In Re the Marriage of Amy J. Dodsworth and Michael R. Dodsworth Upon the Petition of Amy J. Dodsworth, and Concerning Michael R. Dodsworth ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1775
Filed December 24, 2014
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF AMY J. DODSWORTH
AND MICHAEL R. DODSWORTH
Upon the Petition of
AMY J. DODSWORTH,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
MICHAEL R. DODSWORTH,
Respondent-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Monica L.
Ackley, Judge.
Michael Dodsworth appeals the district court decision dismissing his
allegations Amy Dodsworth was in contempt of the provisions of the parties’
dissolution decree. AFFIRMED.
Dennis R. Mathahs of Mathahs Law Office, Marengo, for appellant.
Susan M. Hess of Hammer, Simon & Jensen, P.C., East Dubuque, Illinois,
for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, J.
Michael and Amy Dodsworth divorced in 2011. They stipulated Amy
would pay the first $250 of uncovered medical expenses and fifty percent
thereafter. They also agreed to split physical care of their two children, subject to
every-other-weekend visitation in one of the two homes. The dissolution decree
incorporated their stipulation.
In time, Michael filed an application for rule to show cause why Amy
should not be held in contempt of the decree’s provisions. He asserted Amy
failed to (1) pay $368.51 in uncovered medical expenses and (2) facilitate
visitation. Following a hearing, the district court dismissed the application.
On appeal, Michael takes issue with the following fact findings made by
the district court: (1) Amy had physical care of both children, and (2) he made the
visitation exchange driving distances longer for Amy. He asserts the findings are
“erroneous” and the court “may have ruled differently” had the court made the
correct findings.
Iowa Code section 598.23 (2013), governing contempt in dissolution
matters, permits but does not require a court to hold a person in contempt for
violation of a dissolution decree. Iowa Code § 598.23(1) (“If a person against
whom a temporary order or final decree has been entered willfully disobeys the
order or decree, the person may be cited and punished by the court for contempt
and be committed to the county jail for a period of time not to exceed thirty days
for each offense.”); In re Marriage of Swan, 526 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Iowa 1995)
(noting the statute “allows the trial court some discretion” and “a trial court is not
required to hold a party in contempt even though the elements of contempt may
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exist”). In deciding whether to hold a person in contempt, the court “may
consider all the circumstances, not just whether a willful violation of a court order
has been shown.” Id. The court’s discretion is broad and our review of the
dismissal of a contempt application is for gross abuse of discretion. Id. We
discern no abuse of discretion in the denial of this contempt application, gross or
otherwise.
Everyone agrees the first challenged fact finding is incorrect; Amy did not
have physical care of both children. But the court’s mistaken finding had no
bearing on the issues raised in Michael’s application for rule to show cause. Amy
had an obligation to pay a portion of the uncovered medical expenses and to
facilitate visitation whether she exercised physical care over one or both children.
Resolution of these issues turned on other circumstances disclosed in the record.
Specifically, the district court found Amy lacked “the financial wherewithal to pay
the additional uncovered medical expenses” and the “financial wherewithal to
continue to drive the longer distances for the exchange of the children.”
These pertinent findings are supported by Amy’s testimony. She
conceded she was behind in payments to medical providers but testified she did
not have the ability to make those payments because she had to quit her part-
time job after being diagnosed with a serious medical condition. She further
testified the $275 per month in child support she received from Michael did not
allow her to make ends meet.
As for visitation, Amy stated Michael unilaterally moved the visitation
exchange location from a site they had been using for two years to a site “twelve
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to fourteen minutes” further away. She spent about fifty dollars a week for gas,
money she could ill afford without a job.
This brings us to Michael’s second challenged fact finding concerning the
driving distance for visitation exchanges. Michael contends he did not make
Amy’s driving distance longer, as the district court found, because “[t]here was no
evidence presented that [he] has moved since the dissolution.” This assertion is
a red herring. As noted, Michael made Amy’s driving distance longer not by
moving but by unilaterally deciding to change the visitation exchange location.
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Michael’s application for rule to
show cause.
AFFIRMED.