
custodian, with a capacious or undefined term to reach individuals
whose relationship to a child is less precisely delineated. In this
case, for example, one of the provisions under which the juvenile
court adjudicated J.C. was Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2). This
provision defines a child in need of assistance as a child
[w]ho has suffered or is imminently likely to suffer
harmful effects as a result of . . . [t]he failure of the
child’s parent, guardian, custodian, or other member of
7
in a statute, we generally give those words “their common, ordinary meaning in the
context within which they are used.” J.C., 857 N.W.2d at 500.
In ordinary usage, the word household “can have two meanings.” In re
Smith, 396 B.R. 214, 216 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008). “First, it may mean simply all
of the persons who use a particular structure as their dwelling space.” Id.; accord
id. n.7 (“[A] social unit comprised of those living together in the same dwelling
place.” (alteration in original) (quoting Household, Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary (unabr. ed. 1986))); Household, Merriam-Webster.com,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/household (last visited Feb. 15,
2021) (listing “a social unit composed of those living together in the same dwelling”
the household in which the child resides to exercise a
reasonable degree of care in supervising the child.
Iowa Code § 232.2(6)(c)(2) (emphasis added). This provision
enables a CINA adjudication if a member of the child’s household
other than one of the three specifically defined parties fails to
exercise reasonable care in supervising the child. This provision has
clear potential to encompass a wide range of individuals who could
come into contact with the child. Other provisions aimed at different
conduct are phrased similarly. See, e.g., id. § 232.2(6)(b) (defining
a child in need of assistance as one who has been or is imminently
likely to be abused or neglected by a “member of the household in
which the child resides”). In these provisions, the legislature coupled
the three defined terms with an undefined term meant to broaden the
provision’s scope to reach others. To connect the terms the
legislature used the disjunctive conjunction “or.”
....
As this review of these code provisions demonstrates, the
legislature crafted a narrow and specific definition of “parent” under
chapter 232. But where it deemed necessary, it coupled the term
with more encompassing language meant to embrace other
individuals whose acts or omissions could threaten the child’s
welfare and best interests. The use of the disjunctive conjunction
“or” to connect the terms implies the legislature intended “parent,” as
well as “guardian” and “custodian,” to mean something different than
the more encompassing terms.
Id.
8
as a definition of “household”); Household, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)
(listing “[a] group of people who dwell under the same roof” as a definition of
“household”). This “‘heads on beds’ approach . . . includes all the persons who
occupy a housing unit,” whether related or not. In re Morrison, 443 B.R. 378, 384
(Bankr. M.D. N.C. 2011) (citation omitted). However, as the mother points out,
household can also be understood to “involve a familial relationship.” Smith, 396
B.R. at 216. “That is, a household may mean only those persons who live together
and who are also related by blood or marriage.” Id. (emphasis added); accord id.
n.8 (“[T]hose who dwell under the same roof and compose a family.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Household, Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary (unabr. ed. 1986))); Household, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.m
erriam-webster.com/dictionary/household (last visited Feb. 15, 2021) (listing
“those who dwell under the same roof and compose a family” as a definition of
“household”); see also Household, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (listing
“[a] family living together” as a definition of “household”).
Importantly, though, our job is not to consider the word “household” in
isolation. See Doe, 943 N.W.2d at 610. Rather, we must consider it in the context
of chapter 232, which we read “as a whole.” Id.; see also Deal v. United States,
508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (noting it is a “fundamental principle of statutory
construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be
determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used”);
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
167 (2012) (“Context is a primary determinant of meaning.”).
9
Review of chapter 232 “as a whole” reveals that the legislature included
specific directions for the chapter’s interpretation. Section 232.1 states, in relevant
part: “This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that each child under the
jurisdiction of the court shall receive, preferably in the child’s own home, the care,
guidance and control that will best serve the child’s welfare and the best interest
of the state.” We must “honor the legislature’s directive” in section 232.1 “to
construe chapter 232 liberally to ‘best serve the child’s welfare.’” In re A.M., 856
N.W.2d 365, 373 (Iowa 2014).
