In Re the Marriage of Darin L. Crooks and Jenisha Rae Garden Upon the Petition of Darin L. Crooks, and Concerning Jenisha Rae Garden ( 2015 )


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  •                        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 14-0685
    Filed May 6, 2015
    IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF DARIN L. CROOKS
    AND JENISHA RAE GARDEN
    Upon the Petition of
    DARIN L. CROOKS,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    And Concerning
    JENISHA RAE GARDEN,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, James M. Drew,
    Judge.
    A father appeals a district court order denying his petition to modify
    physical care and visitation of his children. AFFIRMED.
    Judith O'Donohoe of Elwood, O'Donohoe, Braun, White, L.L.P., Charles
    City, for appellant.
    Kristy B. Arzberger of Arzberger Law Office, Mason City, for appellee.
    Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
    2
    VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
    A father appeals a district court order denying his application to modify the
    physical care and visitation provisions of a prior stipulated modification decree.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings
    Darin Crooks and Jenisha Garden divorced after seven years of marriage.
    A stipulated dissolution decree entered in 2006 provided for joint physical care of
    their children, born in 2001 and 2004.
    In 2008, Crooks applied to modify the joint physical care provision of the
    decree. The parents signed a second stipulation allowing Garden to assume
    physical care of the children, subject to liberal visitation with Crooks. The district
    court approved the stipulation.
    Four years later, Crooks again sought a modification of the decree to
    provide for reinstatement of the joint physical care arrangement. Following a
    hearing, the district court denied the application as well as a post-trial motion filed
    by Crooks. Crooks appealed.
    II. Modification of Physical Care
    Crooks contends the district court applied “too heavy a burden” on him. In
    his view, he “was not asking to shift physical care away from [Garden] but merely
    to reinstate it from the original divorce decree.” His assertion contravenes our
    modification standards, which require the applicant to establish “a substantial
    change in the circumstances of the parties since the entry of the decree or of any
    subsequent intervening proceeding that considered the situation of the parties
    upon application for the same relief.” In re Marriage of Maher, 
    596 N.W.2d 561
    ,
    564-65 (Iowa 1999) (emphasis added). Under this standard, Crooks’s burden
    3
    began with the 2008 order approving the stipulated modification rather than the
    provisions of the original dissolution decree.          He was required to show a
    substantial change of circumstances after Garden received physical care of the
    children. He also was required to prove “an ability to minister more effectively to
    the children’s well-being.” See In re Marriage of Rierson, 
    537 N.W.2d 806
    , 807
    (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
    In concluding Crooks failed to satisfy this burden, the district court
    reasoned as follows:
    [Crooks] is a motivated father who wants to be with his
    children as much as possible. For that he should be commended.
    However, in his zeal to obtain equal parenting time he seems to
    have overlooked the obvious: the children are excelling under the
    current arrangement. The court cannot recall a case in which more
    positive evidence was presented regarding the children at issue.[1]
    Unlike the typical modification case, it is unlikely that there is room
    for improvement with these children. Although [Crooks] desires to
    have more time with the children there is no evidence to suggest
    that a change is needed for the children’s sake.
    Even if the children were not doing so well the court would
    be unwilling to order joint physical care in this case. . . . It must be
    understood that joint physical care is more than dividing the days
    on the calendar. It requires a mother and father to work together
    and to be “on the same page” when it comes to parenting. Given
    the lack of respect, lack of communication, and vitriol that exists
    between the parents, the court could not give serious consideration
    to a request for joint physical care even if a change were
    warranted.
    Crooks complains this “decision, given the amount of evidence, is brief.”
    As is ours. On our de novo review, we are convinced both parents have lost
    sight of the forest for the trees. The parents stipulated Garden would exercise
    physical care of the children subject to liberal visitation with Crooks. As the
    1
    The district court in a footnote stated, “Rather than litigating, Darin and Jenisha should
    be celebrating the fact that their children are doing so well. These children are
    exceptional. Most divorced parents aren’t so fortunate.”
    4
    district court explained, the children flourished under the arrangement. Certainly,
    the children deserve credit for making the best of their time with each parent,
    notwithstanding the parents’ animosity towards each other.         But Garden also
    afforded them stability and structure during a period when Crooks was
    experiencing employment upheavals. While Crooks had regained employment
    by the time of the modification hearing, he failed to establish he could improve
    upon the home environment Garden provided.
    In reaching this conclusion, we have considered Crooks’s assertion that
    most of the vitriol the district court observed came from Garden and her
    witnesses. To the contrary, he too harbored resentments over what he concedes
    were “fairly trivial issues.” His unwillingness to set aside these grievances for the
    good of the children cut against his claim of superior caretaking ability.
    Finally, we have considered the older child’s stated preference to spend
    equal time with each parent. A child’s preference is afforded less weight in a
    modification proceeding than in an original action. In re Marriage of Behn, 
    416 N.W.2d 100
    , 102 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987). On our de novo review, we believe this
    mature and sensitive teenager would have settled for mutual respect among the
    adults in both families and consideration of her views on activities of daily living.
    Her otherwise     loving and     well-meaning parents       are fully capable of
    accomplishing this goal under the existing custodial arrangement.
    III. Modification of Visitation
    Crooks alternatively seeks modification of the visitation schedule.       We
    recognize the burden for modifying visitation provisions is lighter than for
    modification of custody. In re Marriage of Salmon, 
    519 N.W.2d 94
    , 95-96 (Iowa
    5
    Ct. App. 1994) (stating a parent seeking to modify visitation must only establish
    “that there has been a material change in circumstances since the decree and
    that the requested change in visitation is in the best interests of the children”).
    However, as the district court noted, “[T]here is nothing to indicate that the
    children . . . are suffering any ill effects from the existing schedule. In fact, one
    must assume the opposite is true based on the children’s development.” We
    conclude the district court’s refusal to modify visitation was equitable.
    IV. Attorney Fees
    Crooks contends the district court should not have ordered him to pay
    $4000 towards Garden’s trial attorney fees. The award was discretionary. In re
    Marriage of Sullins, 
    715 N.W.2d 242
    , 256 (Iowa 2006). We discern no abuse of
    discretion.
    Garden requests appellate attorney fees.               Again, an award is
    discretionary.   In re Marriage of Okland, 
    699 N.W.2d 260
    , 270 (Iowa 2005).
    Because Garden prevailed, we order Crooks to pay $1000 towards her appellate
    attorney fee obligation, in addition to the costs of the action.
    AFFIRMED.