With this in mind, we return to the text of section 232.2(6)(d). As explained,
when (as here) a child “has been, or is imminently likely to be, sexually abused by”
someone who is not “the child’s parent, guardian, [or] custodian,” paragraph (d)
can apply only if the abuser is a “member of the household in which the child
resides.” So, the scope of the statute’s protection depends on the meaning of the
term “household.” If we adopt the mother’s narrow definition of “household,”
paragraph (d) could only apply if the child’s abuser not only lives with the child but
also is part of a family with “which the child resides.” Conversely, if we adopt the
State’s proposed definition of “household,” paragraph (d) could apply whenever a
child is abused by someone who lives with the child, regardless of familial
relationships. Clearly, the State’s broader, “heads on beds” interpretation of
“household” provides greater protection for children. See Morrison, 443 B.R. at
384. So we must adopt it. See Iowa Code § 232.1; A.M., 856 N.W.2d at 373; see
also United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. Iowa Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd.,
928 N.W.2d 101, 110 (Iowa 2019) (“When the legislature issues this kind of
directive on statutory interpretation, it binds us.”).
10
The only question, then, is whether Frank resided with S.J. Following our
de novo review, we conclude he did. After the alleged abuse occurred, Frank told
the police that he “was being kicked out of his apartment.” (Emphasis added.)
When DHS inspected the two-bedroom apartment where the children resided,
Frank was there. It was then that the mother and David told DHS that David was
Frank’s “caretaker” and they all lived in the same apartment. After the children
were removed, the mother and David confirmed with DHS that Frank had been
living with them for eighteen months. So we think it is clear Frank resided in the
same home as S.J. See J.S., 846 N.W.2d at 42. And since the mother does not
raise any other arguments under paragraph (d), we affirm H.W. and S.J. as CINA
under section 232.2(6)(d).
Next, the mother appeals the CINA adjudication for all four children under
section 232.2(6)(n). It applies to a child “[w]hose parent’s or guardian’s mental
capacity or condition, imprisonment, or drug or alcohol abuse results in the child
not receiving adequate care.” Iowa Code § 232.2(6)(n). The mother argues
paragraph (n) cannot apply here because the record does not “contain evidence
to support the allegation that the children were not receiving adequate care in
general.”
The parties do not cite, and we have not found, authorities that provide a
specific definition for the phrase “adequate care.” So we again rely on the principle
that words in a statute should be given “their common, ordinary meaning in the
context within which they are used.” J.C., 857 N.W.2d at 500; cf. Nix v. Hedden,
149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893) (noting that, although “[b]otanically speaking, tomatoes
are the fruit of a vine,” they are “vegetables” in “the common language of the
11
people”). And we bear in mind section 232.1, which requires us to “construe
chapter 232 liberally to ‘best serve the child’s welfare.’” A.M., 856 N.W.2d at 373.
Applying these principles here, we disagree with the mother’s suggestion
that “adequate care” for a child is limited to “a place to live,” “adequate food,” and
“clothing.” Rather, in the common understanding of Iowans, “adequate care” for a
child means meeting the child’s essential needs. One of those essential needs is
a safe home. See In re M.F., No. 14-1016, 2014 WL 4930650, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Oct. 1, 2014) (affirming the juvenile court’s modification of a permanency order
where the court found the mother was impaired from providing “a safe, stable
home”); In re J.F., No. 06-1277, 2006 WL 2873400, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 11,
2006) (affirming a CINA adjudication where “[t]he court concluded numerous
health and safety concerns were present in the home”).
The mother was unable to provide a safe home for S.J. Two DHS workers
testified to the danger the children would face if they returned to the mother’s care.
One testified that she believed “the children would be in imminent danger if they
returned.” The other testified she believed an “imminent risk exists for these
children if they were to remain in the custody of any of their parents.” After
considering this testimony and the evidence as a whole, the district court
concluded it “would be contrary to the children’s welfare” for them to return to the
parental home “because of [the] parents unresolved mental health and substance
abuse issues, domestic violence and lack of protective capacity exposing [the]
children to substance abuse, domestic violence and sexual abuse.” We agree and
conclude the children were not receiving “adequate care.” See Iowa Code
§ 232.2(6)(n); J.S., 846 N.W.2d at 42.
12
IV. Conclusion
Upon our de novo review, we find the juvenile court was correct in
adjudicating H.W. and S.J. CINA pursuant to section 232.2(6)(d) and all four
children CINA pursuant to section 232.2(6)(n).
AFFIRMED.